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There is a poignant moment, at the close of "His Final Bow," when 
Sherlock Holmes turns to Watson and says, "there is an east wind blowing... 
and a good many of us may wither before its blast." He was referring to 
the German threat, of course; but his comment was prescient, in that "the 
east" has bedeviled the 20th century. In addition to Germany, Japan, the 
old Soviet Union, and China have each posed significant security concerns. 
But, just as the "eastern threat" seems finally to have been taken well in 
hand, a new set of problems has emerged, emanating from rogue states, 
criminals and terrorists. They are capitalizing on a modern trend that 
witnesses the increasing destructive power of small groups, epitomized by 
new concerns about their acquisition of chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons. And in addition to capabilities for mass destruction, the great 
dependence of most modern societies on advanced information technologies 
has also posed the prospect of vulnerability to mass disruption, 
principally from "cyberterror."  
 
No less an authority on terrorism than Walter Laqueur has taken the 
position that attacks upon information, and information systems, can be as 
serious as attacks with some weapons of mass destruction.  This view is 
implicitly accepted by the new Russian defense ministry, which reserves the 
right to respond to attacks on its infosphere "by any means."  
 
This notion of the seriousness of the threat is echoed by American 
defense intellectuals and policymakers. From the recent reports of the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the National 
Research Council, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies at 
Georgetown University, one can see clearly the emerging sense of alarm at 
the onset of a new peril before whose onslaught many of us may "wither," as 
Sherlock Holmes would say. 
All these assessments follow the same analytic approach, and share 
the same flaw. They catalog the dependency that comes with 
interconnectivity, and take as given the easy availability of the means of 
cyberattack. But all neglect the "demand side" of the problem. They don't 
examine why rogues and terrorists would want to cultivate capabilities for 
engaging in cyberterror.  
 
This white paper begins the process of articulating the demand-side 
of cyberterror. In so doing, we provide some guidance for setting 
intelligence-gathering strategy. For, armed with useful hypotheses about 
the conditions under which terrorists might seek to acquire or develop 
their capabilities for mass disruption, the intelligence community may be 
able to provide at least some degree of early warning of this emerging 
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threat. And, based on the analysis that forms another part of our study, 
cyberterror is at best only an emerging threat, one far less dire than is 
suggested by others' assessments of this phenomenon. 
Our view is not that cyberterror will fail to emerge as a serious 
threat. Rather, we see that the barriers to entry, for any capability 
beyond annoying hacks, are quite high; and that terrorists generally have 
neither the wherewithal nor the human capital needed to mount cyberterror 
operations on a meaningful level. Thus, because of the difficult technical 
path that must still be followed, cyberterror is not a threat. At least 
not yet, and not for a while.  
 
Given this "breathing space," a period in which awareness of the 
potential vulnerability to cyberterror is keen, but the means of attack are 
not as yet properly honed, how should the defense intelligence community 
proceed? A two-track approach seems appropriate, forming a principal 
recommendation of this white paper. By this, we mean gathering 
intelligence on both the technical and the organizational developments 
taking place in terrorist groups.  
 
A good indicator of a terrorist group's potential for cyberattack 
is likely to be the degree to which it is itself "informatized" (i.e., how 
much it uses the Net for communications, management, and intelligence 
gathering of its own). But as important are the group's own organizational 
dynamics. Is it a young or old group? Is it healthy or in decline? 
State-sponsored or not? Habituated to innovation or staid?  
 
These are the sorts of broad organizational questions the answers 
to which will reveal much about the proclivity of any particular group to 
"go cyber." For, as the technical impediments to engaging in serious 
cyberterror decline in the coming years, the notion of understanding a 
group's "turn of mind" will become increasingly, and crucially, important. 
 
Cyberterror is indeed coming. The anonymity afforded by means of 
attacking via the Net, the increasing economic damage that can be done by 
disruption, and the growing dependence of advanced militaries on 
interconnectivity all suggest that the infosphere is a fertile vineyard in 
which the terrorist may one day toil with good prospects for substantial 
rewards. This is all the more reason to think clearly about the technical 
requirements that must be met and the organizational incentives operative 
in groups that wish to take a path to cyberterror.  
 
We believe that we have done some flinty-eyed analysis along these 
lines, and that we have contributed in two ways. First, we have exposed 
some of the hyperbole that accompanies the current literature on 
cyberterror. More importantly, though, in our view, we have provided a 
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conceptual framework for an intelligence-gathering strategy that will allow 
for more accurate assessments of what will certainly be a growing threat in 
the future.  
 








Much has been made of the threat of cyberterrorism since the report of the 
Marsh Commission in 1997. However, current analyses have merely identified 
the plethora of vulnerabilities in automated information systems (computers) 
and assumed that terrorist organizations would be willing to exploit these 
vulnerabilities. They adopt a rudimentary strategic analysis and conclude that 
cyberterrorism is inevitable because it provides terrorists with a potentially 
strategic advantage over the United States.  
We do not dispute the fact that our vulnerabilities are real and numerous. 
Further, we do not dispute that the consequences of exploitation are 
potentially severe, even strategically debilitating, if events unfolded in a 
manner described in some scenarios. However, based on our research, we 
also do not believe that terrorist organizations will soon possess the 
capabilities described in many of these scenarios.  
According to many analyses, the necessary tools for exploiting vulnerabilities 
in the infrastructure are immediately available, easy to use, and proliferating at 
an alarming rate. Yet, the United States has not experienced any strategic 
attacks on critical infrastructure by terrorist organizations (or any other 
organization, for that matter). Even during the conflict in Kosovo, the most 
serious "attacks" consisted of vandalizing web pages and denial of service 
attacks on e-mail servers. Annoying, yes, but hardly a strategic threat to the 
United States or NATO. This suggests that these tools are still insufficient for 
the purpose of mass disruption, and that there are requirements for effective 
use that go beyond the mere possession of these tools and a desire to inflict 
damage.  
Therefore, a key question we have asked is "Why haven't terrorist 
organizations taken advantage of this opportunity?" We believe that the costs 
of creating a capability sufficient to achieve terrorists’ ultimate goals are much 
higher than the conventional wisdom indicates.  Likewise, simply offsetting 
development costs is but one of several challenges that must be taken into 
account.  Terrorist organizations will likely measure the benefits of pursuing 
cyberterrorism from the perspective of both internal and external incentives.  
Besides development costs, internal incentives must also include the 
individual and group psychological processes that heavily affect terrorist 
organizations.  In terms of external interests, the costs of pursuing cyberterror 
may never be attractive as long as traditional terrorist methods remain viable.   
We examined the issue of cyberterrorism from the perspective of an 
organization seeking to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its activities. 
Our assessment explores the costs, risks and benefits of adopting cyberterror, 
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either as a stand-alone operation or as an adjunct to traditional terrorist 
operations. We believe that this analysis fills a gap in the current literature on 
cyberterrorism.  While the assessment is by no means comprehensive, it 
offers the intelligence community a much-needed starting point for better 




He who defends everything defends nothing 
- Frederick the Great, 1749 
 
There is every reason to believe that given the current world situation, 
terrorism in one form or another will continue to flourish. Most groups will 
continue to use traditional terrorist methods. These methods have been 
proven to provide the impact necessary to carry the terrorist message. For 
those groups that wish to expand their operational repertoire chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear weapons offer a dramatic option. The other 
option is cyberterror. The widespread vulnerabilities that many studies have 
previously identified make Cyberterrorism an attractive option.  
To guide our thinking about cyberterror, we began by adopting the 
Department of Defense definition of terrorism. Based on that definition and the 
necessity that cyberterrorism must qualify as a subset of terrorism, we 
produced the following definition: 
Cyberterrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence against digital 
property to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals 
that are political, religious or ideological.  
We further recognized that cyberterror may come in many forms; and defined 
three levels of cyberterror capability: 
Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct basic hacks against individual 
systems using tools created by someone else. The organization possesses 
little target analysis, command and control or learning capability.  
Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks 
against multiple systems or networks and possibly, to modify or create basic 
hacking tools. The organization possesses an elementary target analysis, 
command and control and learning capability. 
Complex-Coordinated: The capability for coordinated attacks capable of 
causing mass-disruption against integrated, heterogeneous defenses 
(including cryptography). Ability to create sophisticated hacking tools. Highly 




At the simple, low end, a terrorist group may use openly available tools to 
interfere with the computers of government response forces. At the complex, 
high-end, terrorists may seek to disrupt basic services in a large geographic 
area.  
To determine “demand” for a cyberterror capability, we analyzed the goals, 
ideology and psychology of the types of terrorist groups, and the perceived 
utility of the three capability levels. 
Of the five terrorist group types (religious, New Age, ethno-nationalist 
separatist, revolutionary, and far-right extremist), only the religious groups are 
likely to seek the most damaging capability level; as it is consistent with the 
indiscriminate application of violence that has distinguished much of their 
activity.  The most immediate threat is found in the New Age or single-issue 
terrorist community (e.g. Animal Liberation Front). These groups are the most 
likely to accept disruption as a substitute for destruction. Both these groups 
and their primary targets are located in locales rich in information technology 
targets. These groups have, by far, the best match between desire, ideology 
and environment to support a near term advanced-structured attack threat. 
Among the remaining ideological types, both the revolutionary and ethno-
nationalist separatist (ENS) groups are likely to want an advanced-structured 
capability. For the revolutionary group, the advanced-structured level offers 
the necessary degree of control over side-effects. For the ENS group, this 
level provides sufficient impact to serve as an adjunct to its traditional terrorist 
acts.  
In contrast, far-right extremists are not likely to seek anything more than a 
simple-unstructured capability. Cyberterror offers neither the intimacy nor the 
cathartic effects that are central to the psychology of far-right terror. The far-
right groups have also made the greatest use of computer networks in support 
of their operations. Any widespread disruption is thus likely to affect their 
constituency as much as it does their enemies. 
Turning our attention to those that likely already possess the technical 
wherewithal for sophisticated strikes, we see that hacker groups are 
psychologically and organizationally ill suited to mount such offensives. They 
tend to feature loose affiliations without the centralized direction necessary for 
sophisticated attacks on infrastructure targets. Perhaps more importantly, it is 
against their own self-interest to cause mass disruption to the information 
infrastructure.  They have more reason to want The Net up than to take it 
down. 
Any organization that commits to adopting more than simple-unstructured 
cyberterror faces a long, hard road. Today's information technology 
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professionals are in high demand and are well compensated. This reflects the 
difficulty of mastering information technology.  The technical skills associated 
with the advanced-structured level include mastery of at least one operating 
system and one network protocol, as well as programming for both stand-
alone and networked computers. At the complex level we add knowledge of 
industrial and control network protocols to the obvious expansion of the topics 
in the previous level.  Closely tied to technical skill is an analytic ability. The 
cyberterror organization must be able to perform a detailed target analysis.  
Finally, the group must be able to plan and orchestrate the event to within 
very narrow tolerances. 
Given these demands, a group starting from scratch can expect to reach the 
advanced structured level in no sooner than a year. More likely, it will take 
between two to four years. Groups seeking a complex-coordinated capability 
can anticipate expending at least an additional year. Realistically, though, the 
group should plan for six to ten years of effort from the time they first begin. 
The minimum figures only account for the academic, technical requirements. 
The predicted figures include time to develop experience in all three facets of 
the cyberterror capability.   For groups that cannot wait this long, outsourcing 
or sponsorship may prove an attractive alternative.  
Whether a group will pursue an internal or external sourcing method is tied 
closely to its organizational condition. Emerging groups, whose members may 
have already invested the necessary time and effort for the technical skills, are 
most likely to pursue a cyberterror capability internally. In contrast, declining 
organizations face a time imperative that demands external sourcing, 
probably through a sponsor. Splinter groups will also seek external support, 
though they may choose to find that support on the "open market." Stable 
groups have all options available to them. Their choice will be driven by 
circumstances peculiar to the individual group. 
All of these factors combined indicate that pure cyberterrorism is a thing of the 
future. For the present, terrorists are much more likely to pursue cyberterror 
as an ancillary tool. However, as time and resources permit, groups of certain 
ideological types at particular growth stages will attempt to build on already 
existing cyberterror capabilities, constituting a "gradualist approach” to 
increasing their effectiveness. 
Before this happens, the defense intelligence community should apply this 
framework to help identify the likely candidates for advanced cyberterror 




Our foes have extended the fields of battle – from physical space to 
cyberspace. 
- President Clinton, 22 May 1998 
 
If the new terrorism directs its energies toward information warfare, its 
destructive power will be exponentially greater than any it wielded in the past- 
greater even than it would be with biological and chemical weapons. 
- Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism” 
A. Background 
As the world changes at an unprecedented pace, the likely nature of future 
conflict seems less clear. Although still relatively young, the Internet, which 
already claims 120 million users, continues to grow explosively. By 2005, an 
estimated 1 billion people, about one in every six humans, will be connected 
to the Internet. Americans, who today account for over 50% of all users, 
continue to see their banking activities, commerce, entertainment, and 
education migrate to the net. However, along with this increasing 
interconnectivity, America’s critical infrastructures have been developing an 
information network dependency.1 
Although natural phenomena (hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, etc.), 
accidents, component and operator failure, can destroy or disrupt elements of 
the infrastructure, deliberate attacks could potentially cause even more 
significant harm, especially when used in conjunction with physical threats.2 
                                                 
1 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Infrastructures: 
Protecting America’s Foundations (Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1997), pp. 3-4. 
Telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, 
banking and financial operations, air and rail systems, water supply systems, emergency 
services (medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government, are so vital that their 
incapacity or disruption could potentially have a debilitating impact on the defense and 
economic security of the United States. See also The White House, Office of the Science and 
Technology Advisor, Cybernation: The American Infrastructure in the Information Age 
(Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1996).  
2 However, the current ability of any actor to achieve widespread and persistent 
disruption that is severe enough to have strategic consequences is unknown. While many 
states are attempting to develop strategic information warfare capabilities, their level of 
development is difficult to determine. The actual consequences of such an action are still open 
to debate.  
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Attacks on critical infrastructure exist in two forms: physical (or kinetic) attacks 
against property and “cyber attacks” on the information systems that facilitate 
control of the infrastructure. 3  
The Department of Defense (DoD) provides a good illustration of this growing 
dependency.4 It is an essential instrument and symbol of American power, 
and an adversary could exploit its reliance on information systems. Although 
DoD employs many safeguards to ensure the proper functioning of its 
communication systems, it may well be as vulnerable as the rest of American 
society.  
Defense has to protect a vast and complex information infrastructure: currently, 
it has over 2.1 million computers, 10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance 
networks. Defense also critically depends on information technology--it uses 
computers to help design weapons, identify and track enemy targets, pay 
soldiers, mobilize reservists, and manage supplies. Indeed, its very warfighting 
capability is dependent on computer-based telecommunications networks and 
information systems.5 
For the DoD, the Internet represents “a medium for less-sensitive national 
security communications, 95% of which depend on the public switch 
network.”6 A 1996 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that 
DoD “computer systems are particularly susceptible to attack through 
connections on the Internet, which Defense uses to enhance communication 
and information sharing.”7 Although essential command and control systems 
are not connected to the Internet, numerous support functions, such as 
weapons systems research and development, logistics, and finance make use 
                                                 
3 “Cyber attacks” include computer network attack through unauthorized access, 
viruses, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software and activity. For the purpose of 
this report, cyber attacks also include attacks with electromagnetic pulse or directed energy 
weapons.  
4 It is important to note that the vulnerabilities of DoD are not unique. A General 
Accounting Office (GAO) audit of 24 government agencies concluded that “significant 
information security weaknesses” existed in each agency. See General Accounting Office, 
Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at Risk (Washington D.C.:  
GAO, 1998), p. 5.  
5 General Accounting Office (GAO), Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose 
Increasing Risks (Washington, D.C.:  GAO, 1996), p. 3. Although the oft quoted numbers of 
250,000 “attacks” a year has been discredited because of the expansive definition of an attack, 
the essential conclusions of the report remain unchallenged.   
6 P. Constantini, "Virtual Armies Clash by Net" LEXUS/NEXIS Inter Press Service, 4 
June 1996. 
7 GAO, Computer Attacks, p. 3. 
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of the Internet.8 Further, the Internet is only a portion of the information 
infrastructure. Defense installations are still subject to the disruption of 
electrical power and other communications networks, such as the Defense 
Information Systems Network (DISN) and the Global Command and Control 
System (GCCS).9 Disrupting these systems during a crisis could seriously 
impair the ability of the United States to deploy or sustain its forces.  
B. Purpose 
This study will provide a framework for analyzing the group dynamics and 
environmental factors that may lead terrorist organizations to integrate 
cyberterror into their current operations, or drive hacker activity towards 
terrorism. The framework can assist the Intelligence Community (IC) in 
understanding and evaluating the potential threat from cyberterrorism.  
C. Relevance 
The majority of literature dealing with cyberterrorism has focused principally 
on the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures. 10 While the studies have well 
documented the potential vulnerabilities, the studies have consistently been 
alarmist in nature regarding the threat to these infrastructures.11 Prior studies 
have failed to address in any detail the motivation, intent, resources, risks, and 
benefits for non-state actors attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities. Our 
                                                 
8 GAO, Computer Attacks, p. 10. DoD is attempting to develop an independent network, 
the Global Network Information Enterprise project (GNIE) based on Internet protocols. It would 
completely move its unclassified networks off the Internet. John Schwartz, “Online Security Is 
Pentagon's Latest Battle” Washington Post, 2 June 1999, p. A-2. Additionally, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense John Hamre ordered the removal of sensitive information from all DoD 
Internet sites in a Sept. 25, 1998 memo. This was a result of increased awareness of the 
vulnerabilities created by posting information on the Internet.  
9 DISN is a “composite of certain DoD information systems networks under the 
management control and…operational direction of DISA [the Defense Systems Information 
Agency].” GCCS “incorporates the core planning and assessment tools required by the 
combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders.” Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), Joint Pub 6-0:  Doctrine for Command Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) 
Systems Support to Joint Operations (Washington D.C.:  Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 
VI-1 – VI-4. Although these systems are more secure than other networks, they are still 
vulnerable to disruption from loss of electrical power or the physical destruction of network 
nodes or segments.  
10The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), the 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), the General Accounting 
Office and numerous other organizations have analyzed and identified infrastructure 
vulnerabilities. 
11Vulnerability is not synonymous with threat. A vulnerability is a weakness in a system 
that may be exploited. A threat requires an actor with the motivation, resources, and intent to 
exploit a vulnerability. 
  4
study differs from previous studies by addressing the motivations, 
organizational implications, and technical barriers to entry faced by an 
organization wanting to conduct attacks on critical infrastructures. We believe 
our method, which weighs both the costs and benefits of cyberterror, can 
provide a more accurate forecast of cyberterror activity, both in a support role 
to traditional terrorism and as a possible new, stand-alone terrorist tactic. 
D. Methodology/Design 
This study uses an inductive approach to formulate a general framework.  
Based on previously published analyses of the motivation, intent, capabilities 
and resources of traditional terrorist organizations, we develop a framework to 
analyze the prospects for cyberterrorism.  This framework is designed to 
identify useful insights regarding the development and use of cyberterror, from 
the perspective of a terrorist organization.  
E. Limitations 
This study addresses only transnational terrorist organizations; it does not 
consider domestic terrorist organizations in the United States. Further, we do 
not specifically address the “insider threat” to information systems. Nor do we 
provide a comprehensive group-by-group analysis. Rather, we establish a 
framework and make general assessments based on information and 
intelligence regarding terrorist organizations and, their ideologies. The 
diversity of terrorist motivations and the opaque nature of their organizations 
make it extremely difficult to predict specific terrorist behavior. The nearly 
endless supply of “soft targets” also complicates any predictive efforts. This 
problem is particularly acute when addressing “terrorism” as a whole rather 
than specific terrorist groups. Nonetheless, performing this broadly based 
analysis is a necessary first step in understanding and countering an 
emerging threat.  
This report does not provide any additional analysis of vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructures. The vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures have been widely 
examined by a multitude of individuals and organizations. Our analysis is 
based on contemporary circumstances and does not purport to address future 
scenarios. However, the framework developed should be applicable across 
the range of possible futures.  
F. Structure of the Study 
The study is divided into five major chapters and addresses a number of 
diverse, but interrelated, questions. Chapter II examines existing definitions of 
terrorism and establishes definitions of cyberterror, differentiating between 
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cyberterror attacks and cyberterror support. Additionally, this chapter defines 
three levels of cyberterror capability to guide a more detailed analysis of 
terrorist motivations and resources. Chapter III identifies significant trends 
affecting the viability and likelihood of terrorism in general. It also examines 
the specific opportunities for and threats to terrorist organizations wishing to 
pursue cyberterrorism. 
Chapter IV examines the utility of cyberterrorism to specific types of terrorist 
organizations, independent of resource constraints. The organizational 
analysis applied in this chapter considers ideology, group psychology, and 
internal organizational requirements. Chapter V examines the necessary skills 
and resources needed to reach any of the three levels of cyberterror.  Chapter 
VI addresses the barriers to entry in conjunction with the various 
implementation options for groups that decide to pursue cyberterrorism. The 
costs and benefits of the implementation options and the incentives for state 
sponsorship are considered. The final chapter presents conclusions and 
recommendations for future research. 
G. Findings 
Advanced-structured and complex-coordinated cyberterrorism will likely be 
pursued by only a few terrorist organizations.  Of these, the most dangerous 
eventuality will likely come from a newly-formed religious group. However, this 
is a long-term threat. More likely, near-term threats may be posed by stable, 
new age terrorist groups.  We recognize also that several less dramatic 
threats at the simple and advanced-structured levels also merit further 





Above the gates of hell is the warning that all that enter should abandon hope. 
Less dire but to the same effect is the warning given to those who try to define 
terrorism. 12 
This chapter attempts to relate the concept of cyberterror to existing notions of 
terrorism, terrorist activity, and terrorist acts. A comparison of existing 
definitions of terrorism provides the basis for a definition of cyberterrorism. 
Special attention is paid to property destruction, in an effort to illuminate how 
property destruction, which often requires little violence, and seldom produces 
fear, has come to be accepted as a true form of terrorism. Despite claims to 
the contrary, cyberterrorism has only a limited ability to produce the violent 
effects associated with traditional terrorist acts.13 Therefore, to consider 
malicious activity in cyberspace “terrorism,” it is necessary to extend existing 
definitions of terrorism to include the destruction of digital14 property. The 
acceptance of property destruction as terrorism allows this malicious activity, 
when combined with the necessary motivations, to be defined as cyberterror. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a description of threat capabilities, 
categorized in three levels. 
A. Terrorism 
In the search for a clear definition of terrorism, about the only constant is that 
people continue to disagree. During our research, we reviewed academic,15 
State Department (Title 22 U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d)), the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, and the Department of Defense (Joint Publication 1-02) 
                                                 
12 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of an Empire: The United States and 
International Terrorism (Westport, CT:  Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 51. 
13See Barry C. Collin, “The Future of Cyberterrorism:  Where Physical and Virtual 
Worlds Converge” Crime & Justice International 13.2 (March 1997). Available at 
http://www.ascp.uic.edu/oicj/pubs/cjintl/1302/130214.shtml; Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern 
Terrorism” Foreign Affairs 75.5 (Sep/Oct 1996):  24-36; and The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) Global Organized Crime Project, 
Cybercrime…Cyberterrorism…Cyberwarfare… Averting an Electronic Waterloo, ed. Frank J. 
Cillufo, Bruce D. Berkowitz, and Stephanie Lanz (Washington, D.C.:  CSIS, 1998). 
14 In using the term "digital" we recognize that electronic information may be at times 
represented in analog form. For clarity we include both forms when using the term digital. 
15 Thomas Perry Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” Internal War: 
Problems and Approaches. ed. Harrry Eckstien. (New York:  Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 
73. and E.F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979 (London:  
Aldwych Press, 1980), p. XIII-XIV as quoted in Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism (New 
Brunswick:  Transaction Books, 1983), p. 73. and R. Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists 
(London:  Faber and Faber, 1997), pp. 11 & 21 as quoted in Schmid.  
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definitions for terrorism. The discontinuity noted in academic definitions 
continues to be present in various U.S. Government (USG) agencies’ 
definitions. For the State Department: 
The term “terrorism” means the premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant (1) targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
…Noncombatant – to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at 
the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. 16 
The State Department’s definition of terrorism is interesting because it does 
not specifically include actions against “property.” However, the incident 
database reflected throughout the State Department’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism, (1998) does reflect attacks against U.S. commercial property such 
as oil pipelines in Colombia. In fact, 
About 40 percent of the (international) attacks in 1998 – 111 - were directed 
against US targets. The majority of these - 77 - were bombings of a 
multinational oil pipeline in Colombia, which terrorists regard as a US target.17 
Drawing from this, we also note that the USG Title 22 definition, in practice, 
clearly includes destruction of property as terrorism when the other conditions 
for terrorism are satisfied (premeditated, politically motivated, etc.). 
Unlike the State Department definition, the FBI’s definition explicitly includes 
acts against property.  
The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.18 
As noted in the Department of Defense (DoD) regulation O-2000.12-H, “…it is 
important to remember that the DoD definition [logically] subsumes both 
definitions used by the FBI and the DoS [Department of State].”19 In an effort 
to be inclusive, the definition of terrorism used in this study will remain 
                                                 
16 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism:  1997,  p. 4. 
17United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism:  1998 (p. 1, section 
“The Year in Review”). http:www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/review.html 
18 DoD O-2000.12-H, p. 2-1. 
19 DoD O-2000.12-H, p. 2-1. 
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consistent with the broader DoD definition as detailed in Joint Publication 1-02 
and the DoD regulation O-2000.12-H.  
Terrorism – the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear: intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or 
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological. 20 
In the State Department and FBI definitions, the use of “violence” as it applies 
to property damage is generally recognized in the form of property 
destruction. The DoD regulation cited above does include “malicious property 
destruction”21 as a type of terrorist attack. The regulation also begins to 
address destruction at the binary code level and specifically refers to it under 
the use of special weapons: 
Use of sophisticated computer viruses introduced into computer-controlled 
systems for banking, information, communications, life support, and 
manufacturing could result in massive disruption of highly organized, 
technological societies. Depending on the scope, magnitude, and intensity of 
such disruptions, the populations of affected societies could demand 
governmental concessions to those responsible for unleashing viruses. Such a 
chain of events would be consistent with contemporary definitions of terrorist 
acts.22  
As outlined above, the DoD institutional definition of terrorism includes not 
only property destruction, but also begins to expand terrorism into the realm of 
cyberspace. The following section provides a framework for understanding the 
phenomenon of terrorism as applied to cyberspace and information systems. 
B. Cyberterror 
Cyberterrorism is the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to 
intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are 
political, religious or ideological.  
As a subset of terrorism, cyberterror involves using information as a weapon, 
method, or target, to achieve terrorist goals. Cyberterror exists in and beyond 
cyberspace and includes physical destruction of any device, system of 
                                                 
20 DoD O-2000.12-H, p. 2-1. 
21 DoD O-2000.12-H, p. 2-7. 
22 DoD O-2000.12-H, p. 2-10. 
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devices, or process with an information component. At the lowest common 
denominator, an information component can be understood to represent 
binary code. Acts taken to disrupt, deny service, destroy, and corrupt binary 
code are thus acts of cyberterror.  
A characteristic of cyberterror is its ability to leverage inexpensive means to 
gain disproportionate effects through destruction, denial, deceit, corruption, 
exploitation, and disruption. Cyberterror can increase the destructiveness, or 
disruptiveness, of the act by enabling greater target coverage, effect, and 
efficiency. Cyberterror may augment or support traditional terrorism, or be 
employed as a distinct form of action in its own right.  
C. Cyberterror Support 
Cyberterror support is the unlawful use of information systems by terrorists 
which is not intended, by itself, to have a coercive effect on a target audience. 
Cyberterror support augments or enhances other terrorist acts.  
Like terrorist acts (bombings, assassinations, etc.) and terrorist activity 
(financial and logistical support), cyberterror can also be classified as either 
acts or activities.23 For example, in order to accomplish a terrorist bombing, 
various terrorist activities are necessary to support the operation. Such 
activities include, but are not limited to, intelligence collection, 
communications, logistics, and supply requirements..  
The intended outcome of the terrorist use of information technology 
determines whether a given incident qualifies as an attack or support. Attacks 
are events whose outcome is intended to "intimidate or coerce" in the direct 
pursuit of the attacking group’s goals. An incident of cyberterror support is 
intended to augment or enhance some other act (or threatened act) of 
terrorism. The supported act may be traditional terrorism or cyberterrorism.  
Terrorist use of information technology in their support activities does not 
qualify as cyberterrorism. Our definition does not include the otherwise legal 
use of information technology by terrorist organizations.24 While such use may 
improve the distribution of the terrorist message or enhance the efficiency of 
                                                 
23 For clarity and continuity throughout this study, we substitute act and activity for 
attack and support, respectively.  This applies to both traditional terrorism and cyberterror.  We 
choose to use the military forms of expression. 
24 Note that this definition excludes activities such as electronic mail between group 
members and propaganda dissemination. The definition also excludes the legal collection of 
information posted to the worldwide web. While this can be a powerful tool for terrorists we see 
this as equivalent to library research which would not be classified as terrorism. 
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terrorist groups, such activities cannot be construed as cyberterrorism if we 
are to remain precise about our definitions.  
We attempt to clarify the distinction between cyberterror attacks and support 
by examining them in terms of the concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. A breach of confidentiality occurs if an unauthorized user gains 
access to information. A breach of confidentiality is an act of cyberterror 
support. The classic example of a confidentiality violation is acquiring another 
user's password. Violations of confidentiality are essentially passive. It is only 
when the terrorist group threatens (or implies the threat of) some action with 
the stolen information that they cross into cyberterror attacks. 
Violations of the integrity of an information system occur when the information 
the system uses (either program instructions or data) is modified. This 
includes both covert changes to and outright destruction of data.25 These 
modifications can occur while the information resides within a component or 
when the information is in transit between components. Incidents that violate 
integrity may be categorized as either attacks or support. Surreptitious 
modification of a user account to allow an attacker access to a key system, 
without the threat of action, has no coercive effects.26 On the other hand, the 
publicized modification of train routing software intended to produce a collision 
will intimidate a target audience.  
                                                 
25 Destruction includes anything from a bomb, to an EMP device, or simply “erasing” the 
data. 
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Availability refers to the ability of legitimate users to access information and 
information resources. Violations of availability are generally referred to as 
“denial of service attacks.” However, our definition allows violations of 
availability to be either attacks or support. Losses of service can occur as 
unintended side effects.27 This can hardly be intended to "coerce or 
intimidate.” Similarly, a denial of service attack against a computerized 
security system that prevents the detection of physical access to an embassy 
is an enhancement to an attack and thus cyberterror support. In contrast, 
denial of air traffic control services would constitute an attack, because of the 
potentially dire consequences.  
Although all cyberterror acts imply a violation of confidentiality, integrity or 
availability, the reverse is not true. Other criminal acts perpetrated through or 
against information systems for non-terrorist purposes are not cyberterrorism. 
Terrorism represents the intersection of violent criminal activity and political 
activity. The political nature of terrorism is what separates it from other 
criminal activity motivated by financial gain or personal animosity. In general, 
espionage and criminal activity do not constitute terrorism, and should not be 
considered part of cyberterrorism. Therefore, these types of criminal activities 
are excluded from our definition, and from this study.  
The distinction between common criminal activity and cyberterrorism involves 
a substantial gray area – cyberspace activities by terrorist groups principally 
intended to provide financial support for other operations. This is a real 
possibility, especially for groups that lack a sponsor or profit-producing front 
organization. Additionally, other authors have argued that the definition of 
terrorism must be expanded to include economic motivations28 and activities 
by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) but that analysis of is beyond 
the scope of this study.  
Although the use of information-networks to support criminal activity continues 
to grow, such as Internet based money laundering, this use is not analyzed 
herein. For the drug cartel, a type of TCO, profit is the ultimate motivating 
factor. For terrorist organizations and state institutions, cyberterror activities 
are motivated by political aims. With regard to cyberterror, it is necessary to 
remember that the act must first be a form of terrorism before the act can be 
classified as cyberterror. This distinction will allow us to segregate cyber crime 
from cyberterror.  
                                                 
27 For instance, some network scanning software can cause some components to 
become unstable and fail. 
28 Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, “International Terrorism on the Eve of a New 
Millenium,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20.3 (Jul-Sep 1997):  pp. 281-316.  
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Recognizing that new definitions can be difficult to conceptualize, we provide 
the following example to help clarify the meaning of cyberterror: 
Cyberterror Attack Scenario: 
A plane crash is caused, not by a bomb, but through a pulse device. The pulse 
device was transported on board with a passenger. The intent of the pulse is to 
disrupt and permanently corrupt the information system components within the 
aircraft. One disrupted control process affected by the pulse was the landing 
gear control component.  Without the landing gear in the correct position, 
among other problems, the plane attempts to land safely but is unsuccessful.
  
If, in this example, a bomb were substituted for the pulse device, and the other 
conditions for a terrorist act were met (intent, etc), then there would be little 
debate as to the nature of the violence – it is terrorism. From this extreme 
example, the argument is not difficult to make. Examining examples where 
individuals are not placed in life threatening (fear producing) situations, 
though, begins to complicate the definition. Nevertheless, we argue that the 
same criteria applied to traditional terrorism should also be applied to 
cyberterror. Once again we highlight the Colombian terrorist bombings of oil 
pipelines as an example where terror, in the life threatening form, fails to 
develop; but where the incident is indeed categorized as a terrorist act. We do 
not dispute the legitimacy of the bombing act in this case.  Furthermore, we 
employ the same logic when we propose that a cyberterror attack be 
accepted as a form of terrorism. 
D. Levels of Cyberterror – Defining Capabilities 
Not all threats are “created equal.” Any analysis of threats must discern the 
varying capabilities of potential adversaries. To date, other studies such as 
those published by the PCCIP, the CSIS, the National Research Council and 
NSTAC have all failed to do this. We identify three distinct capability levels, 
which pose correspondingly distinct threats. Chapter V of this study will define 
in detail the component skills, and the barriers to achieving those skills, for 
each level of cyberterror capability. As we will argue, achieving the most 
robust capability entails significant challenges for existing terrorist 
organizations – not only organizational restructuring, but possibly a change in 
culture – all of which may decrease the likelihood that this capability level will 
be realized.  
The characteristics of the three levels (simple-unstructured, advanced-
structured, complex-coordinated) help quantify the different skills and 
resources required for a proposed capability. The levels are defined in terms 
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of target scope, target analysis, degree of control over intended effects,29 
potential utility, and target selection methodology. 
Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct basic hacks against individual 
systems using tools created by someone else. The organization possesses 
little target analysis, command and control or learning capability.  
Simple-unstructured cyberterror includes direct probing,30 and probing with 
malicious secondary source software. Simple-unstructured cyberterror is a 
small-scale capability to conduct basic hacks against individual systems using 
basic computer skills and openly available malicious software from a 
secondary source (such as a hacker web page). This level of cyberterror is 
also characterized as simple due to the lack of target analysis and the method 
of target selection. Targets are selected primarily based on available tools and 
poor security procedures, not because they have are tactically or strategically 
significant. The organization lacks the resources and skills to create tools for 
attacking selected targets; they are dependent on the resources provided by 
the hacker community. 
Organizations with a simple-unstructured capability may exhibit low 
confidence in the organization’s ability to integrate cyberterror into its existing 
and future operations because the organization is dependent on secondary 
source hacker software. Electronic mail “bombing” attacks31 and some web 
page hacking can be characterized as simple-unstructured attacks. The 
potential strategic utility of these attacks is low due to the short duration, and 
limited scope and consequences. 
 
                                                 
29 Degree of control over intended effects – describes whether the consequences of the 
cyberterror are manageable by the originator. 
30 Direct probing – attempts to access via normal though not intended channels (default 
accounts or compromised user id and password pairs).  
31 Flooding a site with unwanted mail to cause its servers to fail. 
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Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks 
against multiple systems or networks and possibly, to modify or create basic 
hacking tools. The organization possesses an elementary target analysis 
capability and command and control structure for sequential attacks from a 
single location. Some learning ability - can assimilate some new technologies 
and train personnel. 
Cyberterror activity at the advanced-structured level is more focused in its 
effects than simple-unstructured cyberterror. At the advanced-structured level, 
an elementary target analysis is conducted to determine the targeted system’s 
configuration and system parameters. This level provides a degree of 
assurance regarding the immediate effects of the attack on the targeted 
system but the organization would be unlikely to understand secondary 
effects. At this level, the organization would possess some programming skills 
and a sufficient understanding of the targeted system to create basic hacking 
tools or modify existing ones. The organization may also possess knowledge 
of a variety of information systems. An organization with the ability to operate 
at the advanced-structured level may be able to integrate cyberterror and 
provide operational support for conventional terrorist operations.  
Organizations with an advanced-structured capability will require an internal 
learning mechanism to understand and assimilate new technology and train 
personnel. Recognizing that this is an organizational imperative is critical; the 
internal training mechanism represents a turning point in an organization’s 
cyberterror capability. The organization can grow from a cyber opportunity 
taker, created by the environment, to an opportunity maker with the ability to 
influence the cyber environment. Although the turning point for pursuing more 
advanced capabilities resides at this level, the disruption that can be achieved 
at the advanced-structured level is still limited, due to a lack of understanding 
in multi-system or networked targets. 
Complex-Coordinated: The capability for coordinated attacks capable of 
causing mass-disruption. Ability to analyze vulnerabilities, penetrate integrated, 
heterogeneous defenses (including cryptography) and create attack tools. 
Strong ability to conduct target analysis and high confidence in results. Strong 
command and control structure capable of employing multiple, simultaneous 
attacks from different locations. Strong organizational learning capacity – can 
keep up with latest technology, train personnel, diffuse knowledge throughout 
the organization, make necessary doctrinal and organizational changes to 
enhance capabilities.  
In comparison to lower levels, only a small percentage of individuals are 
capable of executing the tasks categorized as complex-coordinated 
cyberterror. At this level, the terrorist group understands various software, 
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hardware, and firmware characteristics of the targeted systems. Further, they 
possess sufficient intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities to enable 
them to predict the secondary and tertiary effects of their attacks. They may 
also possess the capability to defeat some encryption measures and take 
advantage of covert channels. This detailed understanding of networks and 
computer science coupled with detailed target analysis, with respect to the 
configuration and status of the targeted network, creates the ability for the 
terrorist to manage the spread of effects from the cyberterror activity. This 
capability includes the ability to develop malicious software, and is 
characterized by direct penetration32 and subversion of security 
mechanisms.33 An organization at this level would have a high degree of 
assurance of achieving the desired effects. It would also possess a strong 
organizational learning capacity, and exhibit strong command and control. 
The organization’s ability to assimilate and understand new technology will 
drive the organization’s capability. To assimilate the technology, the 
organization must train its personnel and diffuse knowledge throughout the 
organization.  
At the complex-coordinated level, the utility of cyberterror progresses along 
two avenues. First, fully integrated cyberterror support enhances conventional 
terrorist acts and activity. However, it is also at this level that cyberterror can 
operate in a sufficient manner to be effective in a stand-alone mode. Only at 
this level can cyberterror be considered a possible threat to multi-networked 
infrastructures, or even single-networked infrastructures with numerous types 
and brands of hardware, each with its own proprietary programming code. 
Groups at both the simple-unstructured and advanced-structured levels would 
lack the organizational expertise to acquire, analyze, and understand the 
information requirements for system-wide attacks. 
                                                 
32 Direct penetration - bypassing intended security policies to create or take advantage 
of security holes. 




The following definitions set the conditions for the remainder of our study: 
• Cyberterrorism is the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to 
intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that 
are political, religious or ideological. 
• Cyberterror support is the unlawful use of information systems by terrorists 
which is not intended, by itself, to have a coercive effect on a target 
audience. Cyberterror support augments or enhances other terrorist acts. 
• Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct basic hacks against 
individual systems using tools created by someone else. The organization 
possesses little target analysis, command and control or learning 
capability. 
• Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks 
against multiple systems or networks and possibly, to modify or create 
basic hacking tools. The organization possesses an elementary target 
analysis capability and command and control structure for sequential 
attacks from a single location. Some learning ability - can assimilate some 
new technologies and train personnel. 
• Complex-Coordinated: The capability for coordinated attacks capable of 
causing mass-disruption. Ability to analyze vulnerabilities, penetrate 
complex defenses (including cryptography) and create attack tools. Strong 
ability to conduct target analysis and high confidence in results. Strong 
command and control structure capable of employing multiple, 
simultaneous attacks from different locations. Strong organizational 
learning capacity – can keep up with latest technology, train personnel, 
diffuse knowledge throughout the organization, make necessary doctrinal 
and organizational changes to enhance capabilities.  
With these definitions, and an understanding of the distinctions between 
cyberterror attacks and support activities, we are now able to address the 




III. The Environment - Opportunities and Threats 
A. Introduction 
This chapter examines the current global operating environment.  The 
fundamental question addressed in this chapter is whether this environment 
presents an opportunity for the use of cyberterrorism.  It begins with a brief 
overview of the factors affecting the perceived utility of terrorism, and then 
gives a more detailed examination of the specific opportunities for and threats 
to those organizations that may pursue cyberterror. The macro-environmental 
factors indicate a continuing utility for traditional terrorism as a form of political 
violence. This, combined with information-age developments, will likely create 
localized environments conducive to cyberterrorism as well. However, a brief 
survey of significant indicators related to cyberterrorism reveals a 
heterogeneous growth of information infrastructure and technology utilization 
which may limit the “supply side” for cyberterror. This said, cyberterror will 
certainly be a growing threat in the future.  It is only the rate of growth that is in 
question. 
B. Global Factors Influencing Terrorism 
• The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have 
created instability in many countries, and fostered the growth of 
regional powers. 
• The dominant role of the United States in world affairs (politically, 
culturally, and economically) and its numerous interventions may 
engender resentment and provide rationales for some terrorist 
organizations. 
• The conventional military power of the United States may drive 
adversaries to consider asymmetric approaches to confronting the 
United States. 
• Ethno-nationalist separatists (ENS) are clamoring for independence 
and autonomy in dozens of states. 
• Non-state actors form alliances unconstrained by geographic 
boundaries.  
• The diffusion of technical knowledge concerning CBRN may allow 
terrorist organizations greater access to these weapons.  
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• BOTTOM LINE: Terrorism will persist and the United States will remain 
a target. 
A variety of political and socioeconomic factors affect the continuing utility of 
terrorism. The most significant factors are the changing world security 
environment; the growth of non-state actors; the proliferation of chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; and the growth of information-
age societies. 
The demise of the bipolar security environment has resulted in greater global 
uncertainty. Ethnic tensions suppressed by now defunct totalitarian regimes 
are reemerging, with demands for the right of self-determination. Long-
standing ethnic conflicts threaten to break struggling states into smaller units 
by displacing allegiances from the state to the ethnic group.34 Figure 3-1 
provides a perspective on the pervasiveness of ethnic conflict. The darkened 
(red) areas represent areas of current or potential conflict, a large number of 
which are ethnically motivated. These quests for autonomy will continue to 
generate politically motivated violence.  
As the sole superpower, the United States has assumed a unique role in 
international relations. Because of this role and a policy of engagement, the 
military might and force projection capabilities of the United States have been 
                                                 
34 D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 
1985), pp. 4-6. 
Figure 3-1:  Current or Potential Conflicts 
Source: 1998 Strategic Assessment – Engaging Power for Peace, Institute for National  
Studies, National Defense University, Washington D.C.  
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called upon frequently to intervene in crises around the globe. These 
interventions have served to highlight the superiority of our conventional 
forces and may drive future adversaries to consider asymmetric responses. 
Further, as the United States has responded to these crises in order to protect 
its security interests, it has undoubtedly engendered resentment. The 
aggrieved parties, unable to confront the United States with conventional 
forces, may resort to terrorist acts as revenge for these interventions.35 
The international nation-state system will be challenged by the continued 
growth of non-state actors. Sub-state actors such as transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) can create alliances that are not 
constrained by state boundaries. In economic matters, some MNCs have 
grown to such proportions that their annual revenues dwarf the budgets of 
most nation-states.36 Some authors predict that these non-state actors will 
increase their power at the expense of the state.37 In Mexico, the Zapatistas 
leveraged the possibility of disrupting growth by creating unfavorable 
conditions for foreign investment.38  
                                                 
35 Ivan Elan, “Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?” Cato Institute 
Foreign Policy Briefing #50, 17 Dec. 1998. 
36 Extrapolating from the Global 500 List (see: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/cgi-
bin/fortune/global500) maintained by Fortune Magazine, Mitsubishi’s 1996 total revenues of 
184,365 million US$ would place Mitsubishi 24th, just below Turkey, on the World Bank’s 1999 
World Development Indicators – Total GDP 1997 Listing.  Just below Mitsubishi would be 
Mitsu (25th), another Japanese trading company, which would be followed on the list by Hong 
Kong, Denmark, Thailand, Norway, and Saudi Arabia.  For a complete listing of Total GNP by 
country for 1997 see: http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic. 
37 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security,” In 
Athena’s Camp, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 1997), p. 
329. “…it is clear that TCOs pose threats to security at three levels: the individual, the state 
and the international system of states.” Also see pp. 332-333. 
38 Armando Martinez and David Ronfeldt "A Comment on the Zapatista 'Netwar'," In 
Athena’s Camp, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 1997), pp. 
380-382. The transnational criminal organization's lack of subservience to the state and the 
EZLN's use of propaganda to rile media attention and alarm foreign investors against investing 
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Table 3-1:  CBRN Proliferation 
The proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons provides a potential strategic alternative to cyberterrorism. Although 
the pursuit of both capabilities is possible, most terrorist organizations do not 
have the resources to do so. Despite the obstacles and risks of pursuing 
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these weapons, they may still appeal to certain terrorist organizations.39 
Although no known terrorist group has succeeded in acquiring nuclear 
weapons, the potential cannot be summarily dismissed.40 Similarly, with the 
notable exception of the Tokyo subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo, no terrorist 
organization has successfully used chemical or biological weapons on a large 
scale.41 Again though, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Attempts to forecast 
proliferation are difficult at best, but certain trends seem obvious. For 
example, CBRN knowledge and materials will diffuse beyond those who 
possess such capabilities today.  
As societies transition to the information age, terrorism will see its operating 
environment change as well; i.e. government, business, and the media will all 
be influenced. Because terrorism takes place on a global scale, any analysis 
of terrorism should include an assessment of both the global environment as 
well as the varying multiple microenvironments. For this study, analyzing both 
the macro- and microenvironment is critical.  
The survey of the four variables affecting the future of terrorism yield the 
following results: 
• A security environment where terrorism continues its utility as a form of 
political violence;  
• More, not fewer, asymmetrical options available for terrorist 
considerations (From CBRN to cyberterror);  
• At least one variable (the information revolution) is likely to facilitate the 
pursuit of cyberterrorism. 
The following section analyzes in detail the specific variables affecting the 
future utility of cyberterror. These variables are principally related to the 
spread of the information age. Specifically, global connectivity, increasing 
information technology (IT) use, the low cost of entry, and the lack of legal 
consensus all present opportunities for potential cyberterrorists. Conversely, 
the continued utility of traditional terrorist methods, increasing cyberterror 
                                                 
39 See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1998), 
pp. 185-205. 
40 See Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley Thayer, America’s 
Achille’s Heel:  Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge:  
MIT Press, 1998); Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 1999); and The CSIS Task Force Report, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington, 
D.C.:  CSIS, 1996). 
41 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, pp. 18 - 26. 
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defensive capabilities, and uncertainty are likely disincentives to existing 
organizations considering cyberterror.  Interestingly, the rapid change of 
technology and the prospects for anonymity offer a mixed set of incentives 
and disincentives for pursuing cyberterror. 
C. Incentives for Pursuing Cyberterror 
The following factors are likely incentives for pursuing cyberterrorism. 
1. Global Connectivity 
Offers an expanding set of options compared to previous avenues 
• Diverse systems; not limited to the Internet. 
• Degree of infrastructure development and connectivity vary greatly. 
• Provides potential stand-off attack capability. 
• Increases the number of potential targets.  
• Reduces cost and complexity of command and control and 
propaganda dissemination. 
• Provides a larger audience for terrorist acts. 
• Provides an avenue for the broad dissemination of propaganda.  
Global connectivity enhances the utility of cyberterror by increasing the 
number of possible targets and improving the efficiency and/or effectiveness 
of cyberterror support activities. A review of the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Yearbook of Statistics shows that 
telecommunications networks are expanding.42 The demographics of this 
expansion, particularly regarding the pace and manner in which global 
connectivity is being achieved, yields interesting insights.  First, the growth 
rate in connectivity varies significantly around the globe.  Second, the world is 
“connecting,” but in a heterogeneous fashion. These insights affect the 
incentives for pursuing cyberterror attacks and support activities in interesting 
ways.  
                                                 
42 International Telecommunication Union, Yearbook of Statistics, Telecommunication 
Services, 1988-1997 (Geneva Switzerland:  ITU, 1999). 
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One measure of connectivity, the Internet (a subset of telecommunication 
networks) offers a revealing example of the disparity between different 
regions. In 1998, Americans represented 52 percent of worldwide Internet 
users.43 No other country comes close to reaching that percentage. This 
usage helps drive the U.S. demand for the sale and manufacturing of IT 
products, a market the U.S. also dominates - representing almost 40% of the 
worldwide market between 1985-1995.44 A look at geographical regions 
shows the lack of use outside of developed countries. North America covers 
56 percent of the world usage with Europe and Asia coming in a distant 
second (22%) and third (17%) respectively.45 The regions of the Middle East 
and Africa, as aggregate entities, do not even make the top 15-country list. On 
a world scale, the Middle East accounts for 0.51 of one-percent of Internet 
users, and Africa accounts for only 0.74 of one-percent.46  
Looking at Internet distribution from the hardware perspective is just as 
revealing as looking at user distributions.  
Internet disparity is much greater than for telephone lines. While the gap in the 
level of teledensity (telephone lines per 100 inhabitants) between developed 
and developing nations has diminished over time, new gaps have opened up 
for Internet connectivity. For example there are more hosts in Finland than all 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, there are more hosts in three developed 
countries of the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) than 
in all the other countries combined and there are more hosts in New York than 
in all of Africa.  47  
Even with the above-described discontinuity in telecommunication network 
development, the technical ability to communicate via fax, telephone, or 
modem from anywhere on the planet still exists. What changes with location is 
the price of connectivity: low in advanced societies, but expensive in less 
developed markets. At locations where actual land-based telecommunication 
networks cease to exist, the opportunity to use satellite communications 
remains (although at much greater relative cost and higher risk of exposure).  
                                                 
43 Computer Industry Almanac as quoted in the CyberAtlas web site. 
http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/geographics/article/0,1323,5911_150591,00.html 
44 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Information Technology 
Outlook 1997 pp. 15-19 retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dsti/. 
45 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Party on 
Telecommunication and Information Services Policies, Internet Infrastructure Indicators, 28 Oct 
1988, retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dsti/. 
46 Computer Industry Almanac 1998 report as quoted in NUA Internet Surveys web site, 
http://www.nua.ie/surveys/. 
47 International Telecommunication Union, Challenges to the Network Internet for 
Development (Geneva:  ITU, 1999), p. 23. 
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Global connectivity enhances the attractiveness of cyberterror attacks by 
increasing the number of possible targets. Increasing connectivity also 
translates into a potentially larger audience for these attacks.  
Global connectivity also enhances the attractiveness of IT for terrorist support 
activities. A number of violent groups have already chosen to take advantage 
of this opportunity. During the seizure of the Japanese Embassy in Lima, 
Peru, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), employed IT 
support when they developed and used a multi-media website to keep their 
supporters informed while broadcasting their views to an international 
audience. Many other violent groups use the Internet in a support role. 48 In 
fact, a separate survey identified 489 violent groups on the Internet, ranging 
from groups within advanced societies such as the U.S. to groups 
geographically located in remote regions of the world such as the Free Papua 
Movement (OPM) in Irian Jaya.49 With IT support, terrorist organizations can 
communicate globally and instantaneously to enhance their command and 
control while using commercially available encryption methods (e.g. Pretty 
Good Privacy – PGP) and services. The Animal Liberation Front reportedly 
uses PGP encrypted email to coordinate and share information between its 
North American and European cells.50  
However, the opportunities made available by the growth in connectivity do 
not come without some cost. The discontinuity within this growth will limit both 
what can be targeted, where it can be targeted and how. Because of 
discontinuous and heterogeneous telecommunications expansion in such 
places as Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the pursuit of a cyber-capability is 
likely to be constrained. As the demographic data presented indicate, there is 
a finite set of potential “jumping-off” points available to terrorists operating in 
less developed areas of the world.  Likewise, the network access which would 
support Internet traffic from these regions is also limited. In the absence of 
having Internet access, some areas must rely on more expensive, and easily 
traced, traditional telecommunications systems.  In effect, though the growth 
in connectivity suggests the absolute dissolution of traditional boundaries and 
distances, it is still limited to a definable set of geographic possibilities.   
                                                 
48 Taliban Islamic Movement at www.ummah.net/taliban, the Zapatistas at 
www.ezln.org or the Colombian ultra-right death squads at www.colombialialibre.org . Some 
organizations maintain digital connections closer to home.  Listed from Berkeley, CA is the 
Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (Shining Path support) www.csrp.org from which 
you can order a “digitally remastered (compact disc)…of traditional folk music from Peru set to 
lyrics of the revolutionary struggle – along with voices of revolutionary fighters and prisoners.” 
49 A. P. Iuris, "Information Terrorism," Jane’s for Intelink - Terrorism: A Global Survey, 
01 May 1997. 
50 A. P. Iuris, "Information Terrorism," Jane’s for Intelink - Terrorism: A Global Survey, 
01 May 1997.  
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2. Increasing Dependence on Information Technology 
Highlights a potential asymmetry that was not otherwise available 
• IT is widespread in the United States and other developed nations.  
• Introduces new vulnerabilities. 
• Increases the consequences of cyberterrorist acts. 
• Provides a potential means for financial support. 
• May increase the vulnerability of terrorist organizations who employ it. 
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, Telecommunication Services, 
1988 – 1997, International Telecommunication Union 
World Countries
Telecommunications Infrastructure
Moderate   (35)
Poor   (135)
Robust   (18)
Figure 3-3: Teledensity of World States 
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 [T]echnology and change produce better service at lower cost, new markets 
and more efficient processes throughout the nation and indeed the world. As a 
result, we depend more than ever on infrastructure services. 51 
The increasing employment of IT enhances the attractiveness of cyberterror 
by creating more lucrative target sets and expanding the scope of potential 
damage. The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(PCCIP) warned of the vulnerabilities to our national infrastructure and the 
dangers of increasing dependency.52 For the U.S., all critical infrastructures 
are increasingly reliant on information technology. Telecommunications 
networks, themselves controlled by information technology, provide vital links 
for other infrastructures such as banking and finance, energy, transportation, 
and vital human services. The impact of IT on the financial industry has been 
significant: 
Walter Wriston, a former head of Citibank, points to what he terms a new 
‘information standard’ that is replacing the gold standard. He contends that 
information about money is becoming more valuable than money, as electronic 
data shifts around the world instantly without any bullion or currency physically 
changing hands. 53 
The economic stability of the United States is a vital element of national 
security and global stability; the disruption of these infrastructures could have 
serious economic and security implications. The spread of IT to banking, 
finance, and commerce also presents terrorist with the opportunity to use 
fraud and theft for financial support of their operations. 
The increasing dependency on IT may also affect terrorist organizations that 
choose to employ these technologies. They may increase their own 
vulnerability to infrastructure disruption and other information warfare 
techniques. As terrorist organizations become more reliant on IT, they may 
even become less willing to disrupt infrastructure, lest it disrupt their own 
operations – unless they can carefully control the effects of their attacks.  
The increasing dependency on critical infrastructures presents obvious 
opportunities for those who would target the United States and its interests. 
                                                 
51 PCCIP, Critical Foundations, p. 10. 
52 Although the use of IT is an essential element of dependency, use alone does not 
directly translate into IT dependency. The extent of dependency is a factor of vulnerability, 
redundancy, contingency plans, and mitigation/recovery measures. 
53 A. P. Iuris, "Information Terrorism," Jane’s for Intelink - Terrorism: A Global Survey, 
01 May 1997. 
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While the U.S. may have an IT dependency, other nations which exhibit much 
lower usage rates (as outlined above) may have a much lower level of 
dependency. Recognizing this point, the incentive to pursue cyberterror 
attacks may vary, based upon the primary target’s IT dependency level.  
3. Lack of Legal Consensus 
Lack of consensus regarding traditional terrorism and computer crime 
offer potential offenders a safe-haven 
• There are nine major multilateral conventions related to states' 
responsibilities for combating terrorism. The United States is a party to 
all of these. However, none of them explicitly covers acts against 
information systems. 54 
• Despite agreements to cooperate against terrorism, there is no 
international legal consensus or agreement on computer crimes. 
• The United States has extradition treaties with 107 countries.  
• It is difficult to establish conclusively the identity of the perpetrators of 
computer crimes. 
There is a real, yet largely unrealized, opportunity for terrorists to exploit the 
lack of legal consensus regarding computer crime and terrorism. There is a 
growing international legal consensus and diplomatic efforts against 
conventional acts of terrorism, but response, renditions, and extradition can 
still be difficult.55 The complete lack of consensus with regard to computer 
crimes, combined with global connectivity, means that cyberterrorists may be 
able to operate without the threat of arrest and extradition. There are 
numerous incidents of countries refusing to extradite hackers caught red 
                                                 
54 See the list maintained by the U.S. Information Agency at 
http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/terror/conven.htm 
55 The case of Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish separatist leader is instructive. Despite the 
fact that he was wanted in Turkey, he was able to travel rather freely in Europe. In fact, the 
Italians may even have been complicit in his escape to Kenya, where he was eventually 
caught. Even this capture of a well known terrorist leader caused an outcry and resulted in 
rioting by Kurdish emigrants in some European cities. The U.S. Government continues to 
emphasize bringing “terrorists to justice for their crimes and successfully conducted three 
renditions and one extradition in 1998, twice as many as 1995 and 1996 combined. See Dept. 
of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism:  1998, Introduction, p. 1.and Table:  Extraditions and 
Renditions of Terrorists to the U.S. 1993-1998. 
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handed.56 Using cyberterror, terrorists can attack from anywhere on the globe 
with relative immunity because cyberspace transcends national boundaries. 
Furthermore, victims of attacks may be powerless to respond to attacks 
launched from these safe havens, even if the perpetrators were positively 
identified.57  
In the current international environment, there exists no consensus as to what 
constitutes computer crime as it relates to terrorism. Furthermore, within a 
number of states, the issue of computer crime remains unclear. Drawing on 
how long it has taken the international community to learn to cooperate in 
opposing traditional terrorism, it is safe to forecast that cyberspace-based 
malfeasance will persist for some time.  
4. Low Cost of Entry 
Relatively small investment provides a force multiplier and  
a limited capability 
• The cost of computer hardware continues to decrease. 
• Advanced hacking tools which require only minimal knowledge are 
freely available on the Internet. 
• You get what you pay for – a low-budget capability is likely to produce 
low-budget results. 
The cost-effective nature of cyberterror support and the low start-up costs for 
simple-unstructured cyberterror allow financially constrained terrorist 
organizations an effective, low-cost force multiplier. Cyberterror support 
requires little investment and returns can accumulate immediately. With a 
small investment (just a few thousand dollars), a group can purchase the 
hardware tools necessary to begin employing cyberterror. Already, Jane’s 
Information Group is reporting that terrorists are using cyberterror support to 
                                                 
56 The case of Ehud Tenenbaum (“The Analyzer”), apprehended in Israel and wanted 
by the United States in connection with the Solar Sunrise incident, is among the most 
prominent. Despite recent turbulence in U.S.-Israeli relations, Israel is a staunch U.S. ally and 
they still refused to extradite Tenenbaum. See also Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare 
and Security (Reading:  Addison–Wesley, 1998), pp. 47 & 51. 
57 Listed in Appendix B are the nations with which the U.S. Government maintains bi-
lateral extradition treaties. Source: www.usdoj.gov/usncb/extradite.htm. Appendix C lists the 
185 member states of the United Nations.  As of July 1999, the U.S. Government does not 
maintain bi-lateral extradition treaties with 79 UN member states.  Notably included within the 
79 are Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 
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“co-ordinate operations and to disseminate propaganda.”58 Access to other 
support requirements such as weather, maps, and travel related information is 
also available on demand. Chat rooms link hackers of different skill levels 
creating a virtual classroom for learning and exchange of success stories.  
The Internet is a rich source of malicious software; a variety of tools are freely 
available for downloading. However, unless the source code is available and 
someone in the organization has the requisite knowledge to verify what it will 
do, it is risky to use this type of software. It may well perform as advertised but 
it is also possible that the tool may be a Trojan horse59 that could damage the 
user’s system.  
The rapid pace of change noted above also contributes a lower cost of entry 
in some cases by preventing effective security measures. Some system 
administrators may be overwhelmed or complacent and fail to change the 
default settings of new systems and software. This allows attackers to gain 
access using the default login and password combination. This lowers the 
cost of entry by reducing the knowledge and resources necessary to target 
some systems.  
For terrorists, a simple-unstructured cyberterror attack may require minimal 
investment, but the results will also be constrained in their effects. The 
vulnerable systems may not have any tactical or strategic significance. As the 
level of cyberterror attack increases the costs of intelligence, human capital, 
and in some cases processing power, escalate as well. The United States, 
with its enormous human and technological resources has attempted to 
create an offensive IW capability. Yet, after several years and millions of 
dollars, this capability may not yet have reached an operational status.60 
In review, the low cost of entry holds true if the capability sought is intended to 
accomplish simple-unstructured cyberterror support or attacks. However, the 
cost of entry will increase for both advanced-structured and complex-
coordinated cyberterror attacks. 
D. Disincentives to Pursuing Cyberterrorism 
While the previous section examined the factors that may induce terrorist 
organizations to diversify into cyberterror, this section examines some of the 
                                                 
58 A. P. Iuris, "Information Terrorism," Jane’s for Intelink - Terrorism:  A Global Survey, 
01 May 1997. 
59  A Trojan horse is malicious software contained within an otherwise useful program. 
60 William M. Arkin, “A Mouse that Roars?” Special to washingtonpost.com, 7 June 
1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/arkin.htm 
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factors that may reduce their incentives. The availability and effectiveness of 
strategic alternatives, an increasing emphasis on the protection of 
infrastructures, and overall uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of 
cyberterror all provide disincentives.  
1. Strategic Alternatives 
Cyberterrorism is one of several strategic options available to 
contemporary terrorist organizations 
• Terrorists have multiple strategic options but limited resources. 
• A large supply of soft targets means that their traditional methods are 
still viable. 
• Cyberterror does not have the potential to produce mass casualties.  
• Achieving a level of cyberterror capable of producing similar 
spectacular results requires a significant investment. 
The utility of cyberterrorism may be lessened by the presence of strategic 
alternatives for existing terrorist groups. The strategic alternatives include 
traditional terrorist operations (bombings, hijackings, kidnapping, 
assassination, etc.) and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
weapons (CBRN).61  
Cyberterror has the potential to cause widespread disruption; but its actual 
physical effects are limited. It does not currently have the capability to cause 
widespread destruction. The principal consequences of a cyberterror attack 
include a loss of reputation and confidence (psychological), a loss of 
proprietary information and privacy, and a loss of money or capital (financial). 
In most cases, the risk to information systems is not directly related to the risk 
to human life. There are some exceptions, and it is possible that widespread 
disruption can increase mortality indirectly. However, the physical harm that 
can be inflicted by cyberterrorism does not approach that possible using 
CBRN.  
Of course, some terrorist groups may pursue limited cyberterror capabilities in 
order to enhance their ability to conduct conventional operations. Similarly, 
                                                 
61 See Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer pp. 14-18, for a description of these weapons. 
Note that the use of this acronym does not mean that this is an all-in-one package. Each 
component has specific resource requirements and implications.  
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they may pursue limited cyberterror capabilities to facilitate access to the 
resources necessary to develop CBRN weapons. While a terrorist 
organization could conceivably pursue each of these alternatives, it is unlikely 
because of resource constraints. Terrorist organizations have limited 
resources and are generally averse to increased risk, since their risk level is 
high enough already. Pursuit of complex-coordinated cyberterror capabilities 
may reduce rather than enhance their capability to conduct other operations, 
because of the potentially high resource requirements. It is also unlikely that 
groups that have dedicated themselves to the pursuit of more lethal and 
destructive weaponry would view mass disruption as essential to their efforts. 
If it is not perceived as essential, few terrorist organizations have the 
resources to afford luxuries.  
The continuing utility of traditional terrorist methods represents a disincentive 
to the potential use of cyberterror. The increasing attention or focus on CBRN 
terrorism and cyberterrorism may actually result in increased opportunities for 
terrorist organizations that utilize more traditional means and methods. They 
may be able to operate “below the radar” of law enforcement agencies that 
are increasingly concerned with more exotic forms of terrorism. Terrorist 
organizations “seem to prefer assurance of modest success to more 
complicated and complex- but potentially higher pay-off (in terms of casualties 
and publicity) operations.”62 The lure of traditional methods may be sustained 
by the increasing lethality of conventional weaponry. This would potentially 
enable greater efficiency for terrorist organizations.  
2. Counterterrorism Forces 
Two factors make it likely that anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism will 
improve significantly 
• The increased awareness of vulnerabilities (as a result of Y2K, PCCIP, 
etc.) will likely lead to improved defenses. 
• The capabilities and resources of counterterrorist forces are increasing. 
One threat to the potential of cyberterror is the growth of defensive 
capabilities. In the absence of a superpower threat, there has been an 
increasing focus on terrorist threats.  There is a growing awareness in both 
the private and public sector of vulnerabilities and dependencies associated 
with information systems. The President’s Commission on the Critical 
                                                 
62 Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum,  
presented to the Fifth Annual Conference on Strategy at the US Army War College Carlisle 
Barracks, PA, 15 July 1994. 
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Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) report and the potential for Year 2000 (Y2K) 
computer problems has increased awareness of information system 
vulnerabilities and dependencies and may decrease the cyberterrorist’s 
window of opportunity. Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and 
similar organizations have improved their structure and procedures to identify 
system violations and respond with the appropriate countermeasures.  The 
response time to system attacks is improving with each attack by typical 
hackers. A prime example is the rapid reaction to the “Melissa” macro virus. 
Terrorist organizations that use information technology for improved 
command and control are as vulnerable as any other organization to 
monitoring and intrusion. The use of strong encryption will provide some 
protection but, like other organizations, they are vulnerable when the 
improperly trained user does not follow proper procedures. Their use of 
information technology may help counterattackers locate and track terrorist 
operatives. Internet use can leave an electronic map back to the user and 
mobile telecommunications systems can provide a beacon for counterattack 
forces. Counterterrorist forces could potentially use information warfare tactics 
against the terrorist group to negate or manipulate their action without the 
group realizing it.  
3. Uncertainty 
The utility of Cyberterror is still unknown 
• It is unclear whether disruption is a suitable substitute for destruction. 
• Cyberterror may be an adjunct to destruction but the reliability and 
“half-life” of any attack tool can be limited; a capability may become 
obsolete in a short period of time. 
• The results of a cyberterror attack are difficult to predict. 
• With limited resources, terrorist organizations may be unwilling to 
pursue a capability with so much uncertainty. 
The greatest uncertainty that accompanies the use of cyberterrorism is 
operational - will the attack or collection program achieve the desired results? 
This uncertainty represents another disincentive to cyberterror. While it may 
introduce new vulnerabilities and dependencies, it can also introduce new 
security measures and eliminate existing vulnerabilities. The information 
technology industry continually produces new security measures to eliminate 
existing vulnerabilities; hardware and software upgrades or merely better 
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security procedures, can quickly plug many security holes. An effective attack 
tool or methodology may rapidly lose its effectiveness as awareness 
increases and countermeasures are developed and implemented. Terrorist 
organizations that are constrained by resources might expend a great deal of 
resources acquiring a capability that may be only marginally useful by the time 
it is fully operational because of the rapid pace of change. 
The pace of change means that tools for cyberterror attack and support may 
not achieve the desired effects. In some cases, the effects may be easily 
predictable. However, in many cases the primary and secondary effects of 
disrupting an information system may not be so easily predictable. The 
potential for “blowback” because of unintended consequences cannot be 
ruled out – therefore contributing to uncertainty. A logic bomb may not receive 
the required sequence of events to carry out its programmed intent. 
Additionally, efforts to cover the tracks from an attack may backfire and lead 
the attacked to the attacker. The terrorist group may then find itself on the 
defensive instead of the offensive.  
The final and larger question regarding uncertainty is whether cyberterrorism 
will have the same impact as conventional terrorism. Despite some of the 
advantages offered by cyberterrorism, the ability to generate sufficient 
pressure on the adversary through disruption is still the most critical question. 
Given the demonstrated difficulty of coercing an adversary with physical 
destruction, disruption may not be considered a suitable substitute for 
destruction. Disruption is unlikely to be considered as a unilateral objective 
when the adversary has resorted to force against non-combatants to counter 
terrorist operations (as was the case in Kosovo).  
Despite all of the attention surrounding cyberterror, nobody has successfully 
demonstrated the capability to use these types of attacks to coerce and create 
fear comparable to conventional terrorism.  First, even conventional terrorist 
tactics have a poor track record of achieving their ultimate goals. Second, 
critical infrastructure components are subject to disruption on a regular basis 
as a result of natural phenomena, accidents, and operator error. 
Nevertheless, most individuals and organizations devise ways to deal 
effectively with these disruptions. It is natural to ask what scale of disruption 
would be necessary to achieve the goals of terrorist organizations. This is not 
to say that it is impossible with cyberterror, only that it has not happened yet 
and therefore it is unproven. This lack of proven efficacy contributes to 
uncertainty for terrorist groups thinking about moving into the cyber-realm.  
E.    Factors Acting as Both an Incentive and Disincentive 
Whereas the previous sections addressed factors that were clearly positive, or 
negative, incentives for pursuing cyberterror, the following factors are less 
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clearly defined.  Both rapidly changing technologies and anonymity offer a 
combination of incentives and disincentives for pursuing cyberterrorism. 
1. Rapidly Changing Technology 
Terrorist organizations may potentially profit or be victimized by the 
vulnerabilities associated with rapidly changing technologies 
• Technology is changing at unprecedented rates. 
• Profit and efficiency, not security, are the primary considerations. 
• New technologies can introduce vulnerabilities that are not always well 
understood. 
• The pace of change prevents users and administrators from 
understanding and implementing proper security measures. 
• Standardization of technology for effectiveness and economies of 
scale tends to standardize the vulnerabilities available to an adversary. 
New software and hardware introduce the possibility of new security 
vulnerabilities. The rapid pace of change means that the vulnerabilities of new 
technologies are not always well understood and that many users and 
administrators may be poorly trained in proper security measures. This 
potentially translates into more security vulnerabilities for cyberterrorists to 
exploit. It also imposes a requirement for terrorist organizations to keep 
current with technology changes if they wish to exploit them. 
The demand for new information technologies is commercially driven; 
government has taken a backseat to private industry. Corporations often 
maintain their competitive edge by continually integrating new technology into 
their operations. Most organizations, including the Department of Defense and 
government agencies, employ commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies. 
However, this rapidly changing technology can create vulnerabilities without 
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owner or operator’s knowledge or consent.63 Even program fixes or patches 
may open the doors to exploitation in other program areas. Further, the 
standardization of technology for effectiveness and economies of scale tends 
to standardize the vulnerabilities available to an adversary. 
The pace of change places a burden upon both users and system 
administrators charged with maintaining security. In addition to managing day-
to-day operations, they must keep abreast of newly discovered vulnerabilities, 
threats, and countermeasures. While there has been an increase in 
awareness and use of security measures,64 any system connected to a 
network with remote access can never be completely secure.  
If terrorist organizations wish to pursue cyberterror attacks above the simple-
unstructured level then they must learn to incorporate and understand the 
rapidly occurring changes in Information Technology. Like other organizations 
that use IT, terrorist organizations must be aware of their vulnerabilities and 
ensure that their own use of IT does not become a security liability. 
2. Anonymity  
Anonymity may be achieved, however not without risk 
• Long distance communications allow parties to remain relatively 
anonymous. 
• From the target perspective, it is difficult to immediately distinguish a 
cyberterrorist attack from other malicious activity. 
                                                 
63 Systems change so fast that programmers must build compatibility features into 
software to ensure proper functioning with previous and future standard systems. Microsoft for 
example, in an effort to allow Windows NT Server 4.0 to link to any other operating system, 
contains a flaw in its security function. The flaw gives anyone with standard access to the 
server services the ability, under certain conditions, to alter any file. All this provides the 
potential for unauthorized access or use for group exploitation. As more systems compete on 
the open market, assimilation of the operating systems is key to keeping the seamless 
operation of the information highway. This means that all systems must operate under the 
same guidelines, and these guidelines will bring more problems like those faced by Microsoft 
for the cyberterrorists to exploit.  
64 Current statistics reveal that nations with the higher Internet usage rates also have a 
higher rate (per 100 000 inhabitants) of secure web servers for electronic commerce. “The 
United States is a clear leader with three quarters of all electronic commerce sites and also 
has the highest number of secure web servers at 6.1 per 100 000 inhabitants." OECD, 
Working Party, p 10. 
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• The difficulty in positively identifying the location, identity and intent of 
an attacker can delay or prevent an effective response, giving an edge 
to the attacker. 
• Anonymity is not absolute; calls and connections can be traced and 
computer intrusions detected. 
• Anonymity is not always possible or desirable for terrorist 
organizations. 
The use of cyberterrorism may allow terrorist organizations greater anonymity. 
Theoretically, there are two levels of anonymity – organizational and 
individual; cyberterrorism could potentially enhance both. For obvious 
reasons, individual anonymity has always been an imperative for terrorist 
organizations. Access to the telecommunication’s networks and their growing 
complexity provide ample cover for terrorist groups. Individual terrorists can 
perform malicious acts or collect information on critical infrastructures while 
continually changing locations around the world. Traceroutes of Internet 
routing show the development of network avenues throughout the world, 
which terrorists could use as jumping points for dispersed field operators or a 
means to cover their tracks.  As the Hanover Hacker case demonstrates,65 
hackers may use various network connection paths, but the threat of 
discovery and apprehension remains. 
                                                 
65 Described in detail in Clifford Stoll, The Cuckoo’s Egg (New York:  Pocket Books, 
1990). 
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Improved organizational anonymity could potentially benefit some terrorist 
organizations by allowing them to take action with plausible deniability. This 
may be useful for attempts to manipulate other parties into military action 
against each other. The “Solar Sunrise” incident offers a glimpse into the 
possibilities.66 One possible scenario might involve Taiwanese nationalists, 
conducting attacks that appear to originate in China in order to prod the 
United States into retaliatory action. However, terrorist groups must 
communicate their demands as an essential part of any coercive or deterrent 
strategy and this usually involves (explicitly or implicitly) identifying the 
organization. The exception may be religious or anarchist groups that really 
have no demands, only objectives that are not dependent upon the actions of 
the victims.  
The potential for anonymity during support operations could also be highly 
beneficial. It may allow terrorist organizations to gather information with much 
less risk than conventional reconnaissance. Additionally, unlike cyberterror 
attack, where the terrorist’s network activity is illegal, terrorist IT support 
activities can be legal, cost-effective, and time efficient. 
F. Summary 
What is the supply side of cyberterrorism?  
This section highlighted the factors facilitating the use of traditional terrorism 
as well as other forms such as CBRN and cyberterror.  This was the first 
phase of analyzing the supply side of cyberterrorism. 
Global factors outlined earlier in this chapter emphasize the continuing utility 
of terrorism.   The changing world security environment has resulted in greater 
uncertainty in which ethnic tensions and quests for autonomy are rising.  The 
growth of non-state actors such as TCOs, MNCs and NGOs are free to create 
alliances or independently operate unconstrained by state influence or 
boundaries.  The proliferation of CBRN weapons offers terrorist organizations 
access to greater destructive power than ever before.  Lastly, the information 
revolution is creating an environment in which a terrorist may leverage 
informational vulnerabilities previously not possible.  
                                                 
66 This February 1988 incident involved attempts to penetrate DoD computer systems 
during a period of increased tensions with Iraq. Because DoD officials were initially unable to 
identify the source of the attacks, they believed that the Iraqis could have been responsible 
and considered military options to respond to the attacks. The perpetrators were eventually 
identified as an 18 year old Israeli hacker, Ehud Tenenbaum, and two teenage protégés in 
California.  
  40
Terrorists will likely seek to capitalize on the specific opportunities presented 
by the information revolution. Global connectivity, information technology 
dependence, international legal loopholes and low entry costs collectively may 
contribute to newer forms of terrorism.  If in demand, terrorists may benefit 
from these factors by pursuing capabilities aimed specifically at disrupting 
these vulnerabilities.   
As numerous studies have predicted, the widespread disruption of information 
systems and critical infrastructures could indeed have grave consequences. 
However, developing a capability to accomplish this requires a great deal 
more than just a “computer, modem, telephone, and user-friendly hacker 
software.”67 The viability of traditional terrorist methods as well as other new 
forms of terror (i.e. CBRN), the uncertainty regarding the efficacy of 
cyberterrorism, the limited resources of terrorist organizations, and other 
considerations outlined in this chapter suggest that a more sobering view of 
the supply-side of cyberterror be taken. 
                                                 
67 PCCIP, Critical Foundations, p. 15. 
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IV. The Decision to Pursue Cyberterror:  Factors and 
Influences 
A. Introduction 
While the previous chapter identified the incentives for and disincentives to the 
pursuit of cyberterror, this chapter attempts to determine what types of 
terrorist organizations are most likely to take advantage of these opportunities. 
By definition, all terrorist organizations have demonstrated the motivation and 
intent to effect political or social change through violence. However, the 
targets, methods and scope of violence vary widely.  Terrorist organizations 
are constrained by resources, their goals, and their specific operating 
environment. They must choose tactics and targets that they perceive as 
appropriate. Not every terrorist organization pursues chemical weapons; 
likewise, not every organization will pursue cyberterrorism. Each organization 
must determine the degree to which the disruption of information systems and 
critical infrastructures supports its goals. Therefore, even if a terrorist 
organization recognizes the opportunities and threats, it still must decide 
whether to take advantage of the opportunities and adopt cyberterrorism.  
There are several approaches to analyzing and understanding terrorism and 
terrorist acts: a strategic, a psychological, and an organizational analysis.68 
Each of these approaches represents a valid and valuable analytical 
approach but none of them possesses complete explanatory power.69 It is 
possible that cyberterrorism may not have any strategic utility for a particular 
group, yet it may fulfill the organizational or psychological needs of either 
individuals or the organization as a whole. Conversely, cyberterrorism may be 
congruent with their ideology, yet may be unappealing to the group or key 
individuals within the organization. Therefore, in order to understand the 
potential utility of cyberterrorism, and the likelihood that it will be adopted as a 
tactic, it is important to recognize the impact that its adoption may have on 
                                                 
68 It is important to emphasize that the analysis conducted in this study does not apply 
these perspectives to the origins of terrorist organizations but rather to the decision –making 
processes in existing organizations.  
69 Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism:  Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of 
Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.:  The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990),  pp. 2-
3. 
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each of these dimensions.  In this chapter, we analyze the decision to adopt 
cyberterrorism from the strategic and psychological perspectives.70  
The first section analyzes the utility of cyberterror from a strategic perspective. 
Because terrorist groups with similar ideologies have similar strategic goals, 
the strategic utility of cyberterrorism is examined with respect to particular 
ideologies. This examination is done without regard to resource constraints, 
which are addressed in Chapter V. The second section examines the 
potential effects of individual motivations and group dynamics on the decision 
to pursue cyberterror. It contrasts the motivations of terrorists, computer 
hackers and information technology professionals and highlights the 
challenges and implications of trying to integrate hackers and technical 
professionals into a terrorist organization. The final section examines the 
potential impact of organizational factors, such as structure, culture, and 
organizational lifecycle, on the decision to pursue cyberterror.   
A word of caution is necessary before addressing these issues. Terrorism is 
obviously a complex phenomenon; scholars cannot agree on a definition, let 
alone on the reasons for the adoption of terrorism as a strategy. The same 
difficulty applies to understanding terrorist decision-making; i.e. why and how 
terrorists select tactics and targets. It is important to keep in mind that there 
are wide variations in motivations and tactics among terrorist groups, even 
among those that share similar ideological goals. We realize that the 
characterizations of strategic goals, targeting preferences, psychological 
motivations, and organizational goals offered below are generalizations. 
Further, we understand that our analysis may not be applicable to every group 
under all circumstances. However, these judgments are a necessary first step 
in focusing further investigations of the potential utility for cyberterrorism.  
B. Strategic Analysis 
One method of analyzing the purpose of terrorist acts is to examine them in a 
strategic context; i.e. how the acts relate to the stated strategic goals of the 
terrorist organization.71 These strategic goals may include destabilization, 
coercion, deterrence, revenge, and defense against competing groups or 
                                                 
70 Application of organizational life cycle analysis and other specific organizational 
areas, although introduced in this chapter, were not applied to our framework.  These areas 
did not lend themselves to a general application of terrorism or terrorist ideologies.  Likewise, 
our research did not uncover sufficient data to support such a level of analysis.  However, 
portions of organizational life cycle analysis are incorporated in Chapter Six’s analysis of 
implementation options. 
71 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Strategic Choice,” The Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 1990), pp. 7-24. 
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counterterrorist forces.72 Tactics that garner publicity and international support 
(political, material, or financial), weaken domestic support for or destabilize the 
regime or policies that the terrorists oppose, can support these strategic goals.  
This approach assumes that terrorist organizations possess a collective 
rationality and select courses of action from a set of perceived alternatives.73  
Efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other 
methods of achieving political goals. Reasonably regularized decision making 
processes are employed to make an intentional choice, in conscious 
anticipation of the consequences of various courses of action or inaction. 
Organizations arrive at collective judgements about the relative effectiveness of 
different strategies of opposition on the basis of observation and experience, 
as much as on the basis of abstract strategic conceptions derived from 
ideological assumptions. 74 
Although this passage specifically refers to the decision to adopt terrorism 
versus other means of effecting political change, it can be extended logically 
to the process of selecting weapons, tactics, and targets. However, the 
excessive violence and seemingly random nature of some terrorist acts leads 
many casual observers to question the rationality of terrorists. To a large 
extent, this conclusion is based on mirror imaging; i.e. assuming that terrorists 
reason based on the same premises as their adversaries. The continuing use 
of terrorism does not necessarily reflect terrorist irrationality, but rather reflects 
an inability to understand clearly the premises of terrorist logic. 
                                                 
72 It has also been suggested that terrorists may have an interest in provoking 
disproportionate retaliation, to both gain additional publicity and demonstrate the veracity of the 
charges against a state. This may be particularly true in cases involving repression of an ethnic 
group. See Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics (July 1981):  
p. 387. 
73 Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” p. 8. See also J. DeNardo, Power in Numbers: 
The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1985). 
74 Crenshaw. “The Logic of Terrorism,” p. 8. 
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In reality, there is a great deal of territory between irrationality and rationality. 
Moreover, rational terrorists may reason quite logically, but the fixed premises 
that are the basis of the rational calculus can lead to a “psycho-logic” with 
dreadful consequences. 75 
According to Bruce Hoffman, “All terrorist groups seek targets that are 
rewarding from their point of view, and employ tactics that are consonant with 
their overriding political aims.”76 Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
cyberterrorism in the context of espoused goals.77 Because time and space 
do not allow a group by group analysis, we have adopted the common 
practice of categorizing terrorist groups by their dominant ideology.78 The 
following sections examine the strategic utility of cyberterror for five types of 
terrorist organizations: ethno-nationalist/separatists, revolutionary, far-right, 
new age (single-issue), and religious.79  
1. Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist (ENS) Terrorism 
ENS terrorists principally seek to achieve political autonomy, usually in the 
form of a separate state, or work towards the “elevation of the status of one 
communal group over others.”80 Nationalist groups may also work “to oppose 
foreign influences in their countries.”81 ENS terrorist organizations typically 
                                                 
75 Jerrold M. Post, “Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and 
Constraints,” Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (New 
York:  Lexington Books, 1987), p. 92. 
76 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 158.  
77 We recognize that the specific features of an espoused ideology may be vague or 
inconsistent. Nonetheless, it is possible to classify terrorist organizations by ideology and 
derive some useful insights from the common denominators of these broad ideological 
categories.  
78 Ideology is used in a general sense as “the body of doctrine or thought that guides an 
individual, social movement, institution, or group.” Random House Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary (New York:  Random House, 1991), p. 668. We recognize the difficulty of 
categorizing the complex activity of terrorism and the fact that not all of these categories are 
mutually exclusive. In reality, some groups may adopt ideologies that represent a hybrid of the 
ideological categories that we have chosen. Our effort is not to identify a pure ideological type, 
but only to assign groups to the ideology that most dominates the group’s activity. Additionally, 
we recognize that level of actual commitment to an espoused ideology may vary and that other 
motivations can influence terrorist operations.  
79 Adapted from Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott, eds. The Encyclopedia of World 
Terrorism, Vol. 1 (Armonk:  M.E. Shapre, 1997). 
80 Daniel Byman. “The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21 
(Spring 1998):  pp. 149-169. 
81 Noemi Gal-Or. “Nationalist Terrorism,” The Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, Vol. 1, 
ed. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk:  M.E. Shapre, 1997), p. 192. 
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have great staying power and are among the longest surviving terrorist 
groups. The cause of independent statehood is not easily abandoned, even in 
the face of concentrated counter-terrorist efforts by the adversarial state and 
members of the international community. Examples of ENS terrorist 
organizations are the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the various 
Sikh movements within India, the Palestine Liberation Army, the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Basque ETA in Spain, and the Liberation 
Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. 
In general, the principal strategic goals of ENS groups seeking autonomy are 
to increase the political and financial costs of the adversarial state and its 
supporters and to increase the support for their cause among members of 
their ethnic group. These groups frequently strive to achieve publicity and 
possibly international recognition and support for their cause. Where ENS 
groups seek to limit foreign influence, they frequently attempt to increase the 
economic costs of businesses that are perceived to represent foreign 
influence.  
With regard to violence, certain nationalist terrorists have shown a preference 
for causing numerous casualties; but overall nationalist violence tends to be 
more narrowly focused, especially when compared to the indiscriminate 
application of violence by religious extremists.82 Symbols of authority that 
represent the state are typically the target of violence by nationalist terrorists. 
These types of targets include, but are not limited to, public officials, public 
facilities and utilities, members of other ethnic groups, and representatives of 
other governments that are perceived to oppose self-determination. When 
these groups seek to combat foreign influence in their country, they may 
target the businesses, tourists, and embassies of foreign governments.83 
However, violence against foreign nationals by ENS groups is generally 
limited, because these organizations require international support for their 
efforts. For example, none of the groups mentioned above routinely targets 
the United States or other nations.   
ENS terrorists have also shown a desire and willingness to attack against 
infrastructure targets, which symbolize state control.84 However, using 
cyberterror to attack infrastructure targets requires an advanced-structured or 
complex-coordinated capability. Being the case, it may be simpler and more 
                                                 
82 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 199-205. See also Byman, “The Logic of Ethnic 
Terrorism,” pp. 149-169. 
83 Gal-Or, “Nationalist Terrorism,” p. 193. 
84 As the Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997-Group Profiles highlights, following the 
breakdown of the 1996 cease fire the PIRA conducted a bombing campaign on the British 
mainland targeting train and subway stations as well as shopping areas.  The Tamil Tigers, 
another nationalist group, have targeted public utilities in Sri Lanka – Noemi Gal-Or, 
“Nationalist Terrorism,” p. 193. 
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cost effective for nationalist terrorists operating in the disputed territory to 
continue to use conventional attacks against these types of targets. For 
nationalist terrorists operating from an area external to the disputed territory 
(because of effective security measures or forced exile), cyberterror attacks 
against critical infrastructure may be a viable option. The same logic applies to 
attacks against the critical infrastructure of international supporters of the 
incumbent regime. When the selected targets are not in the immediate area of 
operations, cyberterror attacks offer reduced vulnerability and potentially more 
efficient use of resources. The table below summarizes the considerations 
based on the terrorist location versus the target location. 85 
Location of Target  
Domestic International 
Domestic Conventional attacks are 
simpler; more likely 
Cyberterror attacks provide 







Cyberterror attacks provide 
access that may otherwise 
be unavailable 
Utility of cyberterror 
dependent upon degree of IT 
use in target country. (These 
types of attacks are generally 
eschewed by nationalist 
terrorists) 
Table 4-1:  Effect of Geography on Cyberterror Utility 
The issue of collateral damage (to actual or potential supporters) is significant 
for nationalist terrorists seeking to maintain a base of support among their 
constituency or the international community.  
Their ‘target audience’, however is not just the local, indigenous population but 
often the international community as well. These groups, accordingly, 
recognize the need to tightly control and focus their operations in such a 
manner as to ensure the continued support of their local ‘constituencies’ and 
the sympathy of the international community. What this essentially means is 
that their violence must always be perceived as both purposeful and deliberate, 
sustained and omnipresent. 86 
Cyberterror and its disruptive effects could potentially enhance nationalist 
terrorists’ efforts to create and maintain a constituency and generate 
                                                 
85 This classification is derived from the work of Ariel Merari, “The Classification of 
Terrorist Groups,” Terrorism: An International Journal 1.3/4 (1978):  pp. 331-346. 
86 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 161. 
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international support. Whereas mass violence may drive the undecided citizen 
from the nationalist cause, disruption may become an attractive option to gain 
publicity and support without alienating potential supporters, both domestic 
and international. Limiting damage is a relatively straightforward consideration 
when kidnapping and assassination are employed. However, bombings and 
infrastructure attacks may require more careful planning and execution to 
avoid collateral damage. The same considerations will likely apply when 
conducting cyber attacks against infrastructure targets.  
The more successful ethno-nationalist /separatist terrorist organizations will be 
able to determine an effective level of violence that is at once ‘tolerable’ for the 
local populace, tacitly acceptable to international opinion and sufficiently 
moderated not to provoke a massive governmental crackdown and reaction. 87 
Cyberterror could easily meet the standard of “purposeful and deliberate” and 
still be tolerable for the local population. However, lower level capabilities may 
not present a “sustained and omnipresent” threat. First, the capabilities at the 
simple-unstructured level may become obsolete as security measures are 
improved. Second, attacks at the simple-unstructured level may not rise 
above the “noise level” created by ordinary hackers or naturally occurring 
disruptions. A good example of this is the denial of service attacks carried out 
in May 1998 by the Internet Black Tigers, purportedly an offshoot of the LTTE, 
against e-mail servers of the Sri Lankan government. These simple attacks 
caused a minor disruption but were quickly countered. Since then the Internet 
Black Tigers have disappeared.  
The low cost of entry may be an advantage for ENS terrorist organizations 
with limited resources or no sponsorship. However, low entry cost primarily 
equates to a simple-unstructured cyberterror capability. These types of 
attacks, may initially offer good return on a minimum investment but the long 
term value is questionable. The initial attacks are likely to get a great deal of 
publicity but will also result in improved security measures. At the simple-
unstructured level, where the attacker is dependent on others to provide his 
tools, the ENS terrorist may not be able to circumvent this improved security. 
A more robust capability will require a more significant investment.  
At the advanced-structured level, cyberterrorists may be able to cause greater 
damage and disruption but they may be unable to predict and control the 
effects of their attacks. Widespread disruption may succeed in providing 
publicity but unless the effects are controlled, it may also alienate potential 
supporters by exceeding their tolerance level. In areas where the terrorists are 
not particularly concerned with collateral damage, an advanced-structured 
                                                 
87 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 162 
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capability may be useful in a supporting role for conventional terrorist attacks. 
At this level, cyberterror attacks could provide a tactical advantage for 
terrorists by degrading the command and control of counterterrorist forces. 
Cyberterror attacks could also be used to delay the response of emergency 
services. Cyberterror beyond the advanced-structured level is inconsistent 
with the scope of past traditional ENS terrorist acts and therefore unlikely. 
The connectivity and information technology dependency of both the disputed 
regime and the terrorist constituency are likely to be important factors in the 
decision to use cyberterror. If the ENS terrorist operates within a society with 
minimal information-systems dependency and connectivity, then the 
attractiveness of cyberterror lessens due to the smaller possible realized gain. 
However, if the target audience is a developed society, such as Western 
Europe (see statistics available in chapter III), network connectivity provides 
access to the audience, whom the nationalist and the government are 
competing to influence. The growing global connectivity may provide the ENS 
terrorist with access to the international community regardless of where he 
resides. The ENS terrorist operating in another country can remain virtually 
“local.” He can conduct cyberterror attacks from virtually any location with 






Representative Sample Derived From 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 
ENS (9) 
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To summarize, for ENS terrorists:  
• Attractiveness of cyberterror is primarily related to the information-
systems dependency of the adversary. 
• Continued IT use to facilitate propaganda and publicity of nationalist 
aims to leverage support from the international community. 
• Simple-unstructured attacks are likely to prove non-coercive. 
• Advanced-structured attacks can support conventional operations to 
provide a tactical advantage, and also be used to gain international 
attention. 
• Mass disruption of information infrastructure and other complex-
coordinated activities are unlikely. 
2. Revolutionary Terrorism 
Revolutionary terrorists, such as the Red Army Faction, seek to overthrow 
established governments as part of a broad program of social transformation. 
Although the political ideologies of the revolutionary terrorists can range, they 
are generally leftists.88 In contrast to nationalist terrorists, revolutionary 
terrorists do not “seek to preserve the status quo, the aim is to change the 
rules of the game.”89 They are interested in a wholesale political 
transformation, not just the redistribution of territory for a particular ethnic 
group.90 
Groups such as the German Red Army Faction (a group dominated by left-
wing revolutionaries) have “selectively kidnapped and assassinated persons 
whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression in order to 
                                                 
88 Gal-Or, “Revolutionary Terrorism,” p. 194. 
89 Gal-Or, “Revolutionary Terrorism,” p. 195. 
90 There is, of course, some overlap between nationalist and revolutionary terrorism. 
Many nationalist groups espouse a political ideology that they intend to apply to their newly 
created state. However, their primary goal is the establishment of that new state rather than 
the transformation of the existing state. For true Marxist revolutionaries, the establishment of a 
state on the basis of ethnic affiliation is antithetical. Nonetheless, many nationalist groups 
adopt a leftist ideology derived from Marxism.  
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attract publicity and promote a Marxist-Leninist revolution.”91 In general, 
“Marxist revolutionaries do not believe in indiscriminate violence.”92 
Some social-revolutionary terrorist organizations, in particular the Italian Red 
Brigades, have a history of targeting computer-related facilities. The Italian 
Red Brigades in their “Strategic Directions Resolution” of February 1978 
identified computer systems as the tool of American multinationals and a link 
to imperialism. From the Strategic Directions Resolution:  
You see, computers are identified as a symbol, the highest profile target. It is 
important to destroy their mesh, to disrupt these systems, beginning from the 
technical-military personnel who direct them, instruct them, and make them 
functional against the proletariat. 93 
 
A statistical review, conducted in a separate study by Rozen and Musacchio, 
identified a total of 57 attacks against computer-related facilities between 1978 
and 1988. Ninety-two percent of the attacks took place within Europe (Italy 
52%, France 21%, West Germany 12%, Belgium 7%) with about half of the 
computer-related facility attacks within Italy attributed to the Red Brigades.94 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, left-wing revolutionary movements 
have steadily declined.95 With regard to the remaining left-wing movements, 
identifying the movement’s context within its state, that is the state’s relative 
information infrastructure development level and movement’s locale within the 
state i.e. rural versus urban, helps discern the attractiveness of cyberterror. 
For example, a revolutionary movement focused in the hills of Peru, a rural 
location with little or no information-systems dependent infrastructure will have 
little use for cyberterror. As a movement begins to tackle recruitment and 
operations in an urban environment, the attractiveness of cyberterror 
increases if, and only if, the urban environment has a greater information 
systems infrastructure.  
                                                 
91 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 157. 
92 Gal-Or, “Revolutionary Terrorism,” p. 194. 
93 Quoted in Jerrold M. Post, Kevin Ruby, and Eric Shaw, From Car Bombs to Logic 
Bombs: The Growing Threat from Information Systems Terrorism. (Washington D.C.:  George 
Washington University, 1998), p. 6. 
94 Post, Ruby and Shaw, p. 6. 
95 While the USSR did not actively support every left-wing terrorist organization, the 
decline and collapse of European communism did coincide with a general decrease in the 
level of activity by left-wing terrorist organizations in Europe. The effectiveness of counter-
terrorist forces also played a significant role.  
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Revolutionary terrorist target selection is dominated by the symbolism of the 
target. Past attacks, as the one described above by the Italian Red Brigades, 
focused on individuals or symbols of state control. In the case presented, 
computer-related facilities represented the symbols of state control. However, 
the computer is no longer the sole province of governments and large 
corporations. When the Red Brigades issued their communiqué, personal 
computers did not exist and the Internet was still the ARPANET.96 All this has 
changed though with the introduction and proliferation of the personnel 
computer and the Internet; this has allowed ordinary citizens access to 
computing power that was once only available to governments and 
corporations.  
 
                                                 
96 Today’s Internet is the result of US Government research on packet-switched 
networks. The ARPANET, developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) was a restricted wide area network that connected military, university and research 
computers. In the 1970s, DARPA adopted the TCP/IP protocol suite that is at the heart of the 
current Internet. For a brief history of the Internet, see Barry M. Leiner, et. al, A Brief History of 
the Internet, available online at http://www.isoc.org/internet-history/brief.html 
LOCATIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM
Figure 4-2 
Representative Sample Derived From 




Infrastructure Development Level  
Low High 
Rural Conventional attacks are 
simpler; more likely 
Cyberterror attacks are 
useful for destabilizing  





Urban Cyberterror attacks are useful 
only for foreign targets (e.g. – 
multi-national corporation with 
subsidiary operating in 
country). 
Cyberterror more likely 
Table 4-2:  Effect of Infrastructure Development on Cyberterror Utility 
Unlike in the late 1970s, computer networks today represent a tool for the 
disaffected to leverage their time to communicate their message to a large 
public audience, as is evident by the number of homepages for disaffected 
groups found on the web today.97 Disruption of this medium, in an unfocused 
manner, may be counterproductive for revolutionary terrorists. However, 
focused application of cyberterror in support of traditional revolutionary 
violence is consistent with revolutionary ideology. In particular, focused 
attacks against governments and corporations may be highly attractive to 
revolutionary terrorists.  
To summarize, for revolutionary terrorists: 
• Attractiveness of cyberterror is primarily related to the information-
systems dependency of the adversary, with an added emphasis on 
the rural/urban context.  
• Continued IT use to facilitate propaganda is attractive.  
• Simple-unstructured attacks are likely to prove non-coercive.  
• Advanced-structured attacks can support continued application of 
traditional terrorism, and can also be employed in a stand-alone 
approach against commercial/capitalist interests within the 
opposed state.  
                                                 
97 The Anti-Defamation League maintains a list of extremist groups that utilize the 
Internet. For more information see http://www.adl.org/frames/front_terrorism_up.html. 
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• Mass disruption is unattractive, because of unfocused effects and 
the changing symbolization of information systems. 
3. Far Right Extremist Terrorism 
Within far-right extremist groups98, “there is usually the idea that certain 
groups of people are inferior or superior as an innate principle. This is 
combined with an acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of action.”99  
Hatred of socialism or communism and a tendency towards authoritarianism 
are common traits among far-right extremist groups.100  These groups vary in 
their use of violence, but “the most extreme groups, such as the Nazis and 
modern Italian neo-fascists, see violence as a creative, cleansing force.”101  
Even though right-wing extremists operate within today’s advanced 
information societies (see chapter III), information infrastructure attacks by 
right-wing terrorists are unlikely because unfocused application of cyberterror 
would create a large number of collateral victims, some of whom may be 
                                                 
98 Due to legal constraints, U.S. based extremist groups were not considered by this 
working group. 
99 Tore Bjorgo, “Far-Right Extremism,” Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. Martha 
Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk:  M.E. Shapre, 1997),  p. 197. 
100 Tore Bjorgo, “Far-Right Extremism,” p. 197. 
101 Tore Bjorgo, “Far-Right Extremism,” p. 197. 
Figure 4-3 
LOCATIONS OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISTS
Representative Sample Derived From Jane's 
World Insurgency and Terrorism, 1998 
Far-right Extremists (6) 
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supporters of the extremist cause. With respect to information infrastructure, 
of all the types of terrorist groups, the right-wing groups have shown the most 
extensive use of the Internet for propaganda purposes, selling of survivalist 
gear, and proliferation of hate material.102 They may therefore be disinclined 
to attack or disrupt something that they view as an effective tool for their 
movement. 
An essential characteristic of far-right extremism is the psychology involved in 
the application of their violence. Seeing the enemy as inferior and using 
violence as a cleansing force provides the extremist satisfaction and reaffirms 
their self-fulfilling logic of dominance over the inferior group. Cyberterror’s lack 
of personal contact and disconnection from its target are unlikely to satisfy the 
psychological needs of some far-right extremist groups. 
Recognizing these disincentives leads to the following forecast regarding far-
right terrorist use of cyberterror: 
• Operations will occur in advanced information societies.  
• They will continue use of IT for support operations.  
• Cyberterror attacks against traditional targets will fail to satisfy the 
psychological needs of both the group and individual.  
• Mass disruption may be unattractive because its effects would 
often impact the group's own support operations. 
4. New Age Terrorism 
When the stomach is full, one looks for something else to do. 
Chinese proverb 
New age terrorist (single-issue) groups turn to violence “when they believe 
that the issues they promote become too urgent for the slow progress of 
traditional campaigning.”103 New age terrorist groups, such as anti-abortion 
and animal rights groups, differ from revolutionary terrorists because new age 
terrorist groups focus on one issue above all else, where as revolutionary 
                                                 
102 Post, Ruby, & Shaw, p. 8. 
103 Toby Dodge, “Single-Issue Group Terrorism,” Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. 
Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk:  M.E. Shapre, 1997), p. 200. 
  55
terrorists generally have wider aims. New age terrorist groups are seldom, if 
ever, found outside the context of a greater single-issue, legal, social 
movement. The new age terrorist group can, and probably does, act 
independently from the law-abiding majority of the movement. 
New age terrorist acts tend to be focused in nature against particular 
industries, sections of society, or corporations. The Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF) initially concentrated on targeting pharmaceutical companies, which 
used animals for scientific research.  The ALF maintains an espoused non-
violence strategy against humans, and instead focuses on disrupting 
company operations in an effort to force them out of business.  Past ALF 
tactics include arson and sabotage.104  Cyberterror offers these terrorists the 
ability to target and attack specific corporations via the cyber realm by 
disruption of E-commerce or web-based advertising. The degree to which the 
particular corporation is cyber-vulnerable then becomes the relevant variable.  
Since targeting national level infrastructure is inconsistent with most new age 
terrorist ideologies,105 the likelihood of such an event is low. But, cyberterror at 
the simple-unstructured level would be attractive to the new age terrorist due 
to its ability to expand the terrorist’s target set at a relatively low cost and low 
level of expertise.  
The ALF uses the Internet as a communications medium and to promote their 
cause.   
The ALF and associated groups maintain a number of web sites posting 
reports on recent attacks, appealing to users to write to imprisoned members 
and giving advice on security.  Activists also communicate by E-mail.106 
The ALF operates around the world but most of their terrorist activity takes 
place within the United Kingdom, Canada, and United States.   
                                                 
104 James, Morris, and Pienaar, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism. (United 
Kingdom, Jan 98) “Single Issue Terrorism.” 
105 Other animal rights terrorists such as the Animal Rights Militia and Justice 
Department have expanded their target sets from facilities to the individuals involved in the 
activity, but still the application of violence has been focused in nature and not indiscriminately 
applied against society. See James, Morris, and Pienaar, Jane’s World Insurgency and 
Terrorism. (United Kingdom, Jan 98) “Single Issue Terrorism.” 
106 James, Morris, and Pienaar, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism. (United 
Kingdom, Jan 98) “Single Issue Terrorism.” 
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…the ALF is believed to consist mainly of bright, young, middle class 
individuals, including computer science students and even some 
professionals.107 
Based on these considerations, new age terrorists will likely: 
• Operate in advanced information societies. 
• Continue use of IT for support operations such as communications and 
propaganda. 
• Find simple-unstructured attacks attractive because they expand their 
range of ‘property’ targets at a low cost.  
• Develop advanced-structured attacks to provide a greater probability of 
attack success in disrupting E-commerce of targeted corporations.  
• Reject complex-coordinated effects of mass disruption as inconsistent 
with ideology and past group behavior. 
                                                 
107 James, Morris, and Pienaar, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism. (United 
Kingdom, Jan 98) “Single Issue Terrorism.” 
 
LOCATIONS OF NEW AGE TERRORISM
Figure 4-4 
Representative Sample Derived From Jane's 
World Insurgency and Terrorism, 1998 
New Age (3) 
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5. Religious Terrorism 
Religious extremism represents the fastest growing type of terrorism. “In 
1968, none of the identifiable active terrorist groups were religious. Today, 
there are about 50 known groups, and about a quarter of them are religious in 
motivation.”108 The roots of religious extremism go back over 2,000 years, but 
for most of the twentieth century, motivations based on ideological issues, 
such as Marxism or nationalism, have been more prevalent. For the 
religiously motivated terrorist, “violence is an inspired duty carried out in 
response to some specific theological belief. So this extremism has a god-
driven aspect absent for secular terrorism.”109 Contrary to the revolutionary 
terrorist’s tendency to focus violence, religious extremists “have engaged in 
more indiscriminate acts of violence, directed against a far wider category of 
targets encompassing not merely their declared enemies, but anyone who 
does not share their religious faith.”110 Some of these acts have been 
designed to require the supreme sacrifice, of the adherent’s life. 111 
                                                 
108 Bruce Hoffman, “Religious Extremism,” Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. Martha 
Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk:  M.E. Shapre, 1997), p. 210. 
109 Hoffman, “Religious Extremism,” p. 210.  
110 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 158-159. 
111 There is some evidence however that suicide bombers do not represent the group 
as a whole. Harvey W. Kushner points out that the suicide bombers employed in Israel and the 
West Bank are specially recruited and trained in isolation from other terrorists. Harvey W. 
Kushner, “Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19.4 (Oct-
Dec 1996):  pp. 329-337. 
LOCATIONS OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
Figure 4-5 
Representative Sample Derived From 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 
Religious (19) 
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From the characteristics described above, cyberterror use by the religious 
terrorist would be ideologically consistent with regard to complex-coordinated 
cyberterror attacks against targets which may cause mass disruptions – such 
as information-systems control mechanisms for critical infrastructures. Simple-
unstructured attacks, which require little or no self-sacrifice, may be 
inconsistent with the intrinsic motivations of religious terrorists. To summarize, 
for religious terrorists: 
• IT use to facilitate global expansion is highly attractive. 
• Simple-unstructured attacks fail to rise to the level of destruction 
or violence consistent with religious terrorism.  
• Advanced-structured attacks begin to offer the returns 
consistent with religious terrorism.  
• Complex-coordinated attacks are most consistent with ideology 
and motivations. 
6. Hacker groups 
The final group we examine is the hacker organization that may wish to cross 
over into terrorism. Such a group would already have many of the necessary 
technical skills to perform advanced-structured and possibly even complex-
coordinated attacks (see Chapter Five). These factors tend to make hacker 
groups some of the most menacing from a cyberterror perspective. Indeed, it 
can be argued that hacker groups are the only organizations known to 
possess the technical prowess associated with a complex-coordinated 
capability level. Some hacker groups have used their skills to publicize various 
causes creating a phenomenon called "hacktivism." Their venom has been 
directed against targets from Switzerland112 to China113.  
On closer inspection, the hacker menace appears less threatening. The only 
verified "hacktivist" strikes have been against worldwide web and mail 
servers. Although these groups have declared their support for a variety of 
causes, the only cause that they dependably support is freedom of 
                                                 
112 Niall McKay, "The Golden Age of Hacktivism," Wired News. 22 Sept. 1998. 
http://www.wired.com 
113 Sumner Lemon, "It's Payback Time, Say Mainland Hackers," Computerworld Hong 
Kong (On-line version). 11 August 1998. http://www.cw.com.hk/Features/f980811001.htm 
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information.114 Furthermore, they are loose affiliations whose primary purpose 
is to provide a forum for the exchange of information and braggadocio. Hacker 
groups have little to no centralized authority. While they may recognize certain 
members as particularly skilled, they are resistant to official hierarchy. Group 
members often remain anonymous to each other and tend toward paranoia. 
These traits, combined with their "virtual" organizations, inhibit the building of 
trust. 
The individual members themselves tend to be loners. They usually put their 
own self-interests above those of the group.115 They have an abysmal record 
of keeping secrets. When arrested, they have historically been very 
cooperative.116 Hackers draw their identity from their mastery of the 
information infrastructure. The loss of that infrastructure is counter to their self-
interest. The group character described above and these individual 
characteristics make it unlikely that hacker groups will pursue anything 
beyond the advanced-structured level. 
• Technically complex attacks are consistent with the character and 
ideology of hacker groups; but 
• Coordinated attacks are inconsistent with the group dynamics of 
hacker groups. 
• Hacker groups have a stake in the continued availability of the 
information infrastructure. 
• Hackers are likely to continue to make political statements through 
information technology. 
C. Psychological Analysis 
A second approach to understanding the “demand side” of cyberterror is to 
analyze terrorist acts as the result of psychological factors, both individual and 
                                                 
114 One group recently advocated a cyberwar against countries with poor human rights 
records. Other groups discouraged the action, pointing out the risk to information freedom that 
would likely result. The initiating group backed down. See the joint hacker group statement at 
http://www.l0pht.com/lou.html 
115 The only exception has been over freedom of information issues. 
116 See the account of Operation Sundevil in Bruce Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown: 
Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier (New York:  Bantam Books, 1992). 
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group.117 However, understanding the psychology of the individual terrorist is 
difficult. Aside from the obvious difficulty in observing terrorists in an 
appropriate setting, this approach also has “serious methodological 
problems,” such as a lack of a control group and the possibility that behavior 
and motivations are affected by participation in illegal activities.118  
Comparative studies of terrorist psychology do not indicate a unique terrorist 
mind. Terrorists do not fit into a specific psychiatric diagnostic category. 
Indeed, most would be considered to fit within the spectrum of normality.119  
Despite the difficulties associated with individual psychological analysis, group 
psychology can offer valuable insights about decision-making processes in a 
terrorist organization. 120 In particular, there is a tendency toward a collective 
reasoning in which individual judgement is suspended in the interest of 
conforming to group expectations and maintaining a sense of belonging.121  
A weakness of the group psychology approach is its dependence on an 
understanding the organizational structure of the terrorist organization. 
According to Post, “Both structure and social origin are of consequence. 
Identification of the locus of power and decision-making authority is 
particularly important to structural analysis.”122 These attributes can be 
particularly difficult to determine, especially when terrorist organizations adopt 
a network structure with decentralized decision-making and loose 
coordination.  
                                                 
117 Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic:  Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Psychological Forces,” The Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.:  
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), pp. 25-42. 
118 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” p. 391.  
119 Jerrold M. Post, “Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism:  Psychological Motivations and 
Constraints,” Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (New 
York:  Lexington Books, 1987), p. 92. 
120 Post, “Prospects,” p. 93. See also Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic,” pp. 25-40. 
121 Post, “Prospects,” pp. 93-99. See also Jerrold M. Post, “Narcissism and the 
Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship,” Political Psychology 7.4 (1986):  pp. 675-687. 
122 Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic,” p. 32. 
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1. The Effects of Group Dynamics 
The pressure in small groups to conform may pose a barrier to the 
innovation123 necessary to implement cyberterror. Implementing an 
advanced-structured or complex-coordinated cyberterror capability would be a 
significant innovation for any existing terrorist organization. It would likely 
involve strategic, structural, and cultural changes within the organization. The 
dynamics of small groups may make it difficult to overcome the natural 
resistance to change. 
New technologies are usually simply embedded in existing organizational 
structures without resulting in real innovation.124 Simple-unstructured level 
cyberterrorism is an adoption, not truly an innovation; it is the result of the 
diffusion of IT to terrorist organizations without any structural change. It can be 
accomplished with little organizational restructuring and simply reflect the 
same applications of IT that we have seen in legitimate organizations: 
improved communications, coordination, and efficiency. However, as Chapter 
Five will show, advanced-structured and complex-coordinated levels are 
significant departures from past practices, and will likely require a greater level 
of organizational innovation/restructuring. There is typically a great deal of 
opposition to restructuring. 
                                                 
123 There are at least two frames of reference for innovation. One is industry-based: “an 
item is judged to be an innovation if it represents a significant departure from the state of the 
art in a given field at the time it appears.” The other perspective is from the organization; “the 
item is judged to be a significant departure for the organization.” We use the term “innovation” 
to denote the introduction of a new process or strategy from the perspective of an organization. 
That is, the particular process or strategy is new to that specific organization. In reality, it may 
actually be an adaptation or diffusion of somebody else’s innovation. John R. Kimberly, 
"Organizational and Contextual Influences on the Diffusion of Technological Innovation," New 
Technology as Organizational Innovation:  The Development and Diffusion of Microelectronics, 
ed. Johannes M. Pennings and Arend Buitendam (Cambridge:  Ballinger, 1987), p. 248. 
124 John Child, Hans-Dieter Ganter and Alfred Kieser, "Technological Innovation and 
Organizational Conservatism," New Technology as Organizational Innovation:  The 
Development and Diffusion of Microelectronics, ed. Johannes M. Pennings and Arend 
Buitendam (Cambridge:  Ballinger, 1987),  p. 112. 
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Behavioral inertia and organizational conservatism are the norm; rapid and 
thoroughgoing acceptance of innovation is exceptional. For a variety of 
reasons, some obvious and some not so obvious, it can be anticipated that 
most individuals and collectivities will behave in ways that maintain the familiar 
and screen out the unfamiliar…The probability of innovation’s being adopted 
and used fully is increased to the extent that its visible impact on established 
routines is relatively small.  125 
Although there are other factors, the role of the “champions,” or “boundary 
spanning individuals” may be one of the most crucial adopter characteristics in 
the innovation process.126 Innovation generally requires a “champion,” 
someone with the vision, technological expertise, and credibility to build 
consensus for change. The innovation decision process generally consists of 
lower level participants (proponents or “champions”) attempting to convince 
the upper level participants to approve the project. 127 Although it is possible 
for innovation to be a top down process, it may be more likely to be bottom-up 
when advanced technology is involved. A study on integrating advanced 
technology found that lower level technical people are usually responsible for 
initiating the innovation decision process.  
These individuals are often young, not long out of school, and are fascinated 
by the potential of advanced technology to improve operations within their 
company. 128 
Champions generally come in two types: the technical champion and the 
management champion. The technical champion is the person who 
“generates or adopts and develops an idea for technological innovation and is 
                                                 
125 Kimberly, p. 238. 
126 Strategic and financial considerations, the credibility and commitment of the 
“champions,” and organizational politics (the ability to generate consensus at lower levels 
before moving up the chain) influence the process of justification. Other influences are the 
degree to which adoption and implementation distracts from current operations; the position of 
the proponents in the organizational structure/hierarchy also affects decision-making.  
127 James W. Dean Jr., "Building the Future:  The Justification Process for New 
Technology," New Technology as Organizational Innovation:  The Development and Diffusion 
of Microelectronics, ed. Johannes M. Pennings and Arend Buitendam (Cambridge:  Ballinger, 
1987), p. 39. 
128 Dean, p. 38. 
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devoted to it.” A management champion “acts as a supporter or sponsor to 
shield and promote the idea within an organization.” 129  
In legitimate organizations, these individuals must build a consensus for 
change. This will be particularly difficult in terrorist organizations as the 
dynamic of small groups, particularly in underground organizations, tends to 
enforce conformity.130 It may be difficult to voice opinions about even small 
changes, let alone the radical changes that the advanced-structured and 
complex-coordinated levels of cyberterror require. An exception may be when 
an informal group leader becomes the champion. If the champion is not an 
informal group leader he/she may still influence innovation.  The proximity of 
the champions to the decision-makers also influences the decision.131 
Therefore, the dynamics of small group interactions may inhibit the adoption 
of cyberterrorism unless a “champion” emerges from the group leadership.  
2. Comparison of Individual Motivations 
A number of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations may influence an individual to 
pursue cyberterrorism. The intrinsic motivations are power and self-fulfillment.  
The extrinsic motivations are pay, non-financial personal benefits, 
responsibility and empowerment. We address these motivations through a 
comparison of hackers, terrorists and computer technology professionals. 
Hackers and terrorists both are generally young and narcissistic. At a certain 
level, they also crave attention.  They are, to some degree, isolated from other 
social contacts. Both may be isolated from their families and friends and 
alienated from society.132 However, one defining difference is how each 
chooses to carry out their activities.  While both may be considered action-
oriented, the terrorist depends upon physical action whereas hacker activities 
are conducted virtually and remotely.  Excepting the minority personality that 
derives satisfaction from both forms, it is unlikely that members of one group 
will accept the activity of the other, and vice versa. 
                                                 
129 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 6th ed. (Cincinnati:  South-
Western College Publishing, 1998), p. 297. See also Kimberly, p. 248 and James L. 
McKenney, Waves of Change:  Business Evolution Through Information Technology 
(Cambridge:  Harvard Business School Press, 1995), p. 210; Peter J. Frost and Carolyn P. 
Egri, “The Political Process of Innovation,” Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 13 ed. 
L.L. Cummings and Barry M. Straw (New York:  JAI Press, 1991), pp. 229-95; Jay R. 
Galbraith, "Designing the Innovating Organization,” Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1982, pp. 
5-25. 
130 Post, Terrorist Psycho-Logic, pp. 33-34. 
131 Dean, pp. 53-57. 
132 Allen N. Chantler, Risk:  The Profile of the Computer Hacker (Doctoral Thesis, Curtin 
University of Technology), pp. 163-166. 
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Hackers and computer technology professionals have an intrinsic motivation 
to work with information technology and find dealing with technology a 
challenge. Computer professionals are currently in great demand yet there is 
a short supply of qualified specialists. Ironically, hackers (particularly 
amateurs) are multiplying rapidly given the proliferation of tools available via 
the Internet. Both share extrinsic motivations from compensation and 
autonomy, however, only professionals have the ability to find legitimate 
employment with generous compensation because of shortages of skilled 
applicants.  Many companies are hesitant to hire known hackers given the 
obvious risks associated with their employment.  
While membership in a terrorist organization may at some level provide 
intrinsic motivation for an individual hacker, or technology professional, it is 
unlikely to provide much in the way of extrinsic motivations.  As previously 
stated, terrorist organizations typically form around a group’s ideological 
interests first, and later are subordinated to the interests of the individuals in 
the group.  At the group level, interests include overthrowing the state,  
establishing a new order, or the pursuing a specific ideal such as animal 
rights.  At the individual level, interests range from power to revenge and self-
fulfillment.  Terrorist groups, limited in resources, generally do not provide 
monetary incentives to its members.  Terrorists groups generally do not 
empower their members beyond their specific specialties.  Unlike the highly 
trained knowledge workers of today’s information technology organizations, 
terrorist specialists are simply ‘highly skilled’ at a dangerous, but simple, 
specialty. IT professionals can demand greater levels of empowerment 
because of the difficult nature of their skills, whereas terrorist specialists can 
not. 
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D. Organizational Analysis  
[A]cts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational 
survival or the requirements of competition with rival terrorist groups. Terrorism 
is the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization, a decision-making 
process that links collectively held values and goals to the perceptions of the 
environment. An organizational approach assumes that members may be 
attracted to terrorist organizations as much for nonpolitical as political ends. 
Incentives to join can include comradeship, social status, excitement, or 
material reward. The longer a terrorist organization exists, the more likely that 
group solidarity will replace political purpose as the dominant incentive for 
members.133 
A third approach to understanding the “demand” for cyberterror is to examine 
terrorist acts as the result of organizational processes based on their 
similarities to other voluntary organizations.134 An analysis which focuses on 
organizational processes “assumes a complexity of motivation well beyond 
the strategy of challenging governments to effect radical change.”135 This 
approach assumes that terrorist organizations, regardless of their political or 
ideological aims, endeavor to survive above all else and will take actions 
based on this organizational imperative.  
From this perspective, terrorist acts “may serve internal organizational 
functions of control, discipline, and morale building within the terrorist group 
and even become an instrument of rivalry among factions in a resistance 
movement.”136 As an example of this last point, Crenshaw uses the factional 
terrorism among Palestinian groups intended to gain influence among other 
groups rather than influence Israeli public opinion.137 It is important to 
emphasize that terrorist acts can serve to advance both external strategic and 
internal organizational goals. While these purposes are not necessarily 
contradictory, some authors have argued that over time the strategic goals of 
                                                 
133 Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach,” p. 473. See also James Q. Wilson, 
Political Organizations (New York:  Basic Books, 1973).  
134 Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach,” pp. 465-488. 
135 Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach,” p. 487.  
136 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” p. 387. 
137 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” p. 387. 
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terrorist organizations are subordinated to internal organizational goals to the 
detriment of the organization. 138 
Applying an organizational analysis to terrorist organizations entails some 
special considerations. Terrorist organizations differ from other political 
organizations in several important respects. First, they are clandestine by 
nature, which complicates efforts at observing internal organizational 
processes. Second, the clandestine and conspiratorial nature of terrorism 
results in an extreme emphasis on solidarity and allegiance to the group 
rather than the espoused political goals.139 Third, the illegal nature of terrorist 
organizations may also place constraints on their ability to recruit personnel. It 
is important to recognize these differences affect the way that terrorist 
organizations can respond to changes in their environment and that their 
responses to a given set of circumstances may differ markedly from the 
responses of legitimate organizations.  
The organizational approach provides for a more comprehensive analysis 
than either a strategic or a psychological analysis alone. In fact, an 
organizational analysis subsumes these types of analyses while introducing 
other factors such as organizational structure, goal conflict and organizational 
life cycle into the analysis. Similar to the previous psychological analysis, this 
analytical framework is intentionally general.  
1. Organizational Structure 
“An innovative organization is characterized by flexibility, empowered 
employees, and the absence of rigid work rules” 140  
These are not typically the characteristics of terrorist organizations because of 
the need for security.  However, to integrate advanced-structured or complex-
coordinated cyberterror capabilities, these organizational characteristics may 
be a necessary precondition.  These characteristics are significantly 
influenced by an organization’s structure. 
                                                 
138 Charles Lockett, We Bomb, Therefore We Are:  The Evolution of Terrorist Group Life 
Cycles. (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1994), p. vi. See also J.K. 
Zawodny, “Internal Organizational Problems and the Source of Tensions of Terrorist 
Movements as Catalysts of Violence,” Terrorism:  An International Journal  1:3/4 (1978):  pp. 
277-285. 
139 Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach,” p. 480. See also Wilson, Political 
Organizations, p. 50 and Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic,” pp. 33-35. 
140 Daft, p. 294. 
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Structure influences the location of decision-making within the organization. 
Organic structures foster innovation; mechanistic structures stifle/inhibit 
innovation but provide the best structure for efficiently producing routine 
products. Jenkins, Hoffman, and others have noted the general conservatism 
of terrorist groups. This is because they are generally mechanistic. The same 
dilemmas that confront military organizations attempting to adopt networked 
or organic structures confront terrorist organizations: how low can decision-
making be delegated before it has an effect on the ability to accomplish 
objectives or maintain security?  Meaning lower-level members of terrorist 
organizations are not likely to pursue development of cyber capabilities or 
conduct attacks when given the opportunity because of the risk to themselves 
and the organization. 
2. Goal Conflict within Organizations 
Integrating cyberterror with conventional terrorism in an any group, existing or 
emerging, has the potential to create intra-group conflicts within the terrorist 
organization. “Goal incompatibility” is probably the greatest source of conflict 
within organizations. 141 The achievement of one groups’ goals interferes with 
or contradicts another groups’ goals. Currently, the principal goal of 
cyberterrorism is disruption versus the predominant goal of destruction 
(whether limited or unlimited) in traditional terrorist organizations. While these 
objectives may be complementary in principle, they may become opposed as 
an organization expends the resources necessary to achieve a complex-
coordinated or advanced-structured cyberterror capability.  
Resource scarcity is a common source of conflict in organizations. Groups 
must compete for limited resources (money, facilities, human resources, etc.). 
Resources can symbolize power and influence within an organization; the 
ability to obtain resources enhances prestige. Competition can lead to conflict 
between groups/cells within an organization. The power wielded by a 
particular group can play a significant role in structural change, 
interdepartmental coordination, leadership/management succession, and 
resource allocation. If the newly formed cyberterror cell consumes resources 
but does not produce unambiguous success, it may result in a conflict with 
more traditional elements of the organization. The best chance for avoiding 
this type of conflict is if the cyberterror cell has a “champion” or patron that 
wields enough power within the organization to maintain the flow of resources.  
                                                 
141 Daft, p. 489. 
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The level of differentiation and competition for resources will increase as the 
desired capability increases. Differentiation refers to the variations in 
“cognitive and emotional orientations in different functional departments”142  
Functional specialization requires people with specific education, skills, 
attitudes, and time horizons. The group norms and values influence behavior. 
Departments or divisions (cells in terrorist groups) may have different values, 
attitudes, standards, of behavior. These cultural differences can lead to inter-
group conflict within the organization.143  
 
We see examples of this specialization in traditional terrorist organizations. 
Such an example is the differentiation between intelligence and operational 
cells. Each function has distinct requirements and may attract different types 
of people. Intelligence analysts may have no desire for combat or 
confrontation.  Another example of this is the integration of terrorist suicide 
bombers. Recent research conducted by Dr Ariel Merari144 on Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad suicide bombings reveals that approximately half of those 
suicide bombers studied were previously active members of the terrorist 
organizations.  The other half were recruited from the group’s support base 
after being identified as willing to pursue martyrdom.  Following recruitment, 
the future bombers were exposed to the religious heads of the organization, 
trained for their task, and in some cases then secluded from the rest of the 
group for the week prior to suicide attack. Terrorist bomb-makers provide 
another data point when examining specialization.  
Skilled bomb-makers are rare in most terrorist organizations. They have 
invariably had to learn from experience, and many have been killed by their 
own mistakes. Within a terrorist organization, a distinction is often made 
between the  bombmaker, who never goes near a target and whose skills are 
carefully preserved, and the other operatives who risk arrest and premature 
detonations while planting the devices.145  
Another potential source of conflict is the interdependence between 
cyberterror cells and conventional operations cells. Interdependence can 
increase the level of conflict between groups, particularly if it is a reciprocal or 
                                                 
142 Daft, p. 93. 
143 Daft, p. 490. 
144 Dr Ariel Merari was interviewed by phone on 26 July 1999.  Dr Merari is a Senior 
Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. 
145 Donald Sommerville, "Bombing Operations," Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. 
Crenshaw and Pimlott (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 217. 
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sequential interdependence.146 At the advanced-structured and complex-
coordinated levels, with cyberterror in a support role for conventional 
terrorism, interdependence may be either sequential or reciprocal. If the 
cyberterror capability is unreliable (e.g. – unable to guarantee that a portion of 
the public switched network will be taken down at a particular time and kept 
down for a specified period), it may cause tensions with the supported cells. 
This problem would become particularly acute if the cyberterror cell failed to 
accomplish a mission that led to the failure (compromise, capture, or death) of 
members of another cell.  
3. The Effects of Organizational Life Cycle 
When considering organizational change and innovation the concept of an 
organizational life cycle provides a useful framework. This concept suggests 
that organizations “follow a fairly predictable pattern” of sequential stages of 
organizational development.147 The developmental stage of an organization is 
considered a significant determinant of organizational behavior.148 While this 
concept has been principally applied to business organizations, there is very 
little existing research that applies this type of analysis to terrorist 
organizations. If terrorist organizations do indeed progress through these 
developmental stages, or similar ones, there are several implications for their 
ability and willingness to adopt cyberterror. In general, existing terrorist 
organizations would seem unlikely to adopt radical changes in their modus 
operandi. However, newly formed or emerging terrorist groups may be willing 
to adopt cyberterror if it is perceived to satisfy their strategic goals.  
Recent work on organizational life-cycles suggests that there are four major 
stages of organizational development: entrepreneurial, collectivity, 
formalization, and elaboration. A fifth stage (decline) is possible for 
organizations that fail to adapt to the changing environment. Measuring the 
lifecycle of underground organizations is difficult.149 The clandestine nature of 
terrorist organizations will likely frustrate most attempts to measure the critical 
                                                 
146 Sequential interdependence means that one group relies on the output of another 
group to complete its work. Reciprocal interdependence means that the groups mutually 
exchange information and products.  
147 Daft, pp. 173-185. See also Robert E. Quinn and Kim Cameron, “Organizational Life 
Cycles and Shifting Criteria for Effectiveness: Some Preliminary Evidence,” Management 
Science 29 (1983):  pp. 33-51; and Larry E. Grenier, "Evolution and Revolution as 
Organizations Grow,” Harvard Business Review 50 (July-August 1972):  pp. 37-46.  
148 For business-oriented organizations, there are several indicators of lifecycle stage: 
organizational structure, management style and systems, goals, reward/control systems, and 
the variety of products or services. Daft, p. 178.  
149 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 3.1 
(Spring 1991):  pp. 69-87. 
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indicators such as organizational size, structure, resources, etc.  However, as 
a starting point for further analysis, we introduce this life cycle framework. 
Table 4-3 summarizes the major characteristics of each stage. 
Stage Characteristics 
Entrepreneurial Informal; non-bureaucratic; ambiguous goals; high creativity.  
Collectivity Hierarchy of authority begins to develop but structure and 
communication are informal; high commitment to the 
organization.  
Formalization Increased bureaucracy; formalization of rules, structure and 
incentives. Emphasis on efficiency, characterized by division of 
labor. Innovation may be restricted. 
Elaboration More complex structure; decentralization; diversified 
products/services. Organization may become too bureaucratized 
to respond to changes in the environment.  
Decline Failure to adapt to environment causes decline in 
competitiveness and profit leading to conflict, dissention; high 
employee turnover rate.  
Table 4-3: Stage Characteristics150 
It is important to note that not every organization reaches the decline stage. 
Effective responses to changes in the environment can allow continued 
productivity and organizational viability. Still others organizations may attempt 
to maintain themselves at a specific stage. For example, at one time the 
management of Apple Computer made an explicit commitment to try to 
remain in the collectivity stage for as long as possible. 151 It is also important 
to emphasize that the age of an organization does not necessarily correlate 
with any specific developmental stage; organizations will develop at different 
rates.152 The overall size is not necessarily an indicator of a developmental 
stages either; it is possible for small organizations to become rigid and 
bureaucratic.  
                                                 
150 Adapted from Daft, esp. pp. 173-185. 
151 Stephen P. Robbins, Organization Theory:  Structure, Design and Applications, 2d 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 18. 
152 Robbins, p. 18. 
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Both organizational and individual security relies explicitly on formal rules and 
procedures to prevent compromise.153 Because terrorist organizations have 
an inherent need for secrecy to protect them, they must rapidly reach the 
formalization stage. It is at this stage that formal structure and rules are 
implemented. It is also at this stage that innovation can become more difficult 
as efficiency and stability are emphasized.154 Therefore, terrorist 
organizations at this stage of development may be unlikely to innovate155 
voluntarily as long as they perceive their current tactics as successful. 
However, competition from other terrorist groups or effective 
countermeasures by security forces can create incentives to innovate. Still, 
the majority of terrorist groups have not demonstrated a willingness to 
undertake the type of radical transformations that would be necessary to 
implement an advanced-structured cyberterror capability.  
However radical or revolutionary these (radical leftist and ethno-nationalist) 
groups were politically, the vast majority were equally conservative in their 
operations. These types of terrorists were said to be demonstrably more 
‘imitative than innovative’, having a very limited tactical repertoire directed 
against a similarly narrow target set. They were judged as hesitant to take 
advantage of new situations, let alone create new opportunities. 156 
The innovations by terrorist organizations came principally in the choice of 
targets and method to conceal or detonate bombs; they still employed 
hijackings, bombings, and assassinations as their primary tactics.157 Hoffman 
believes that the religious and millenarian groups are less constrained than 
“traditional” terrorists, and therefore more likely to pursue more destructive 
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155 Innovation has a variety of definitions. In the broadest sense, it means simply to 
introduce something new. For our purposes, we have adopted the definition offered by 
Arquilla, et. al., “Innovation is manifested by the development of new warfighting concepts 
and/or new means of integrating technology. New means of integrating technology might 
include revised doctrine, tactics, training, or support.” See Jeffrey Isaacson, John Arquilla, and 
Christopher Layne, Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1999), p. 8. 
156 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 198. The quote is from Brian Michael Jenkins, 
International Terrorism:  The Other World War (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1985), p. 12. 
157 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 198. 
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means.158 Assuming these groups accept mass disruption as a suitable 
substitute for destruction, we may conclude that these types of groups, as we 
have argued earlier, are likely to pursue advanced-structured and complex-
coordinated cyberterror capabilities.  
Life cycle theory predicts that organizations in the elaboration phase will 
search for “new products and growth opportunities.”159 However, innovation at 
this stage is generally accomplished through institutionalized research and 
development. Terrorist organizations are typically limited in their resources 
and, unlike business organizations, may not actively seek growth 
opportunities. Further, even if they did pursue innovation, it is unclear whether 
they would seek radical change at this stage of development. 
While existing terrorist organizations may be hesitant to innovate, emerging 
terrorist groups may be likely to innovate (at least with regards to 
contemporary terrorism). Life cycle theory predicts that emerging 
organizations in the entrepreneurial and collectivity stages are highly creative. 
These immature organizations have few of the restrictions that can potentially 
retard innovation in more mature organizations. They are already assuming a 
large risk by establishing a new organization. They may therefore be willing to 
attempt innovative tactics with theoretical, but unproven, utility. This 
willingness to take risks could also apply to splinter groups from existing 
organizations.  
E. Summary 
Is there a demand side for cyberterrorism? 
This chapter highlighted those terrorist organizations which are likely to take 
advantage of the opportunities made available by the information age.   This 
analysis, what we refer to as the demand side of cyberterrorism, took into 
account terrorist ideology and group and individual psychological interests. 
From the individual and group psychological perspective we make the 
following observations. 
• Advanced-structured and complex-coordinated cyberterror capabilities 
require innovation and/or restructuring at the organizational level. 
                                                 
158 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 196-205. 
159 Robbins, p. 17. 
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• Terrorist organizations are typically opposed to restructuring. 
• Pressure to conform is a barrier to innovation. 
• Opposition to innovation may be offset by a “champion.” 
• Innovation is more likely to develop from the bottom-up rather than the 
top-down. 
From the strategic perspective, we synthesize both the supply and demand 
sides of cyberterror to reach 'equilibrium' results. 
• It is probable that new age terrorists will desire their 'best-fit' cyberterror 
capability (see figure 4-6 for 'best fits'). 
• It is possible that ENS, revolutionary, and religious terrorist have the 
necessary incentives to pursue their respective 'best fit' capability. 
• It is unlikely that far-right extremists will desire cyberterror. 
• Hackers are unlikely to cross over to cyberterror. 
The likely capability level results are summarized in figure 4-6. 
 




















In sum, most terrorists will seek at least an advanced-structured cyberterror 
capability; but only religious terrorists will have incentives to develop complex-
coordinated capabilities.  To the extent to which the other types of terrorist 
groups have some religious motivations, this finding could be very troubling.
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V. Capabilities and Resources - What is Necessary for 
Cyberterrorism? 
It is not good to have zeal without knowledge, nor to be hasty and miss the 
way. 
-- Proverbs 19:2 (NIV Translation) 
In previous chapters we identified the factors that might encourage or 
discourage the pursuit of cyberterrorism from the environmental and 
organizational perspectives. In this chapter we turn to the detailed skill 
components that constitute a given capability level. This material should 
provide a better understanding of the obstacles placed before an organization 
that wishes to pursue cyberterrorism. Combining this information with that 
provided previously enables an assessment as to whether terrorists can move 
effectively into the cyber realm.  
A. Introduction 
The ability to wage cyberterrorism depends on more than technical savvy. It 
requires a combination of technical, analytical and organizational talents. A 
cyberterror organization will hold a mix of these skills, in varying proportions. 
Although a group cannot be utterly devoid of any particular skill, it is the 
group's aggregate capability that matters. We believe that a group's capability 
level is the equally-weighted average of its individual skill levels.  
Figure 5-1 provides a graphic depiction of two possible variations in 
composition for a capability level. The first set of columns depicts a 
successful, established terrorist group that is building its technical skills. They 
have a well-developed command and control system and intelligence 
gathering capability. This propels them into the advanced-structured capability 
level even though their technical skills are not yet at that level. In contrast, the 
second set of columns depicts a hacker group that decided to pursue a 
terrorist agenda. In this case, the group has technical skills sufficient for a 
complex-coordinated capability but lacks the command and control system to 
achieve their full potential. 
Structuring the capability levels this way would seem to allow the possibility of 
combinations such as a "complex-unstructured" capability. While such 
combinations are theoretically possible, our working hypothesis has been that 
growth in ability to mount attacks of increasing complexity parallels the growth 
in technical skill. We base this on two facts. The first is that the utility of 
cyberterrorism depends on both the quality of the attack tools and the 
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precision with which they are applied. The second is that both target analysis 
and real-time command and control capabilities are at least partially 
dependent on technical skill. 
A given skill level does not imply an inherent cap on destructive potential. An 
unskilled attacker could stumble upon a critical vulnerability that produces 
substantial cascading effects. However, a terrorist group depending on such a 
"lucky shot" would be foolish. 
For example, component failures are a certainty, but the probability that the 
loss of a single transformer, switching device, or sensor, for example, would 
trigger a chain reaction that disrupts a major portion of the network (although it 
does happen) is usually quite small.160 
In Chapter Two, we defined the distinction between cyberterror support 
activity and direct attacks. The crux of that distinction was whether the terrorist 
deed was intended to have a coercive effect. We believe that this distinction 
holds across the three capability levels. Any level of capability can be used for 
either support activity or as a primary means of attack. The fundamental 
difference between cyberterror support and cyberterror attacks with regard to 
capability level lies in the incentives to seek increasing capability. As we shall 
see, the higher capability levels place significant demands on an organization. 
A cost-benefit analysis will not favor pursuit of higher capability levels solely 
for support purposes. 
                                                 
160 The White House, Office of the Science and Technology Advisor, Cybernation:  The 







Figure 5-1:  Skill Composition Comparison 
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B. Defining the Components of the Capability Levels  
The technical expertise requirements include knowledge of the characteristics 
(both hardware and software) of each of the nodes on the path from the 
attacker to the ultimate objective. These nodes include the terrorists’ own 
cyberterror resources (i.e. programs), the target’s resources and those of any 
intervening network. The technical requirements become more burdensome 
as the variety and complexity of the nodes increases.  
The required analytical skills center around conducting a detailed nodal 
analysis of a candidate target. This analysis should result in the identification 
of vulnerabilities and inter-nodal dependencies. Ultimately the terrorist must 
determine the critical nodes and how those nodes may be attacked. Clearly, a 
strong technical base is essential for target analysis, but analytical ability goes 
beyond the technical. Analytical ability is heavily dependent on the intangible 
qualities of insight and creativity. These qualities are innate talents that some 
individuals and groups may never possess. 
Finally, the organizational capabilities of a group are built on their command 
and control and group learning talents. A robust command and control system 
allows the terrorist group to bring its forces to bear at the decisive time and 
place. Command and control includes both planning and execution. 
Organizational (or group) learning refers to the ability of the organization to 
keep pace with new technology and assimilate that technology into their 
tactics and techniques. This requires the terrorist group to develop an internal 
mechanism to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge throughout the 
organization. The group must also conduct sustainment training for their 
technical specialists.  
C. Detailed Analysis 
Having defined the three major components of cyberterror capability 
(technical, analytical and organizational skills), we turn now to a detailed 
discussion of their respective sub-components. These individual elements of 
the three components represent the specific barriers to entry for a group 
pursuing cyberterrorism. Those barriers become formidable as the desired 
capability level increases. 
1. Simple-Unstructured  
The capability to conduct basic hacks against individual systems using tools 
created by someone else. The organization possesses little target analysis, 
command and control or learning capability. 
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The simple-unstructured cyberterror capability represents an ability to disrupt 
individual systems through simple hacks using software tools and techniques 
created by others. It is estimated that up to 95% of the hacker population 
resides at this skill level.161 This level of capability will probably confine an 
organization to using cyberterror as a supporting activity. An example of 
cyberterror support at this level would be an ICMP flood (Smurf162) attack 
against all government agencies in the area surrounding a kinetic strike.  
If actual cyberterror attacks are conducted at this level, they will likely need to 
be crafted to create the illusion of greater effect. For example, any successful 
cyberterror attack on a facility associated with weapons of mass destruction, 
regardless of actual physical effects, could cause sufficient terror among the 
populace.  
It requires virtually no skill to begin a simple-unstructured cyberterror 
capability. The only substantial technical skill requirement at this level is 
knowledge about (and possession of) a UNIX-based operating system. 
Although it is possible to conduct attacks from a Windows-based platform, an 
organization choosing to do so has severely limited itself.163 Beyond that, a 
group at this skill level will possess the basic computer skills shared by most 
personal computer owners. This expertise boils down to downloading tools 
and concomitant instructional material. These groups can issue simple 
commands and run pre-compiled programs.164  
The entire body of technical knowledge for a group at this level can reside in 
one individual. Novices will seek experience by borrowing the tools and 
techniques from outside sources and use what they acquire to test the waters 
on their own.  Web pages and chat rooms provide an ample source of 
material, programs, and connections to experienced hackers who can provide 
mentoring.165 Once connected, novices can download the programs they 
need and discuss execution techniques with active hackers.  
                                                 
161 Peter Tippett, quoted in Michael E. Ruane, "New Technology Makes Hacking a 
Snap," Washington Post, 10 Mar. 1999,  p. A -1. This statement was confirmed by separate 
correspondence with Mr. Tippett's executive assistant. 
162 The hacker program Smurf causes an unwitting site to flood the victim site with 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Echo Replies. The volume of these messages 
chokes out legitimate traffic. In this scenario, responding agencies would be unable to use 
computer networks to coordinate their response or to communicate information. 
163 Windows-based systems to not support the manipulation of raw network data to the 
extent that UNIX-based systems do. They also require specially written drivers to use a sniffer. 
164The alternative to pre-compiled programs is source code. The use of source code 
requires a compiler and the knowledge of its use. 
165 Chantler, pp. 156-159. 
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A key discriminator at this level is that the attackers are largely ignorant of the 
complexity of the tools they employ.166  Hacker activity throughout the world 
has shown us that this is not a null capability. The attackers may not 
understand authentication and identification security mechanisms, but they 
can still download and run password cracking programs. Similar examples 
include the use of worms or viruses.167   
When organizations at this level gather intelligence for cyberterror, they 
attempt to find targets to match the tools that they have collected. They look 
for systems that are either unmistakably open or accessible by tools that the 
attackers have procured.  
The greatest constraint on target intelligence analysis at the simple-
unstructured level is the organization’s inability to understand the complexities 
of system level targets. Organizations at this level do not understand the 
intersystem dependencies or the strategic effects of their activities. The lack of 
target intelligence in these groups is partially mitigated by the fact that the 
expertise needed to access the target is contained within the tool and not the 
user.  
The Task Force agrees that it is easy for skilled individuals (or less skilled 
people with suitable automated tools) to break into unprotected and poorly 
configured networked computers and to steal files, install malicious software, or 
cause a denial of service. However, it is very much more difficult to collect the 
intelligence needed and to analyze the designs of complex systems so that an 
attacker could mount an attack that would cause nation-disrupting or 
war-ending damage at the time and place and for the duration of the attacker's 
choosing.168 
The command and control requirements of an organization at this level are 
minimal with respect to cyberterrorism. Groups at this skill level define 
success as any negative impact on a chosen target. Simple-unstructured 
attacks are performed by a single individual or at most a small number of 
individuals. At this cyberterror capability level, the organization does not retain 
the necessary technical knowledge to reliably forecast second- and third-order 
effects. They can identify the immediate effects (i.e. “the server is down”) but 
not the larger technical implications.   
                                                 
166 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
Committee, Proceedings From the Carnegie Mellon Workshop on Network Security STIC 97-
001 (Springfield, VA:  National Technical Information Service, 1997), p. iii. 
167 Chantler,  pp. 84-88. 
168 Defense Science Board, Report on Information Warfare Defense (Washington, D.C.:  
GPO, 1996), p. 2-4. 
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Although a group could begin using these hacker tools immediately upon 
downloading them, we believe that terrorists will allow themselves time to 
become comfortable with the technology. A terrorist group starting out with no 
computer background can reasonably be expected to take up to six months 
before feeling comfortable enough to use cyberterror tools in an actual 
operation.169 
The disadvantages of remaining at this level are two-fold. First, the ability to 
do meaningful damage is almost non-existent. Second, attackers with only 
this level of skill face a substantial risk of failure and compromise.  
These less sophisticated hackers … are easier to detect and eradicate than 
educated ones because of standardized behavior and because they do not 
have experience to know when to abort a hacking attempt and often make 
repeated attempts at re-entry.170 
The majority of computer security incidents are facilitated by poor security 
practices. Victimized organizations often felt that they had nothing worth the 
effort to protect. Organizations that have identified themselves (or been 
identified externally) as having critical assets are likely to take greater 
precautions. From the terrorist perspective, there is substantial risk that as 
awareness of the threat grows, opportunities against even non-critical sites 
will decrease. While the hacker community can certainly be counted on to 
continually develop new means of attacking sites, the terrorist group that 
wishes to pursue an independent capability must rise to the advanced-
structured level at a minimum. 
2. Advanced-Structured 
The capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks against multiple systems or 
networks and possibly, to modify or create basic hacking tools. The organization 
possesses an elementary target analysis capability and command and control 
structure for sequential attacks from a single location. Some learning ability - can 
assimilate some new technologies and train personnel. 
To rise above the limitations of a simple-unstructured capability, terrorists may 
wish to pursue an advanced-structured capability. Cyberterrorists at this level 
                                                 
169 All of the development times identified in this paper have been checked by various 
domain experts and borne out by the academic and professional experiences of the authors. 
170 NetSolve Inc., ProWatch Secure Network Security Survey  (May-September 1997). 
Posted to the Bugtraq mailing list 19 Nov 1997 by Craig H. Rowland of Wheelgroup. 
http://www.securityfocus.com 
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are equivalent to what the CERT®/CC171 termed "sophisticates". By their 
estimation an attacker "with a B.S. or M.S. in Computer Science has more 
than enough knowledge" to operate at this level "especially, if he or she is 
knowledgeable about operating systems."172 This is the level where 
cyberterror attack becomes realistic as a primary method of attack. A 
cyberterror organization wishing to pursue this capability cannot be wholly 
dependent on the Internet for its tools. They must have specially adapted (or 
developed) tools.  
 
Figure 5-2:  Example Heterogeneous Network 
At this level, the barriers to entry become more formidable. Technical 
expertise at this level goes beyond an academic understanding of 
                                                 
171 The CERT®/CC began as the Computer Emergency Response Team under a 
government charter in Jan. 1988. It was formed as a result of the Robert Morris Internet Worm 
incident. Carnegie-Mellon University subsequently registered the term CERT as their 
trademark title. 
172 DCI, p. 2. 
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programming principles. An attacker at the advanced-structured level has 
developed practical knowledge through experience or close personal 
mentoring. This requirement for ‘applied’ technical expertise creates a 
substantial barrier to advanced-structured cyberterror attack even when 
attacking homogeneous networks or systems.  This barrier grows 
substantially if the group attempts to target heterogeneous networks — those 
using multiple, proprietary, software, hardware, and firmware components. 
Figure 5-2 depicts a typical local area network. One can see that even in this 
small example there are a number of different operating systems, protocols 
and equipment brands in use. 
The required technical knowledge to operate at this level is summarized in 
Table 5-1. While it is not the full computer science curriculum called for above, 
it represents a substantial leap from the unskilled computer user at the simple-
unstructured level. The knowledge represented at this level empowers a 
group to defeat a single layer of indirection such as a firewall. 
• Sophisticated programming 
skills. 
• Mastery of at least one 
Operating System. 
• Understanding of the 
mechanics of common security 
measures. 
• Detailed understanding of 
network & computer 
architectures. 
• Detailed understanding of the 
TCP/IP protocol suite. 
• Familiarity with 
telecommunications systems & 
databases. 
Table 5-1:  Advanced-structured Capability IT Expertise Requirements 
The foremost skill requirement is programming expertise. Attackers at this 
level modify programs or even create small programs of their own. These 
attackers should have skills in programming for both stand-alone and 
networked systems. The programming requirement differs from that normally 
taught in computer science curricula. In order to modify attacks taken from 
hacker sites, the attacker must be capable of reading a program and following 
the flow of execution like a storybook. Commercial competition has eliminated 
some proprietary programming and promoted an environment with standard 
program functions for interoperability between programs and operating 
systems.  Nonetheless there are subtle variations in execution between 
operating systems. The advanced-structured level attacker must understand 
the implications of those variations.  
  83
The programmer’s language repertoire absolutely must include C or C++.173 If 
the attacker cannot program in traditional C (as opposed to C++) he must at 
least read and understand it. C and C++ are the languages used by the vast 
majority of hacker tools. They offer the most direct interface with the essential 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) since most operating systems are 
written in C. The API is the controlling mechanism between application 
programs and the operating system or the network protocols.174 Skillful 
manipulation of the API can give the attacker access to the target system.175  
Not all of the hacker tools are compiled programs. Many of them are 
command scripts.176 As such, the ability to read scripting languages such as 
Perl and Tcl/tk as well as the traditional OS scripts is essential.  
If the terrorist group hopes either to target or utilize worldwide web assets, it 
must also have the ability to read hypertext mark-up language (HTML) and 
Java. Java is used widely on the World Wide Web and provides an additional 
means of attack via what are known as hostile applets. Java applets are small 
programs that are transmitted with a web page and run locally on the 
receiver's computer. In addition to hostile applets, a Java-savvy attacker could 
create elaborate false web pages to collect or hide information.177 
An individual wishing to become a cyberterrorist should plan on a minimum of 
six months to meet these programming skill requirements. This six-month 
figure is based on an academic semester of intense study. Any outside 
demands on the student's time will only serve to lengthen the required period 
of study. 
Because the performance of most programming languages is dependent on 
the operating system on which it is compiled, a terrorist with the requisite 
programming skill will have some knowledge of at least one operating system. 
                                                 
173 C is a ‘high-level’ programming language designed for systems programming. It is 
extremely powerful but it uses a cryptic syntax and numerous shortcuts which make it difficult 
to read. C++ is an object-oriented extension of C. 
174 Douglas E. Comer, Computer Networks and Internets (Upper Saddle River, NJ:  
Prentice Hall, 1997), pp. 285-286. 
175 For example the hacker program GetAdmin exploited an API call in Windows NT to 
give any user administrator privileges. 
176 A command script is similar in function to a program but it consists of a text file 
containing a series of operating system instructions. They are normally used to automate 
repetitive tasks. The Autoexec.bat file in MS-DOS is an example of a script. Scripts are used 
heavily in UNIX environments. 
177 For a detailed discussion of deception using Java see Edward Felton, "Web 
Spoofing, An Internet Con Game," Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems 
Security Conference, Volume 1 (Baltimore, MD:  National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 1997), pp. 95-103.  
  84
However, to manipulate operating system programs or bypass security 
measures, his knowledge must go deeper. At a minimum, he should have a 
detailed understanding of the following topics. 
• The file system. 
• The identification and authentication (logon) system. 
• User and group permissions. 
• The auditing and logging system.  
• Process execution. 
• Input-output (I/O) and inter-process communication handling.  
An appreciation of these topics is essential to understanding and exploiting 
system vulnerabilities. 
One of the most ubiquitous computer vulnerabilities is the buffer overflow.178 
Buffer overflows occur when the size of an input item exceeds the size of the 
memory space allocated to hold it. As a result, the excess input overwrites the 
contents of the adjacent memory. Buffer overflows often result in denial of 
service. If operating system code was located adjacent to the overflow, it is 
possible for well-crafted input to execute system commands. Buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities are found in operating systems and applications alike. They are 
very difficult to work with and their effects depend on obscure details of the 
target system.179 The majority of root180 compromise attacks are buffer 
overflows.181 Writing a buffer overflow involves direct manipulation of the bits 
and bytes in the target system's memory. As such, the writer is required to 
perform binary and hexadecimal math.182 The writer is similarly required to 
understand the system architecture and assembly language for his chosen 
                                                 
178 Of the 50 CERT®/CC advisories published between Jan. 1997 and July 1999, 28 
involved buffer overflows. 
179 For a detailed discussion see Aleph One, “Smashing The Stack For Fun and Profit,” 
Phrack 7.49 (Nov. 1996). http://www.phrack.com/archive.html 
180 Root, also called administrator, privilege allows full control of a computer. 
181 Based on a survey of the attacks found at the hacker site Fyodor’s Playhouse 
(www.insecure.org). Of the 16 attacks that might allow root privileges, 9 were buffer overflows, 
3 were CGI errors, 2 were backdoors, one was a symbolic link error and 1 was not defined. 
Similar results were obtained using the CERT®/CC advisory data. 
182 This skill is also necessary for working with raw sockets. 
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target (or targets).  Without such an understanding the attacker cannot be 
sure that the operating system will execute the overflow contents as intended.  
Moving outward from the individual host, the next field an attacker must 
master is Local Area Networks (LANs). A detailed understanding of protocols 
and topologies enables the cyberterrorist to better identify useful targets and 
their vulnerabilities. Attacks designed for one protocol or topology often will 
not work on another. For example, it is possible to install a sniffer183 via a 
Trojan Horse. However, most sniffers are designed to work on Ethernet184 
LANs. If the intended victim is on a non-Ethernet (e.g. token-ring) LAN, the 
sniffer will not work. If it is an Ethernet LAN but it uses switches instead of 
hubs,185 the sniffer may not capture anything useful.  
At the wide area network level, there are still more protocols and architectures 
to consider. A detailed understanding of the TCP/IP protocol suite is required 
for launching advanced attacks across the Internet. This includes knowledge 
of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) and sub-net masking.186 Without 
this knowledge an attacker cannot interpret Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
and correctly map them to hosts. With this knowledge an attacker can identify 
and exploit some common addressing practices.187 
The telecommunications system transmits data across wide areas. It is the 
backbone of all worldwide electronic connectivity. Familiarity with 
telecommunications systems enables a group to perform signal interception or 
denial against open systems. Similar attacks are possible against wireless 
communications in local and metropolitan area networks. Many SCADA 
systems use wireless communications with isolated remote terminal units 
(RTUs). 
Taking a broader, system view, an attacker should understand the functioning 
of common security measures such as firewalls and intrusion detection 
                                                 
183 A sniffer is a program that collects all of the information that passes on the LAN 
segment to which it is attached. It amounts to a computerized version of a phone tap. 
184 Ethernet is Xerox Corporation's trademarked name for a popular commercial LAN 
implementation. It uses a broadcast transmission method on a shared medium thus all users 
can potentially view each other's communications. The term has come to refer to all LANs that 
use the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) protocols.  
185 Hubs simply provide a central connection point. Switches direct traffic to individual 
hosts. This prevents the eavesdropping possible with hubs. 
186 CIDR is a technique for using two or more Class C addresses as if they were a 
single address. Sometimes referred to as supernetting. Subnetting is a technique for 
hierarchically dividing a site's assigned addresses among smaller sub-networks.  
187 For example, the servers for a given sub-net are usually assigned the low numbers 
in an address block. What these low numbers are depends on the sub-netting scheme. 
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systems. These provide the first level of defense against hostile activity 
against a system or network. Here there are different degrees of firewall 
protection. Static firewalls check access against an access controls list to 
grant entry into the network. Well-crafted IP spoofing can overcome this 
security. Dynamic firewalls are more intelligent and check the access against 
several variables in its programmed decision tree and depending on their 
sophistication can be tough to overcome.188 An understanding of these 
systems enables the advanced cyberterrorist to avoid or counter them.  
In a similar vein, knowledge of common cryptographic applications and 
protocols is essential to knowing how to work around them. Weak 
cryptographic protocols allow text to be easily decrypted. Some protocols are  
particularly complicated, introducing risks of improper implementation. For 
example it is possible to defeat cryptography by compromising the integrity of 
the key distribution process with a man-in-the-middle attack.189 
To put all of these technical requirements (other than programming) in 
perspective, the burden is roughly equivalent to becoming a Microsoft 
Certified Systems Engineer, Plus Internet (MCSE +I). As it was intended, this 
certification requires at least six months of dedicated study.190  
The organization’s improved technical knowledge increases their ability to 
develop detailed target intelligence. Rather than searching for a target that is 
vulnerable to the available tool, the terrorist is now selecting the correct tool 
for the chosen target. If needed, the attacker will use the knowledge gained 
from the target intelligence to combine or modify existing tools to access the 
system. To satisfy the information requirements, these groups will conduct a 
thorough pre-attack reconnaissance.   
An organization at this skill level can search through multiple layers of 
separation and/or indirection in order to locate the desired target. This 
includes at least some capability to work through firewalls. 
In order to test and rehearse the cyberattack, the organization must be able to 
model the target system. This capability is based on both the computer 
science knowledge discussed above and the analytical capacity to identify the 
                                                 
188 Brenton, pp.145-164 
189 In this attack, an intruder inserts himself between two communicating parties and 
impersonates each of them. He provides a false key to each party allowing him to view or 
manipulate messages. When properly executed, the attack is transparent to the victims, as 
they appear to be receiving valid messages from one another. 
190 See for example the training program offered by the University of Phoenix. Although 
there are a number of other organizations that advertise a much shorter study period, they help 
people "cram" for he examinations without truly mastering the material. 
  87
salient features of a given system. The information about the target must 
include more than just the computer types. The attackers must be sufficiently 
familiar with any devices connected with the target system to include their 
effects in the analysis. 
A group at this level knows what to look for and how to get it. What they may 
be unable to do is correctly infer missing or incomplete target information.  An 
absence of complete information will characterize most attacks. This analytical 
weakness will therefore have an impact on the organization’s planning and 
execution capabilities. 
This group has a definite vision of success (though they may not be able to 
clearly articulate it). Advanced-structured cyberterror activities may exhibit a 
high degree of sophistication. An advanced-structured attack may consist of 
many intricate parts. Any group acting at this level will have detailed 
knowledge about the first order effects of the planned cyberterror activity. 
They would also have considered and addressed second and third order 
effects. 
One of the key differences between advanced-structured activities and the 
complex-coordinated activities discussed below is that advanced-structured 
activities are generally executed sequentially. Events that occur concurrently 
do so in barrage fashion without much synchronization. 
The greatest single area of improvement from the simple-unstructured to the 
advanced-structured capability levels is in the area of technical expertise. The 
greatest single limitation to further capability is in command and control. 
Because of this limitation, all of the technical expertise for a group of this 
caliber is still likely to reside in a single individual. 
3. Complex-Coordinated 
The capability for coordinated attacks capable of causing mass-disruption. Ability 
to analyze vulnerabilities, penetrate complex defenses (including cryptography) 
and create attack tools. Strong ability to conduct target analysis and high 
confidence in results. Strong command and control structure capable of 
employing multiple, simultaneous attacks from different locations. Strong 
organizational learning capacity – can keep up with latest technology, train 
personnel, diffuse knowledge throughout the organization, make necessary 
doctrinal and organizational changes to enhance capabilities. 
The group that wishes to strike at large-scale command and control, industrial 
or infrastructure networks with surety must develop a complex-coordinated 
capability. These networks are heterogeneous. They consist of varied 
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hardware and software components. Many of these components are 
specialized. Knowledge of workstations and web servers will not suffice. 
A group with a complex-coordinated attack capability would be an elite 
organization. The existence of this level of expertise in the underground 
community is widely rumored but unproven. Estimates vary from source to 
source, but personnel at this skill level make up an extraordinarily small 
percentage of the hacker population.  
The Center for Infrastructural Warfare Studies estimated in December 1997 
that there were then fewer than 1000 professional hackers worldwide at the 
time. They defined ‘professional hacker’ as someone who "is capable of 
building and creating original cracking methods. He has superior programming 
skills in a number of machine languages and has original knowledge of 
telecommunication networks.”191 
Can hackers working from personal computers at home really pose a serious 
threat to national and commercial security? L0pht thinks it's possible. They've 
encountered perhaps twelve genius-level hackers in the online world and say 
six of them should be feared. 192  
In theory, an attacker at this skill level could strike without warning and leave 
no clues as to his identity. "Pure" cyberterrorism193 finally becomes possible at 
this level. Because it is so difficult to achieve, a complex-coordinated attack 
capability is arguably a group, vice individual, capability.194 Although there are 
required technical skill improvements, the primary advancement at this level is 
in organizational skills. Some sources believe that a charismatic, visionary 
leader could assemble a group of individuals with advanced-level skills and 
create a complex-coordinated capability.195 
                                                 
191 CIWARS Intelligence Report, Vol. 1, Issue 16, 14 Dec 1997 as quoted in Dorothy 
Denning, Information Warfare and Security (Berkeley, CA:  Addison-Wesley, 1999), p. 51. See 
also John Borland, "Analyzing the Threat of Cyberterrorism," at Infowar.com 
http://www.infowar.com 
192 Tom Bearden, "Hacking Around" transcript of The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 8 May 
1998. http://www.pbs.org/newshour 
193 Pure cyberterrorism uses only information technology to achieve its aims. This 
includes everything from information gathering to execution. Pure cyberterrorism is interesting 
because its success is independent of any target specific factors. It therefore scales infinitely. 
194 For a mythical example see Frederick Cohen, “Managing Network Security – 
Anatomy of a Successful Sophisticated Attack.” Network Security Management, Jan. 1999. 
Available at http://all.net/journal/netsec/9901.html  
195 See DCI 1997 and Douglas Hayward, "Hacker's Dark Side Gets Even Darker" 
TechWire. 19 June 1997. http://www.techwire.com/ 
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A sample cyberterror act in this realm would be sustained, total interruption of 
some component of the national critical infrastructure across a substantial 
customer base (i.e. a state or a major metropolis). 
A complex-coordinated capability requires superior programming skill. The 
programmer at this level is capable of writing device drivers.196 The group has 
fully mastered at least one high-level language and can write passable 
programs in any common language. They have also mastered the assembly 
language for at least one target platform. 
Likely targets at this level will have redundancies and back-ups. These 
protective measures force attackers at this level to master multiple operating 
systems. The attackers must also be at least comfortable with those systems 
they have not mastered. This is a substantial requirement. There are at least 
42 variants of the UNIX operating system alone. In many systems of interest 
there are differing, proprietary hardware variations. 
Complete interruption of a heterogeneous network demands that attackers 
develop similar diversity in their tools. They will need to create specialized 
programs to defeat each of the critical components.   
In order to attack the trusted systems in use by command and control systems 
and other high value targets the organization at this level requires knowledge 
of advanced security measures. Targeting industrial facilities implies an 
understanding of industrial computer systems. This includes both Supervisory 
Controls and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as well as Distributed 
Control Systems (DCS). This is, once again, a challenging technological 
expertise proposition since there is a wide array of potential protocols and 
application software to master.197  
At the previous two levels it was possible to execute an entire attack locally. 
That is not possible at the complex-coordinated level. This situation demands 
a deeper knowledge of telecommunications in order to coordinate widely 
distributed attack elements attackers. An attacker should be able to transmit 
coordination messages via out-of-band means so as not to be reliant upon the 
targeted network for communications.  
                                                 
196 Device drivers are the software interface between an operating system and the 
system (mostly hardware) components. Writing one requires intimate knowledge both of the 
component and the operating system. 




• Expert level programming skill. • Mastery of multiple operating 
systems. 
• Detailed knowledge of 
industrial computer systems. 
• Detailed knowledge of 
telecommunications. 
Table 5-2:  Complex-coordinated Capability IT Expertise Requirements  
We have surveyed the available literature and conducted our own scenario 
development in an attempt to produce the worst-case scenarios of 
cyberterrorism. We concluded that they tend to revolve around either financial 
or infrastructure networks. In either case, the terrorist organization must be 
knowledgeable on two subjects, the computer systems and the controlled 
process. 
In the case of infrastructure networks, the controlled process is some physical 
activity. Example processes include power generation, air traffic control and 
the manufacture of potentially harmful materials. The level of target specific 
information required to attack these targets is that of an insider.198  
As the magnitude of the target increases, the number of essential elements of 
information (EEIs) will increase. The intelligence burden for targets of this 
magnitude will require long term, detailed target reconnaissance using 
multiple collection methods. Processing the collected information requires a 
multi-source intelligence fusion capability.199  
The resident technical experience at this level allows for thorough target 
intelligence analysis.  A near compete understanding of the technical 
complexity of the network allows for accurate nodal analysis.  The greatest 
limitation to target intelligence at this level is gathering the appropriate 
information to analyze.200  Even in the absence of complete information, a 
complex-coordinated target intelligence capability can infer from traffic 
analysis some of the system parameters. 
Conducting a nodal analysis on a complex network is a substantial 
undertaking. Studies on network reliability and survivability have examined the 
                                                 
198 Capt. Barry Ezell USA, "The Risks of Cyber Attack Against Supervisory Controls 
And Data Automation For Water Supply" (Masters Thesis, University of Virginia, 1998). 
199 These are additional reasons to believe that groups, rather than individuals, must 
conduct the attacks at this capability level. 
200 An excellent inhibitor to effective target intelligence is for organizations to recognize 
their critical network and identify the essential elements of information (EEIs) needed to attack 
their system and then protect these EEIs. 
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problem of determining the minimum number of links that must be removed 
for any given pair of hosts to be completely disconnected. This is the analysis 
that an attacker must perform to ensure success of his attack. For complex 
networks this analysis can require effort proportional to the square of the 
number of nodes in the network.201 
The Threat and Vulnerabilities Panel concluded that if, with all the knowledge 
we have about our own systems, we are unable to determine the degree to 
which effects would multiply and cascade; an adversary would have a far more 
difficult task of collecting and assessing detailed intelligence of literally 
hundreds, if not thousands, of networked systems in order to plan and 
successfully execute an attack of the magnitude which we would consider to 
be "strategic." The very complexity and heterogeneity of today's systems 
provide a measure of protection against catastrophic failure, by not being 
susceptible to the same precise attacks.202 
Before a group at this level even begins planning, they can be expected to 
conduct a thorough and unbiased risk analysis. Only if they determine that the 
prospects for success are good will they proceed. These groups will have very 
specific criteria for success. The success criteria will include the second- and 
third-order effects that the attack should produce.  
Attacks at this capability level demand the synchronization of widely 
distributed elements – potentially to within fractions of a second. The attack 
must be wargamed and rehearsed. Detailed alternate and contingency plans 
must be developed. These additional plans must also be rehearsed. The 
attack itself should be conceptualized as a campaign with a series of 
simultaneous attacks being orchestrated concurrently in time - in a word, 
swarming.  If the target is composed of heterogeneous nodes, the attack will 
require a separate tool designed for each distinct sub-component. Multiple 
actors will almost certainly be necessary to handle the volume of activity.  
The technical requirements of the complex-coordinated capability level 
represent at least a doubling of the demands at the advanced-structured level. 
The command and control requirements present an even greater obstacle. 
The planning and coordination skills at this level are equivalent to those 
associated with field-grade officers in the military. Such an officer results from 
at least six years of practical experience. 
                                                 
201 Douglas R. Shier, Network Reliability and Algebraic Structures (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 18. 
202 Defense Science Board, Report on Information Warfare Defense (Washington, D.C.:  
GPO, 1996), pp. 2-14. 
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At the complex-coordinated attack level, the demands of the cyberterror effort 
may impel a displacement of traditional terrorist methods.  Leading such an 
attack demands significant attention.  At the organization’s strategic level, the 
terrorist leader's focus is divided between traditional and cyberterror activities.  
Presented with the competing demands on leadership’s time, the strategic 
decision-maker may focus on the bigger return, in this case most likely the 
complex-coordinated cyberattack against an information infrastructure.  
D. Summary 
A cyberterror capability requires a mix of skills. Those component skills do not 
have to be present in equal measure. An overall capability level is the average 
of the three component skills. However, the three components are sufficiently 
intertwined that they grow in parallel. 
The barriers to entry at the simple-unstructured capability level are minimal. 
These barriers become increasingly formidable at each subsequent capability 
level. It is therefore likely that most groups will opt to remain at the simple-
unstructured level. This is further supported by the fact that a great number of 
cyberterror support activities reside at the simple-unstructured level. Groups 
that decide to pursue higher levels of capability face potentially large time 
delays. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, this may imply a need for 





VI. The Path - Developing a Cyberterror Capability 
A. Purpose 
Having discussed the opportunities, incentives, and required capabilities for 
pursuing cyberterrorism in previous chapters, this chapter explores how an 
organization actually develops the intended capability. This is the 
implementation phase, a necessary second phase of strategy 
development.203 During implementation, an organization faces a number of 
considerations.  Generally, it must take into account the actions needed to 
incorporate major new proposals and articulate a detailed plan of ushering in 
activities in support of these proposals.204  The criteria these activities must 
abide by include that they be technically feasible, politically acceptable to key 
people within the organization, and be in accordance with pre-existing norms 
and values of the organization.205   In chapter four we concluded that 
cyberterrorism is both politically acceptable and consistent with the norms and 
values of a minority segment of traditional terrorist organizations. 
This chapter builds upon the insights of Chapter Five, regarding cyberterror 
technical requirements, by introducing implementation options.  Technical 
barriers are an important issue because they influence the organization’s 
decision to develop a cyberterror capability internally, or acquire it externally.  
Other factors that influence development options to a lesser extent include the 
organization’s context, whether the desired capability is pursued singularly or 
in tandem with other traditional methods, and sponsorship.  The result of this 
analysis yields a general understanding of the challenges in actually 
developing a cyberterror capability, as well as insights into how it may be 
developed.    
                                                 
203 Peter McKiernan,  “Strategy Past:  Strategy Futures,” Long Range Planning, 
International Journal of Strategic Management and Corporate Planning 30.5 (1997):  pp.790-
798. 
204 John M. Bryson,  “A Strategic Planning Process for Public and Non-profit 
Organizations,” Long Range Planning, International Journal of Strategic Management and 
Corporate Planning 21.107 (1998): pp. 73-81. 
205 Bryson, p. 77. 
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B. Implementation Options 
The key strategic issue in insourcing versus outsourcing is whether a company 
can achieve a maintainable competitive edge by performing an activity 
internally – usually cheaper, better, in a more timely fashion, or with some 
unique capability – on a continuing basis.206 
A key early choice in acquiring a cyberterror capability is whether to outsource 
the desired capability, or to develop it internally. This section analyzes the 
barriers to entry and associated benefits and risks of pursuing either 
development option from the perspective of an organization interested in 
cyberterrorism.  
1. Barriers to Entry  
In the previous chapter, we indicated that an organization wishing to possess 
the capability to conduct simple-unstructured cyberterror activity faces virtually 
no technical barriers. The required technical skills are minimal, as are the 
resource costs. For a simple-unstructured cyberterror capability, no internal 
organizational learning function needs to be created.  
If a group wishes to rise to an advanced-structured cyberterror capability, the 
technical barriers increase sharply. The required skills described in chapter 
five are recounted in Table 5-1. It is possible that a group could have one or 
more members, who already possess a portion of these skills. In this case, 
the choice to develop internally is clear.  
Advanced programming skills. Mastery of at least one operating 
system. 
Understanding of the mechanics of 
common security measures. 
Detailed understanding of network 
architectures. 
Detailed understanding of the 
TCP/IP protocol suite. 
Familiarity with telecommunications 
systems. 
Table 6-1:  Advanced-structured Capability IT Expertise Requirements 
If a group does not have pre-existing capabilities a remedial solution to 
cultivate a more robust program may be to select one or more members from 
                                                 
206 Henry Mintzberg and James B. Quinn, The Strategy Process, 3rd ed. (New Jersey:  
Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 69. 
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within the organization to receive training. These members should have a 
demonstrated aptitude for mathematics and science. If no such members 
exist, the group cannot realistically pursue this capability internally.  
In the previous chapter we introduced several rough metrics for determining 
the time required to develop a given level of cyberterror capability. The time 
estimates are summarized in table 6-2. These estimates are calculated for a 
group starting out with no IT background. The figures represent the total time 
required to reach the selected capability level. Thus, a group that has 
developed an experience base through administrative use of IT will have a 
lead over a group that has not developed a similar base.  
By the table 6-2 figures a terrorist group can expect to have an advanced-
structured cyberterror capability in a year at best. That accounts only for the 
academic technical requirements. The one year figure does not account for 
the practical experience so essential to advanced-structured cyberterror. The 
need for experience drives our analysis that 2-4 years is more likely. Recall 
that the CERT®/CC assessment provides a high-end estimate of four years 
(the undergraduate degree).  
We assessed the technical demands of the complex-coordinated cyberterror 
capability level as double those of the advanced-structured level. Using that 
assessment results in a minimum figure of two years (one year after achieving 
advanced-structured capability). At the complex-coordinated level, those 
technical requirements are likely not the determining factor. Using the field-
grade officer analogy of chapter five for command and control provides a likely 
development time of six years.207 
A combination of human factors contributes to the barriers in developing a 
complex-coordinated capability.  Individuals must combine training and 
experience with innate talents. Talents that are genetically granted, not 
produced through training.  However, simply accumulating these individual 
skills is also not enough. Additionally, terrorist groups wishing to cultivate a 
complex-coordinated capability must inculcate other individual and group 
learning characteristics of more highly creative organizations.  
                                                 
207 Several domain experts have also indicated that 4-6 years is appropriate for 
developing the required expertise in controlled processes. 
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Every knowledge worker in the modern organization is an “executive,” if by 
virtue of his possession of knowledge, he is responsible for a contribution that 
materially affects the capacity of the organization to perform and to obtain 
results.208 
At a complex-coordinated level a terrorist group’s ability to assimilate and 
understand new technology will also influence the organization’s capability; 
i.e. to demonstrate organizational learning.  This barrier is the critical obstacle 
for organizations wanting to attain a complex-coordinated capability.  
Substantial organizational focus is required to maintain pace with rapidly 
changing technology.  Internal to the organization, cyberterror issues will 
dominate fiscal commitments. Although hardware purchasing requirements do 
not increase drastically from the advanced-structured level, the manpower 
requirements for intelligence collection and analysis will likely create a drain.  
In review, the desire to pursue a cyberterror capability must account for 
substantial barriers to entry at the advanced-structured and complex-
coordinated levels.  The main obstacle enroute to developing these 
capabilities falls generally within two categories summarized below.  
Cyberterror Level Skills Time 
Simple-unstructured Gain Familiarity 0-6 Months 
Advanced-structured Mastery of OS 
Programming 
Min: 1 Year 
Likely: 2-4 Years 
Complex-coordinated Improve and Combine 
Advanced-structured Skills 
with innate talents 
Organizational Learning 
 
Min: 2 Years 
Likely: 6-10 Years 
Table 6-2:  Summary of Barriers to Entry 
                                                 
208 Peter Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York:  Harper & Row, 1966), p. 5 as 
quoted in Ray Grenier and George Metes, Going Virtual: Moving Your Organization into the 
21st Century (New Jersey:  Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 87. 
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2. Develop Internally 
a) Benefits of Internal Development 
Organizations benefit from internal development in several ways.  If done 
internally, the organization gains greater independence.  Real problems can 
occur when external sources do not share the same priorities as the 
organization seeking their product or service.209   
Internal development also enhances security, a critical interest of all terrorist 
organizations.  Not having to rely on external interactions reduces the risk of 
exposure during electronic and personal interactions with outside parties.  
Internal development also eliminates unpredictable security arrangements 
normally associated with most outsourcing solutions.   
Finally, internal development may facilitate interactions among skilled people 
in different functional areas.  This form of interaction may augment the groups’ 
knowledge base while increasing organizational creativity. 
b) Risks of Internal Development  
Perhaps the single greatest risk in developing cyberterror capabilities 
internally may result from failing to develop an effective capability.  In other 
words, the organization is unable to cultivate an advanced-structured or 
complex-coordinated capability, or prematurely exposes it. Failure, in this 
case, would lead to ineffectiveness as an organization, irrelevance and 
possibly extinction.  
Additionally, internal transaction costs of pursuing advanced-structured and 
complex-coordinated capabilities may be extremely high.  If a terrorist 
organization is to produce these capabilities internally on a long-term basis, it 
must be prepared to finance research and development, personnel 
development, and infrastructure investments.  If incorrectly assessed, the 
organization may lose precious amounts of limited financial resources. 
At the individual level, terrorist groups also risk loosing key personnel before 
necessary training can be provided.  This “brain drain” may affect terrorist 
organizations in the same way it has other IT companies.  Unless the 
incentives of membership in a terrorist organization offset the monetary 
incentives associated with pursuing legitimate IT professions terrorist groups 
                                                 
209 Mintzberg and Quinn, p. 72. 
  98
may never adequately recruit potentially gifted members.210  The following list 
of IT salaries is evidence of the monetary incentives for pursuing legitimate 
professions that terrorist organizations must contend with.   




















Database Analyst $54,300 $3,600 
Table 6-3:  Average IT Salary Data211 
3. Acquire Externally 
An alternative to developing these capabilities internally is outsourcing.  We 
identify two general forms of outsourcing.  The first is through open-source 
markets.  The second form of outsourcing is to cultivate the necessary 
capabilities with a sponsor.  
                                                 
210 Even in the absence of a salary, the terrorist organization will be competing against 
the cyber ‘terrorists’ expectations for a standard of living. Individuals with advanced or 
complex-coordinated technical expertise must forego market valuation of their skills to provide 
the necessary commitment to the terrorist organization. 
211 Leslie Goff, "Enough is Enough, Computerworld's 12th Annual Salary Survey," 
Computerworld, 7 Sept. 1998, pp. 56-61. Available online at: 
http://www.computerworld.com/home/features.nsf/All/980907mgt2 
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a) Open Sources 
In a general sense, outsourcing provides necessary skills, services or 
products that the organization is either unable to develop, or based upon other 
criteria, may be more cost-effectively acquired elsewhere.  Typically, the tasks 
acquired externally are beyond the core interests of the organization. "Most 
companies will benefit by extending outsourcing first in less critical areas."212   
However, in the case of organizations considering development of a 
cyberterror capability, most must consider outsourcing critical skills and 
products because they simply are not available inside the organization.213  
Beyond deciding what to outsource, an organization must also consider the 
following criteria: security, availability, cost, timing and the reliability of the 
outsourcing endeavor.  
(1) Benefits of Outsourcing 
The benefits of outsourcing a cyberterror capability include timeliness, cost-
efficiency and security.  As discussed previously, many of the skills necessary 
to conduct complex-coordinated attacks can only be found outside 
conventional terrorist organizations.  Over time, assuming the organization 
intends to develop an internal capability, this will change. Until then, the 
fastest method of developing simple-unstructured, advanced-structured or 
complex-coordinated capabilities is via outsourcing.  Therefore, timeliness is 
an important issue in the consideration of outsourcing.  
Until recently, the main attraction to outsourcing was cost efficiencies.  
Savings of between 30 and 70 percent, can be obtained -- estimates vary -- 
largely because of the reduced staff costs.214  
Cost efficiencies of this kind may significantly benefit those organizations 
interested in developing a cyberterror capability. The banking industry 
provides an instructive example of successful outsourcing. Banks share some 
of the security concerns held by terrorist groups. Many banks have discovered 
that they cannot afford to keep up with the rapid pace of technological change 
on their own. Those banks have entered into contracts with third-party 
                                                 
212 Mintzberg and Quinn, p. 69. 
213 Of the groups presented in Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism only six were 
shown having any cyberterror capability.  All were at the simple-unstructured level according to 
our taxonomy. 
214 Jim Hayes, "Offshore IT providers ready for business after year 2000," IT Week 
Online, 3 May 1999. http://www.zdnet.co.uk/itweek/brief/1999/17/offshore/01.html. 
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processing companies that have developed as a result of consolidation and 
the pursuit of operating efficiencies within the financial services industry.  
Typical services offered by third-party processors include the following: 
• Data center management  
• Network management  
• Application development, management and maintenance  
• Check and statement processing  
• Mutual fund account processing  
• Electronic funds transfer  
• Core technology implementation and support.215 
These outsourcing efforts have been so successful that some banks have 
even outsourced whole departments. In fact, over 10 percent of checks and 
sixty-eight percent of credit card accounts are now processed by these third 
party technology providers.216  
Finally, outsourcing may augment security arrangements within terrorist 
organizations. Security equates to essentially two areas concerning terrorist 
organizations. Terrorist groups, of necessity, must remain a secret to both 
state and international counter-terror operations.  Security is also achieved by 
maintaining anonymity within the group.  In other words, the less constituents 
within the organization know and understand about the group overall, the 
better the security.  In the same way, many military secrets are kept secret by 
compartmentalizing.  Outsourcing is a creative means of compartmentalizing 
within the terrorist organization, assuming it is done properly.  Many of today’s 
network tunneling protocols support this arrangement. One of these protocols 
is the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP).217 PPTP allows organizations 
to use the Internet as a secure private network. Merrill-Lynch and TRM Inc., 
                                                 
215 Joanna Bers, "Outsourcing It All," Bank Systems, March 1996 as quoted in The 
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), Financial 
Services Risk Assessment Report (1997), p. 20. All of the NSTAC reports are available online 
at http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/NSTACreports.html 
216 NSTAC, Financial Services. The top five such service providers in the United States 
are ALLTEL Information Services Inc, BISYS, Electronic Data Systems Corp., Fiserv Inc., and 
M&I Data Services. 
217 American Research Group, Windows NT 4.0 Security (ARG, 1998), p. 10-2. 
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among others, have adopted this technique to protect some of their electronic 
interactions.218 
(2) Risks of Outsourcing 
Alternatively, the risks associated with acquiring a capability externally include 
reliability and availability.  Unlike most outsourcing issues, in the case of 
cyberterror, the terrorist organization is likely to seek all, or a majority of their 
cyber-capability, by a third party.  Can the organization depend on an outside 
source to provide these skills?  
The most successful outsourcers find it absolutely essential to have both close 
personal contact and rapport at the floor level and political clout and 
understanding with the supplier’s top management.219 
For obvious security reasons terrorist organizations seeking to outsource with 
legitimate vendors will be unable to maintain close contact and rapport.  
There are numerous security concerns when groups are forced to exercise 
outsourcing solutions. Because cyberterror at the advanced-structured and 
complex-coordinated levels is so difficult to understand it will be very difficult to 
conduct quality control assessments on an outside agent. The risk that their 
external source is either compromised or incompetent may be too great for a 
terrorist organization. Likewise, there is a certain amount of risk associated 
with the collection of hacker tools. It is possible that the terrorist group may get 
"hacked" while attempting to find tools. There have been incidents of hacker 
tools that contained Trojan horses directed against the tool user.220 The risk of 
being victimized on the Internet is certainly no greater than the risk of 
outsourcing to an untrustworthy or incompetent agent. 
The final issue with regard to outsourcing is availability. IT skills and 
equipment are disseminating globally.   IT skills are not confined to the 
Western world.221  Those skills that cannot be accessed in person, are 
increasingly accessible via communication media.   
                                                 
218 Microsoft press release retrieved from 
http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/commserve/solutions/default.asp. 
219 Mintzberg and Quinn, p. 72. 
220 Two examples include the programs Wartools and WinSATAN. 
221 Hayes, http://www.zdnet.co.uk/itweek/brief/1999/17/offshore/01.html. 
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Advances in global communications mean that projects can be coordinated in 
real time, with code and other collateral being transmitted backwards and 
forwards with ease.222   
However, can this form of remote access be trusted?  The same 
vulnerabilities associated with the Western infrastructure dependencies are 
likely to affect groups that rely on remote access.  
b) Sponsorship 
An alternative to externally acquiring a cyber capability from an open source 
vendor is through sponsorship.   
Sponsorship refers to the assistance a terrorist group receives from states, 
non-states or other terrorist organizations.  Assistance, in this case, may take 
the form of personnel, basing, training or resourcing.  It may be provided for a 
specific target, series of targets, a duration of time, or toward the development 
of a general capability. 
The U.S. State Department recognizes seven countries offering sponsorship 
to terrorist organizations.  These are Sudan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, and Cuba.  Additionally, Burma, Yemen, Egypt, Uganda, Eritrea and 
Ethiopa are identified as potential supporters.  Of the known sponsors, Iran 
poses the most serious threat.   
Iran continued to provide support to a variety of terrorist groups, including the 
Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Jihad, which oppose the 
Middle East peace process through violence.  Iran supports these groups with 
varying amounts of training, money, and/or weapons.223 
What may be more disturbing about Iran, however, is that it is likely 
developing a comprehensive Information Warfare capability as well.   
State sponsors with IW programs may benefit by sharing these capabilities 
with terrorist groups. By making these capabilities available to terrorist groups 
sponsors are provided a means of testing specific capabilities while also 
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maintaining deniability. Terrorist groups benefit in this arrangement by 
potentially gaining access to advanced-structured and complex-coordinated 
cyberterror capabilities.   
4. Summary of Implementation Options 
The key strategic issue in insourcing versus outsourcing is whether a company 
can achieve a maintainable competitive edge by performing an activity 
internally – usually cheaper, better, in a more timely fashion, or with some 
unique capability – on a continuing basis.224 
Assuming a terrorist group has sufficient resources, time, and at least 
fundamental technical expertise, one would expect a cyberterror capability to 
be developed internally. However, the technical skills necessary to 
accomplish advanced-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities are 
formidable, and even if they were attainable, the time it would take to cultivate 
these skills may be at odds with the group’s interests. Therefore, terrorist 
organizations may choose to acquire all or part of these capabilities externally.  
The options, in this case, are to acquire these functions from open source 
providers or to seek support from terrorist sponsors with IW programs.   
C. Organizational Contexts 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, we test the general implementation 
options presented above against four general organizational contexts. This 
analysis highlights whether certain organizational settings are more, or less, 
inclined to develop advanced-structured and complex-coordinated 
capabilities. The contexts presented are newly formed organizations, splinter 
groups, stable organizations and organizations in decline.   
a) Newly Formed Organizations 
Newly formed organizations operate in the entrepreneurial stage of 
organizational life cycle development. Organizations in the entrepreneurial 
stage are in their infancy.  They are informally structured, highly creative and 
share ambiguous goals.  Osama Bin Laden’s “Al Qaeda” is the closest 
example of an organization in this category.    
Newly formed organizations may be favorably inclined toward cyberterror 
under the following conditions:   
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• When relying on a “core competency” to break into the “competitive 
market” may seem attractive. 
• When they are flexible enough to have the option of fully developing a 
cyberterror capability, or to outsource specific needs. 
• When they do not need to rely on sponsorship for resourcing or 
development issues. 
Newly formed organizations may gain a competitive advantage by 
concentrating on a core competency. First, the organization maximizes 
returns on internal resources by concentrating on what it does best.  Second, 
fully developed core competencies provide flexible barriers to change in the 
organizations competitive environment by reducing risks, shortening 
development timelines and lowering investments. Third, perhaps most 
importantly, is the potential to fully utilize external suppliers, innovations and 
professional capabilities that may be prohibitively expensive or impossible to 
duplicate internally. 225  
Newly formed organizations may have the luxury of insourcing; i.e. not relying 
on a sponsor or other outsourcing option.  Simple-unstructured capabilities 
can be pursued internally with relative ease.  Given the skills and resources 
needed to develop a simple capability, newly formed organizations can readily 
access the resources and personnel necessary. The newly formed 
organization capable of overcoming the significant technical barriers to 
develop an advanced-structured or complex-coordinated capability internally 
will benefit from greater security and independence.  By developing the 
capability internally, the organization is neither forced to surrender its 
independence to an external sponsor, nor subject to the risks and 
unpredictable security of most outsourcing options.   
To implement advanced-structured or complex-coordinated capabilities 
however, may require a significantly greater expenditure of time and 
resources than a newly formed organization may otherwise have available.   
The decision to implement these capabilities internally must be met with an 
acceptance that it will take significantly longer, cost significantly more, and 
ultimately, may jeopardize the group’s transition to later stages of 
development.  To mitigate these factors, the organization may conceive an 
implementation strategy that involves outsourcing specific functions. 
Newly formed organizations may outsource for the following reasons:   
                                                 
225  Mintzberg and Quinn, p. 64. 
  105
• The organization actively develops a capability internally but is far from 
able to conduct any sort of credible attack. 
• The organization chooses temporarily to outsource advanced-
structured and complex-coordinated capabilities from a sponsor, other 
terrorist organization, hacker group or TCO.   
• Outsourcing is used because it allows the organization to claim a 
capability long before it is able to develop one internally.   
Outsourcing may be done in support of a single or a finite number of 
operations.  The benefit of outsourcing is to access quickly the advanced-
structured and complex-coordinated capabilities that would take much longer 
to develop internally. However, this benefit must be weighed against the 
security risks of acquiring the capability externally addressed in previous 
sections.   
To summarize, newly formed organizations are suitably inclined to pursue 
cyberterror through internal development or external acquisition.  They will 
likely attempt to develop core competencies internally, while acquiring less 
essential cyber activities from outside vendors. It is possible, however unlikely, 
that newly formed groups would seek to develop advanced-structured or 
complex-coordinated capabilities with a sponsor; because this would 
unnecessarily require them to surrender their independence and some level of 
anonymity. 
b) Splinter Groups 
Splinter groups feature some of the characteristics of an organization in the 
entrepreneurial stage of development, as well as characteristics of a stable 
organization.   The Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI), an Egyptian Islamist group 
responsible for the murders of 58 tourists and four Egyptians in November 
1997, is an example of a recently “splintered” terrorist group.  
Splinter groups are inclined to implement a cyberterror strategy through 
external acquisition, for the following reasons. 
• They must be willing to accept disruption as a suitable substitute for 
destruction in pursuit of a cyberterror strategy. 
• They must rely on external acquisitions or sponsorship to provide 
necessary advanced-structured or complex-coordinated capabilities. 
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• They are inherently predisposed to a given set of cultural and 
organizational constraints that other newly formed or stable 
organizations are not, due to the nature of their formation. 
• Most often, they leave their former organizations in support of a 
specific agenda, typically violent in nature.   
Splinter groups are unlikely to engage in cyberterror.  Simple-unstructured 
cyberterror (hacking, defacing web sites, etc.) does not provide a group 
psychological rewards comparable to the violent acts traditionally seen from 
splinter groups. Advanced-structured and complex-coordinated cyberterror 
may produce the level of destruction or disruption to meet the 
organizational/psychological desires of the splinter group. However, given the 
technical barriers associated with pursuing advanced-structured and complex-
coordinated capabilities, it is unlikely that splinter organizations will be able to 
perpetrate disruptive attacks without outside assistance.   
This means that if they undertake to develop a cyberterror capability, splinter 
groups will likely pursue an outsourcing strategy because it provides 
immediate access to advanced-structured, and possibly complex-coordinated, 
capabilities. Splinter organizations are more likely to acquire these capabilities 
from a sponsor than through other legitimate forms.  In the case of splinter 
organizations, likely sponsors include other terrorist organizations, non-state 
actors, or states such as Iran.  
Assuming the technical barriers can be overcome, splinter organizations must 
also overcome their ingrained cultural and political obstacles to pursuing any 
form of cyberterror.  The set of norms, experiences and accepted 
relationships that exist within splinter groups are often disincentives for 
adopting cyberterror.  Typically, these groups share a common belief that 
increased violence and action are necessary means of coercion.  This belief is 
often the driving force behind their group’s movement away from 
organizations perceived to be less aggressive.   
To summarize, this organizational context facilitates the pursuit of cyberterror, 
but only if disruption is accepted as suitable feedback, and the advanced-
structured and complex-coordinated capabilities necessary to accomplish 
mass disruption, can be acquired externally. 
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c) Stable Organizations 
Stable organizations have a history of development that includes some or all of 
the following organization life cycle stages: collectivity, formalization and 
control or elaboration. Organizations in the collectivity stage characteristically 
have informal structures, clear goals, and high personal commitment. 
Organizations in the formalization stage characteristically have stabile 
structures, formalized activities, and conservative decision-making. 
Organizations in the elaboration stage perform diverse activities, search for 
growth opportunities, practice decentralized decision-making, and are 
structurally more complex. Hamas, Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 
Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA), Hezbollah, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional 
(ELN) are all examples of stable organizations.   
Stable organizations are inclined to pursue a cyberterror capability for the 
following reasons.  
• They enjoy stable funding, practice thorough training and have a 
regular supply of personnel (whether indigenous or provided by a 
sponsor). 
• They can more easily add cyberterror to other existing “specialties.”  
• They are procedurally efficient. 
• They are more protected against adversity in the environment 
although, they may be slow to respond to change.  
Stable organizations enjoy the benefits of strong support.  This support 
extends to funding, basing, training, equipment and personnel. Whether these 
areas are indigenous to the organization or provided by an outside sponsor 
depends upon the organization in question.226  However, the fact that these 
are available broadens the scope of what the organization can pursue.  
Having a strong support base provides the would-be cyberterrorist with the 
flexibility to pursue traditional forms, protection against emerging challenges 
and a relative sense of independence.  
Stable organizations may be motivated to pursue cyberterrorism in 
conjunction with other traditional forms of terrorism.  Appending cyberterror to 
traditional terrorism is a form of “related diversification.” Related diversification, 
if done properly, benefits the organization by providing operational and 
                                                 
226 This report is not designed to address each organization.  Instead we are trying to 
identify why these support relationships exist and how the organization benefits. 
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administrative synergies, and economies of scale with other traditional terrorist 
functions.227 A symbiosis with traditional terrorist methods and cyberterror 
attack can occur.  An organization begins to integrate the cyberterror attack 
capability into the operation of the organization.  With this introduction of a 
new terrorist ‘tool’ the organization will develop internal processes and control 
mechanisms to manage the new ‘operational’ capability.   This new 
complementary operational capability is not likely to diffuse throughout the 
terrorist organization though.  For example, each terrorist operative within the 
organization would not be trained in cyberterror attack.  The capability would 
reside within a cyber cell whose activity would be coordinated to support a 
traditional operation.228  Similar to the way terrorist organizations value skilled 
bomb-makers and as previously noted in out section on task specialization 
(chapter four): 
Within a terrorist organization, a distinction is often made between the 
bombmaker, who never goes near a target and whose skills are carefully 
preserved, and the other operatives who risk arrest and premature detonations 
while planting the devices.229  
The ability to use secure e-mail and construct anonymous web pages are 
examples of ways the organization may improve command, control and 
communications within the organization’s cells.  These abilities may grow and 
provide the necessary capability to conduct simple-unstructured cyberterror 
attacks such as “smurfing.”  However ineffective as coercive instruments, 
simple-unstructured attacks may also serve as useful advertising and 
propaganda tools for the traditional terrorist.  
                                                 
227 Brian K. Boyd, Sydney Finkelstein, Harry Barkema and Luis Gomez-Mejia, 
"Matching Diversification and Compensation Strategies," New Managerial Mindsets:  
Organizational Transformation and Strategy Implementation, ed. Michael A.. Hitt, Joan E. 
Ricart i Costa and Robert D. Nixon (New York: Wiley, 1998), p. 170 and Mintzberg and Quinn, 
p. 717. 
228 Drawing from Henry Mintzberg, Structures in Fives – Designing Effective 
Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  Prentice Hall, 1993), we propose that the new 
(advanced-structured capable) cyber cell within a previously traditional terrorist organization 
most likely will reside within the organization's support structure and not within the operating 
core where a number of levels of management would reside between the cyber capability and 
the organization’s strategic apex (leadership).    
229 Sommerville, p. 217. 
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In February 1995 supporters of the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional 
(EZLN) posted messages on several Internet news groups alleging that the 
Mexican Army was subjecting villages in Chiapas to random airborne 
bombardment, killing unarmed civilians in large numbers.  However, 
investigative journalists who visited the area were unable to find any evidence 
to confirm the reported incidents.230 
Stable organizations may benefit from the pursuit of cyberterrorism in another 
way.  The redundancies that may be realized with the development of a 
cyberterror capability will provide organizational “slack.”231  These 
redundancies protect the organization from sudden changes in their 
environment.  Redundancies are also a cost-effective way of supporting two 
divergent capabilities, for the price of one.  
Stable organizations are likely to benefit from the added efficiencies and 
unintended consequences that result from embracing IT.  The internet, 
cellular communications and facsimile all combine to enhance distributed, 
difficult to trace communications traffic among and between terrorist 
organizations, their members and their sponsors.  The devices used to initially 
support traditional terrorism administratively may some day be used to 
conduct operations in the form of cyberterror attack. 
To summarize, stable organizations are likely to pursue cyberterrorism 
because it can be easily appended to other existing specialties, they will enjoy 
enhanced performance organizationally, and it protects them from adversity in 
their environment. 
d) Organizations in Decline 
Organizations in their decline realize a significant loss of personnel while 
suffering decreased demand from their competitive market.  These 
organizations are on the verge of extinction, or at least irrelevance.  Abu Nidal, 
Islamic Brotherhood and the Red Brigades are examples of organizations in 
this category.   
Of all the categories reviewed, organizations in decline are least capable of 
cultivating a cyberterror capability for the following reasons. 
                                                 
230 Jane’s Information Group Limited, World Insurgency and Terrorism (UK:  DPA 
Publishing, 1998). 
231 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 4th ed. (New York:  The Free Press, 
1997). 
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• They tend to rely on existing methods rather than other, more creative 
approaches.  
• They look toward increasing violence to reverse their growing 
ineffectiveness as an organization. 
• They do not have the benefit of time to develop advanced-structured or 
complex-coordinated capabilities and it is unlikely that external sources 
would provide these capabilities. 
• Although most likely to seek sponsor support to develop a capability, it 
is unlikely to be in the best interest of a sponsor to invest in a declining 
group. 
Organizations in decline, rather than trying something new, tend to rely on 
previously used methods.  The historical trend among those groups that go 
into decline has been both to rely increasingly on previously successful 
attacks as well as to increase their frequency.  During decline, the terrorist 
group is at its most dangerous.  The group needs to get back in the game.  To 
do so, publicity and headlines are necessary.232 
Similarly, organizations in decline tend to rely on increased violence 
(hyperviolence) in a final effort to regain political coerciveness.  As discussed 
earlier, the most likely results of cyberterror range from moderately disruptive 
at the simple-unstructured level to massively disruptive, and perhaps 
moderately destructive, at the advanced-structured and complex-coordinated 
levels.  To date however, neither mass disruption, nor destruction has been 
achieved in the realm of cyberterror. 
Finally, organizations in decline are in a race against the clock.  Declining 
organizations have neither the time to consider nor to implement new 
strategies that may revive their cause (assuming they could accomplish 
disruptive or destructive effects).  Assuming an organization in decline is 
interested in pursuing a cyberterror attack, it would be forced to acquire this 
capability externally. 
Unlike newly formed organizations and splinter groups, declining 
organizations are not likely to benefit by external acquisitions.  First, 
organizations in their decline are unlikely to have the finances needed to 
acquire the personnel and hardware from an external source needed to 
pursue advanced-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities.  Secondly, 
the benefits of sponsoring an organization in decline may not offset the 
                                                 
232 Lockett, p. 49. 
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inherent risks of being associated with this group.  As the incentives for group 
participation deteriorate, members exit in pursuit of other personal interests.233 
Any sensitive information concerning sponsor relationships or specific cyber-
capabilities that the group may have attempted to develop before its 
dissolution may therefore be subject to public disclosure.    
To summarize, organizations in decline are less likely to implement a 
cyberterror strategy.  They are not likely to accept the disruptive effects made 
possible by cyberterror attacks in exchange for repetitive, and violent, 
traditional acts.  They are also less likely to benefit from external acquisition 
options because of the inherent risks of associating with an organization 
dangerously near extinction. 
D. Conclusions 
By testing the general development options presented earlier in this chapter 
against each of the four general organizational contexts above we now have a 
sense of which organizations are more likely to pursue advanced-structured 
and complex-coordinated cyberterror capabilities.  We also have a general 
understanding of how these groups may develop these capabilities.  The 
following table summarizes these results. 
                                                 
233 Lockett, p. 50. 
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Newly Formed √ √  
Splinter Group  √ √ 
Stable √ √ √ 
Organizations in 
Decline 
  √ 
Table 6-4: Development Summary 
• Newly formed organizations will likely attempt to develop a cyber 
capability internally while acquiring less essential activities externally. It 
is possible they will develop advanced-structured or complex-
coordinated capabilities with a sponsor. 
• Splinter groups will pursue cyberterror if disruption is accepted as 
suitable feedback, and the advanced-structured and complex-
coordinated capabilities necessary to accomplish mass disruption, can 
be acquired externally. 
• Stable organizations are likely to pursue cyberterrorism as an adjunct 
to other existing specialties. 
• Organizations in decline are unlikely to implement a cyberterror 
strategy unless supported by a sponsor.   
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VII. Conclusions 
Threat analysts warn us of our vulnerabilities yet overlook our strengths.234 
A. Overview 
This report takes a balanced approach to analyzing the threats associated 
with cyberterrorism. This analysis, based upon organizational long-range 
planning, reviewed the internal and external factors that influence a terrorist 
group’s strategic decision processes.  It consisted of an assessment of the 
operational environment, taken from the perspective of a terrorist 
organization.  This was undertaken by reviewing the strategic and 
organizational incentives for pursuing the opportunities identified in the 
previous analysis.  Next, an analysis of what was required to pursue 
cyberterrorism was done, also from the perspective of a terrorist organization.  
Finally, a review of the options for developing a capability were presented. 
The first step of the process was to determine if there was an opportunity in 
the environment that traditional terrorist organizations could leverage.  We 
concluded that the future will likely feature a continuing utility for traditional 
terrorism, as well as facilitate the pursuit of cyberterrorism.   
The second step called for an assessment of whether this identified 
opportunity was consistent with the strategic interests, group ideologies and 
the other personal and organizational incentives held by traditional terrorist 
groups.  We concluded that a minority of traditional terrorist organizations are 
likely to pursue cyberterrorism. 
The next step was to determine whether it is feasible  for an organization with 
little or no existing cyber-capabilities to seek cyberterror.  We first presented a 
generic assessment of what an organization must do to produce simple-
unstructured, advanced-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities. This 
took into account the individual and organizational technical skills and 
resources necessary to achieve each level. 
This assessment was followed by an analysis of the general implementation 
options that could be used to develop a desired capability.  We concluded that 
the technical barriers to entry, although insignificant at the simple-unstructured 
level, are significant for advanced-structured and complex-coordinated levels.  
Additionally, organizations generally have two implementation options – 
                                                 
234 Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future, p. 205 
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outsource or develop a desired capability internally.  However, this decision is 
largely dependent upon the context of the organization (newly formed, splinter 
group, stable or declining).  
For the near-term future, advanced-structured and complex-coordinated 
cyberterrorism will likely be achieved by only a few terrorist organizations. The 
most dangerous eventuality will likely come from a newly formed, religious 
group.  However, we see this as a long-term threat.  A more likely, near-term 
threat may be posed by stable, new age terrorist groups. Several less 
dramatic threats at the simple-unstructured and advanced-structured levels 
were also identified in this analysis that may merit further consideration.  
We can expect cyberterror to be developed in iterative stages.  Initially, 
support activities will precede attacks because the Internet and other 
communications media are readily available.  The Zapatistas and Tamil Tigers 
provide evidence of simple-unstructured capabilities already existing.  Simple-
unstructured capabilities – support and attack - will continue to be the order of 
the day until more advanced-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities 
have had time to develop (either internally or through sponsor programs).  At 
first, cyberterror is likely to accompany other traditional forms of terrorism. 
However, as complex-coordinated capabilities are developed, it will likely exist 
independent from traditional terror.  When cyberterrorism reaches this point, it 
will be in its most dangerous and difficult form to defend against. 
Our greatest fear is the development of a capability at the edge of all the 
areas we’ve considered.  In other words, a group formed specifically to 
capitalize on the most destabilizing aspects of the future environment using a 
combination of conventional and unconventional practices in an effort to 
develop the most creative, organic and well-led organizations yet conceived.  
We have already encountered hierarchies and tomorrow’s virtual teams.  Fred 
Cohen’s Anatomy of a Successful Sophisticated Attack presents a scenario 
depicting the creative and destructive potential of these highly organic 
organizations.235  What is troubling about Cohen’s account is that it is based 
upon attacks that have already occurred.   
An organization that is formed in pursuit of a complex-coordinated capability, 
but is not limited to using this capability remotely, is more likely, yet equally as 
dangerous. An organization that: 
• Projects traditional terrorist operatives over-the-horizon that are skilled 
in infiltrations, shootings, bombings and barricades; 
                                                 
235 Cohen,  "Anatomy of a Successful Attack," http://al.net/journal/netsec/9901.html.   
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• Communicates using a suite of IT devices capable of reaching back to 
a clandestine command and control center; 
• Is supported by nontraditional terrorist personnel capable of 
developing, using, and remotely orchestrating the most insidious and 
complex cyberterror attacks imaginable, and; 
• Is coordinated by a new breed of terrorist leader who demonstrates 
both competence and creativity.   
This form of cyberterror, which relies on gaining physical access, enhanced 
communications, sophisticated hacking techniques and thorough target 
intelligence is likely to present the greatest threat to our infrastructure in the 
mid-term future (i.e., a decade out).   
B. Recommendations for Future Research 
This report suggests starting points for several other research efforts.  The 
first calls for an application of current intelligence data on known and 
suspected terrorist organizations and their sponsors to the framework 
presented here.  The database available to the authors of this report was a 
fraction of what is otherwise available to the DIA, CIA and the DOD.  
Optimally, one or all of these agencies may elect to cull the necessary data, 
then analyze it using the framework presented in this study. 
This framework is a useful tool for both profiling terrorist groups and 
establishing a cyberterror database.  Using the typologies established in this 
study, the intelligence community now has a useful starting point for 
establishing and maintaining group profiles according to simple-unstructured, 
advanced-structured and complex-coordinated cyberterror capabilities.  
Similar to existing terrorist databases, this database will consolidate raw 
intelligence data from distributed sources and categorize this information 
according to the categories described in this report.  
As noted in the introduction, this report focused on terrorist organizations 
outside the United States.  To be both accurate and thorough, it must also be 
applied to domestic terrorist groups as well.  This is not to say that the 
Defense Intelligence Agency should be made responsible for this effort, 
though. It can’t.  An arrangement should be made to allow the appropriate 
agency, or interagency group, to apply this framework to domestic groups and 
then share these results with both federal and state agencies. 
Additionally, an effort must be made to apply future data to this framework.  In 
this case the data must be interpolated from one, or several, forms of future 
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forecasts. Examples of these include assumption-based planning and 
scenarios. The point here is not to decide which form of future planning model 
to use, but rather to use the model to develop a general set of data that may 
also be applied to this framework.  In other words, to apply the framework to 
an environmental context that is 15-20 years in the future. Although 
unpredictable now, this future context will likely present a new set of 
assumptions and technical possibilities that today may not even seem 
feasible.  However, to be successful this effort to ‘run’ future data through the 
framework must first consider the need for model revision.  In other words, the 
framework developed in this study is only applicable to the data available 
today.  Analysts must be wary of any indicators in the future that may suggest 
the need to revise the model. 
Finally, there are two remaining points that should be considered regarding 
future research. Because of its simplicity, this framework is generally 
applicable to a number of intelligence problems.  One example is to apply this 
framework to an analysis of terrorism and WMD use. In this case, the need for 
revision must again be considered. Second, although not a goal at its 
inception, this project can be viewed as a catalyst for the development of an 
intelligence threat assessment and early warning system that can be shared 
by all counter-terror agencies. In this way, we may begin to grapple with the 
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Appendix B –  Bi-Lateral Extradition Treaties 
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Appendix C –  UN Membership As Of July 1999  
With the admission of Palau, there are now 185 Member States of the United 
Nations. The Member States and the dates on which they joined the Organization 
are listed below: 
1. Afghanistan -- (19 Nov. 1946) 
2. Albania -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
3. Algeria -- (8 Oct. 1962) 
4. Andorra -- (28 July 1993) 
5. Angola -- (1 Dec. 1976) 
6. Antigua and Barbuda -- (11 Nov. 1981) 
7. Argentina -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
8. Armenia -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
9. Australia -- (1 Nov. 1945) 
10. Austria-- (14 Dec. 1955) 
11. Azerbaijan -- (9 Mar. 1992) 
12. Bahamas -- (18 Sep. 1973) 
13. Bahrain -- (21 Sep. 1971) 
14. Bangladesh -- (17 Sep. 1974) 
15. Barbados -- (9 Dec. 1966) 
16. Belarus -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
17. Belgium -- (27 Dec. 1945) 
18. Belize -- (25 Sep. 1981) 
19. Benin -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
20. Bhutan -- (21 Sep. 1971) 
21. Bolivia -- (14 Nov. 1945) 
22. Bosnia and Herzegovina -- (22 May 
1992) 
23. Botswana -- (17 Oct. 1966) 
24. Brazil -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
25. Brunei Darussalam -- (21 Sep. 1984) 
26. Bulgaria -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
27. Burkina Faso -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
28. Burundi -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
29. Cambodia -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
30. Cameroon -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
31. Canada -- (9 Nov. 1945) 
32. Cape Verde -- (16 Sep. 1975) 
33. Central African Republic -- (20 Sep. 
1960) 
34. Chad -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
35. Chile -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
36. China -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
37. Colombia -- (5 Nov. 1945) 
38. Comoros -- (12 Nov. 1975) 
39. Congo -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
40. Costa Rica -- (2 Nov. 1945) 
41. Côte d'Ivoire -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
42. Croatia -- (22 May 1992) 
43. Cuba -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
44. Cyprus -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
45. Czech Republic -- (19 Jan. 1993) 
46. Democratic People's Republic of Korea -- 
(17 Sep. 1991) 
47. Democratic Republic of the Congo -- (20 
Sep. 1960) 
48. Denmark -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
49. Djibouti -- (20 Sep. 1977) 
50. Dominica -- (18 Dec. 1978) 
51. Dominican Republic -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
52. Ecuador -- (21 Dec. 1945) 
53. Egypt -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
54. El Salvador -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
55. Equatorial Guinea -- (12 Nov. 1968) 
56. Eritrea -- (28 May 1993) 
57. Estonia -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
58. Ethiopia -- (13 Nov. 1945) 
59. Fiji -- (13 Oct. 1970) 
60. Finland -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
61. France -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
62. Gabon -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
63. Gambia -- (21 Sep. 1965) 
64. Georgia -- (31 July 1992) 
65. Germany -- (18 Sep. 1973) 
66. Ghana -- (8 Mar. 1957) 
67. Greece -- (25 Oct. 1945) 
68. Grenada -- (17 Sep. 1974) 
69. Guatemala -- (21 Nov. 1945) 
70. Guinea -- (12 Dec. 1958) 
71. Guinea-Bissau -- (17 Sep. 1974) 
72. Guyana -- (20 Sep. 1966) 
73. Haiti -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
74. Honduras -- (17 Dec. 1945) 
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75. Hungary -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
76. Iceland -- (19 Nov. 1946) 
77. India -- (30 Oct. 1945) 
78. Indonesia -- (28 Sep. 1950) 
79. Iran (Islamic Republic of)-- (24 Oct. 
1945) 
80. Iraq -- (21 Dec. 1945) 
81. Ireland -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
82. Israel -- (11 May 1949) 
83. Italy -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
84. Jamaica -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
85. Japan -- (18 Dec. 1956) 
86. Jordan -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
87. Kazakhstan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
88. Kenya -- (16 Dec. 1963) 
89. Kuwait -- (14 May 1963) 
90. Kyrgyzstan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
91. Lao People's Democratic Republic -- (14 
Dec. 1955) 
92. Latvia -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
93. Lebanon -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
94. Lesotho -- (17 Oct. 1966) 
95. Liberia -- (2 Nov. 1945) 
96. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -- (14 Dec. 
1955) 
97. Liechtenstein -- (18 Sep. 1990) 
98. Lithuania -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
99. Luxembourg -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
100. Madagascar -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
101. Malawi -- (1 Dec. 1964) 
102. Malaysia -- (17 Sep. 1957) 
103. Maldives -- (21 Sep. 1965) 
104. Mali -- (28 Sep. 1960) 
105. Malta -- (1 Dec. 1964) 
106. Marshall Islands -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
107. Mauritania -- (7 Oct. 1961) 
108. Mauritius -- (24 Apr. 1968) 
109. Mexico -- (7 Nov. 1945) 
110. Micronesia (Federated States of)-- 
(17 Sep. 1991) 
111. Monaco -- (28 May 1993) 
112. Mongolia -- (27 Oct. 1961) 
113. Morocco -- (12 Nov. 1956) 
114. Mozambique -- (16 Sep. 1975) 
115. Myanmar -- (19 Apr. 1948) 
116. Namibia -- (23 Apr. 1990) 
117. Nepal -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
118. Netherlands -- (10 Dec. 1945) 
119. New Zealand -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
120. Nicaragua -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
121. Niger -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
122. Nigeria -- (7 Oct. 1960) 
123. Norway -- (27 Nov. 1945) 
124. Oman -- (7 Oct. 1971) 
125. Pakistan -- (30 Sep. 1947) 
126. Palau -- (15 Dec. 1994) 
127. Panama -- (13 Nov. 1945) 
128. Papua New Guinea -- (10 Oct. 1975) 
129. Paraguay -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
130. Peru -- (31 Oct. 1945) 
131. Philippines -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
132. Poland -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
133. Portugal -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
134. Qatar -- (21 Sep. 1971) 
135. Republic of Korea -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
136. Republic of Moldova -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
137. Romania -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
138. Russian Federation -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
139. Rwanda -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
140. Saint Kitts and Nevis -- (23 Sep. 1983) 
141. Saint Lucia -- (18 Sep. 1979) 
142. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -- (16 
Sep. 1980) 
143. Samoa -- (15 Dec. 1976) 
144. San Marino -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
145. Sao Tome and Principe -- (16 Sep. 
1975) 
146. Saudi Arabia -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
147. Senegal -- (28 Sep. 1960) 
148. Seychelles -- (21 Sep. 1976) 
149. Sierra Leone -- (27 Sep. 1961) 
150. Singapore -- (21 Sep. 1965) 
151. Slovakia -- (19 Jan. 1993) 
152. Slovenia -- (22 May 1992) 
153. Solomon Islands -- (19 Sep. 1978) 
154. Somalia -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
155. South Africa -- (7 Nov. 1945) 
156. Spain -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
157. Sri Lanka -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
158. Sudan -- (12 Nov. 1956) 
159. Suriname -- (4 Dec. 1975) 
160. Swaziland -- (24 Sep. 1968) 
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161. Sweden -- (19 Nov. 1946) 
162. Syrian Arab Republic -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
163. Tajikistan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
164. Thailand -- (16 Dec. 1946) 
165. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -- (8 Apr. 1993) 
166. Togo -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
167. Trinidad and Tobago -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
168. Tunisia -- (12 Nov. 1956) 
169. Turkey -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
170. Turkmenistan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
171. Uganda -- (25 Oct. 1962) 
172. Ukraine -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
173. United Arab Emirates -- (9 Dec. 1971) 
174. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
175. United Republic of Tanzania -- (14 Dec. 1961) 
176. United States of America -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
177. Uruguay -- (18 Dec. 1945) 
178. Uzbekistan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
179. Vanuatu -- (15 Sep. 1981) 
180. Venezuela -- (15 Nov. 1945) 
181. Viet Nam -- (20 Sep. 1977) 
182. Yemen -- (30 Sep. 1947) 
183. Yugoslavia -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
184. Zambia -- (1 Dec. 1964) 
185. Zimbabwe -- (25 Aug. 1980) 
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